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MIND
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OF
PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
EDITED BY
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WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF PROF. SIR F. C. BARTLETT AND PROF. C. D. BROAD

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BY R. M. HARE

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often get across one another. I will call them respectively
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inaccurate for the analysts are in fact often studying the same
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' ordinary-language ' variety, have to answer). The source of the
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of which we want to say that we *know* that they are so—or even
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I.—PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOVERIES[1]

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I

THERE are two groups of philosophers in the world at present who often get across one another. I will call them respectively ' analysts ' and ' metaphysicians ', though this is strictly speaking inaccurate—for the analysts are in fact often studying the same old problems of metaphysics in their own way and with sharper tools, and the metaphysicians of an older style have no exclusive or proprietary right to the inheritance of Plato and Aristotle who started the business. Now metaphysicians often complain of analysts that, instead of doing *ontology*, studying *being qua being* (or for that matter *qua* anything else), they study only *words*. My purpose in this paper is to diagnose one (though only one) of the uneasinesses which lie at the back of this common complaint (a complaint which analysts of all kinds, and not only those of the ' ordinary-language ' variety, have to answer). The source of the uneasiness seems to be this : there are some things in philosophy of which we want to say that we *know* that they are so—or even that we can *discover* or *come to know* that they are so—as contrasted with merely deciding arbitrarily that they are to be so ; and yet we do not seem to know that these things are so by any observation of empirical fact. I refer to such things as that an object cannot both have and not have the same quality. These

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things used to be described as metaphysical truths ; now it is
more customary, at any rate among analysts, to express them
metalinguistically, for example by saying that propositions of
the form ' *p* and not *p* ' are analytically false. An analyst who
says this is bound to go on to say what he means by such ex-
pressions as ' analytically false ' ; and the account which he
gives will usually be of the following general sort : to say that a
proposition is analytically false is to say that it is false in virtue
of the meaning or use which we give to the words used to express
it, and of nothing else. But this way of speaking is not likely to
mollify the metaphysician ; indeed, he might be pardoned if he
said that it made matters worse. For if philosophical statements
are statements about how words are *actually* used by a certain
set of people, then their truth will be contingent—whereas what
philosophers seem to be after are necessary truths : but if they
are expressions of a certain philosopher's *decision* to use words
in a certain way, then it seems inappropriate to speak of our
knowing that they are true. The first of these alternatives would
seem to make the findings of philosophy contingent upon lin-
guistic practices which might be other than they are ; the second
would seem to turn philosophy into the making of fiats or con-
ventions about how a particular writer or group of writers is
going to use terms—and this does not sound as if it would provide
answers to the kind of questions that people used to be interested
in, like ' Can an object both have and not have the same quality,
and if not why not ? ' This is why to speak about ' decisions '
(Henle, *op. cit.* pp. 753 ff.) or about ' rules ' which are ' neither
true nor false ' (Körner, *op. cit.* pp. 760 ff.) will hardly assuage
the metaphysician's legitimate anxiety, although both of these
terms are likely to figure in any successful elucidation of the
problem.

It is worth pointing out that this dilemma which faces the
analyst derives, historically, from what used to be a principal
tenet of the analytical movement in its early days—the view
that all meaningful statements are either analytic (in the sense
of analytically true or false) or else empirical. From this view
it seems to follow that the statements of the philosopher must
be either empirical or analytic ; otherwise we can only call them
meaningless, or else not really statements at all but some other
kind of talk. Many analysts failed to see the difficulty of their
position because of a confusion which it is easy to make. It is
easy to suppose that the proposition that such and such another
proposition is analytically true, or false (the proposition of the
analyst) is itself analytic, and therefore fits readily into one of

the approved categories of meaningful discourse. But, though it may *perhaps* be true, it is not *obviously* true that to say ' Propositions of the form " *p* and not *p* " are analytically false ' is to make an analytically true statement ; for is not this a statement about how the words ' and not ' are used ? And is it analytically true that they are used in this way ? There are conflicting temptations to call the statement analytic, and empirical, and neither. The early analysts therefore ought to have felt more misgivings than most of them did feel about the status of their own activities ; and this might have made them more sympathetic towards the metaphysicians, whose activities are of just the same dubious character (neither clearly empirical nor clearly analytic).

This is not to say that the matter has not been widely discussed since that time ; and indeed there are certain well-known simple remedies for the perplexity. But I am not convinced that the disease is yet fully understood ; and until it is, metaphysicians and analysts will remain at cross purposes. It is a pity that the early analysts, in general, tended to follow the lead, not of Wittgenstein, but of Carnap. Wittgenstein was moved by doubts on this point among others to describe his own propositions as ' nonsensical ' (*Tractatus*, 6.54) ; but Carnap wrote, ' [Wittgenstein] seems to me to be inconsistent in what he does. He tells us that one cannot state philosophical propositions and that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent ; and then instead of keeping silent, he writes a whole philosophical book ' (*Philosophy and Logical Syntax*, p. 37), thus indicating that he did not take Wittgenstein's misgivings as seriously as he should have. At any rate, the time has surely come when metaphysicians ought to co-operate in attacking this problem, which touches them both so nearly.

Once it is realised that the propositions of the analyst are not obviously analytic, a great many other possibilities suggest themselves. Are they, for example, empirical, as Professor Braithwaite has recently affirmed ?[1] Or are some of them analytic and some empirical. Or are they sometimes ambiguous, so that the writer has no clear idea which of these two things (if either) they are ? Or are they, not statements at all, but resolves, stipulations or rules ? Or, lastly, are they (to use an old label which has little if any explanatory force) synthetic *a priori* ? These possibilities all require to be investigated.

This paper is intended to serve only as a prolegomenon to such an investigation. It takes the form of an analogy. If we could

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[1] *An empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief*, p. 11.

find a type of situation in which the same sort of difficulty arises, but in a much clearer and simpler form, we might shed some light on the main problem. In choosing a much simpler model, we run the risk of over-simplification ; but this is a risk which has to be taken if we are to make any progress at all. If we are careful to notice the differences, as well as the similarities, between the model and that of which it is a model, we shall be in less danger of misleading ourselves.

The suggestion which I am going tentatively to put forward might be described as a demythologised version of Plato's doctrine of *anamnesis*. Plato says that finding out the definition of a concept is like remembering or recalling. If this is correct, some of the difficulties of describing the process are accounted for. To remember (whether a fact, or how to do something) is not (or at any rate not obviously) to make an empirical discovery ; yet it is not to make a decision either. So there may be here a way of escaping from the analyst's dilemma.

II

Suppose that we are sitting at dinner and discussing how a certain dance is danced. Let us suppose that the dance in question is one requiring the participation of a number of people —say one of the Scottish reels. And let us suppose that we have a dispute about what happens at a particular point in the dance ; and that, in order to settle it, we decide to dance the dance after dinner and find out. We have to imagine that there is among us a sufficiency of people who know, or say they know, how to dance the dance—in the sense of ' know ' in which one may know how to do something without being able to *say* how it is done.

When the dance reaches the disputed point everybody may dance as he thinks the dance should go ; or they may all agree to dance according to the way that one party to the dispute says it should go. Whichever of these two courses they adopt, there are several things which may, in theory, happen. The first is, chaos—people bumping into one another so that it becomes impossible, as we should say, for the dance to proceed. The second is that there is no chaos, but a dance is danced which, though unchaotic, is not the dance which they were trying to dance—not, for example, the dance called ' the eightsome reel '. The third possibility is that the dance proceeds correctly. The difficulty is to say how we tell these three eventualities from one another, and whether the difference is empirical. It may be thought that, whether empirical or not, the difference is obvious ; but I do not find it so.

It might be denied that there is any empirical difference between the first eventuality (chaos) and the second (wrong dance). For, it might be said, we could have a dance which consisted in people bumping into one another. In Michael Tippett's opera *The Midsummer Marriage* the character called the He-Ancient is asked reproachfully by a modern why his dancers never dance a new dance : in reply, he says ' I will show you a new dance ' and immediately trips one of the dancers up, so that he falls on the ground and bruises himself. The implication of this manoeuvre is the Platonic one that innovations always lead to chaos—that there is only one right way of dancing (the one that we have learnt from our elders and betters) and that all deviations from this are just wrong. But whether or not we accept this implication, the example perhaps shows that we *could* call *any* series of movements a dance. If, however, we started to call it a dance, we should have to stop calling it chaos. The terms ' dance ' and ' chaos ' mutually exclude one another ; but although we cannot call any series of movements *both* chaos *and* dance, we can call any series of movements *either* chaos *or* dance ; so the problem of distinguishing dance from chaos remains.

The first and the second eventualities (chaos and wrong dance) are alike in this, that, whether or not we can say that *any* series of movements is *a* dance, we cannot say that *any* series of movements is *the* dance (*viz.* the eightsome reel) about the correct way of dancing which we were arguing. It might therefore be claimed that, although it may be difficult to say what counts as *a* dance, and thus distinguish between the first and second eventualities, we can at least distinguish easily between either of them and the third (right dance). And so we can, *in theory* ; for obviously both the wrong dance, and chaos or no dance at all, are distinct from the right dance. That is to say, the terms of my classification of things that might happen make it analytic to say that these three things that might happen are different things. But all distinctions are not empirical distinctions (for example evaluative distinctions are not) ; and the question is rather, How, empirically (if it is done empirically) do we tell, of these three logically distinct happenings, which has happened ? And how, in particular, do we tell whether the third thing has happened (whether the dance has been danced correctly) ?

III

Let us first consider one thing that might be said. It might be said : ' The dance has been danced correctly if what has been danced is the dance *called* the eightsome reel.' On this suggestion,

all we have to know is how the expression ' eightsome reel ' is used ; then we shall be able to recognise whether what has been danced *is* an eightsome reel. This seems to me to be true ; but it will be obvious why I cannot rest content with this answer to the problem. For I am using the dance analogy in an attempt to elucidate the nature of the discovery called ' discovering the use of words ' ; and therefore I obviously cannot, in solving the problems raised within the analogy, appeal to our knowledge of the use of the expression ' eightsome reel '. For this would not be in the least illuminating ; the trouble is that we do not know whether knowing how the expression ' eightsome reel ' is used is knowing something empirical. We shall therefore have to go a longer way round.

It may help if we ask, What does one have to assume if one is to be sure that they have danced the right dance ? Let us first introduce some restrictions into our analogy in order to make the dance-situation more like the language-situation which it is intended to illustrate. Let us suppose that the dance is a traditional one which those of the company who can dance it have all learnt in their early years ; let us suppose that they cannot remember the circumstances in which they learnt the dance ; nothing of their early dancing-lessons remains in their memory except : how to dance the dance. And let us further suppose that there are no books that we can consult to see if they have correctly danced the dance—or, if there are books, that they are not authoritative.

What, then, in such a situation, do we have to rely on in order to be sure that we have really established correctly what is the right way to dance the eightsome reel ? Suppose that someone is detailed to put down precisely what happens in the dance that the dancers actually dance—what movements they make when. We then look at his description of the dance and, under certain conditions, say, ' Well then, *that* is how the eightsome reel is danced '. But what are these conditions ?

We have to rely first of all upon the accuracy of the observer. We have to be sure that he has correctly put down what actually happened in the dance. And to put down correctly what one actually sees happening is, it must be admitted, empirical observation and description. But what else do we have to rely on? There are, it seems to me, at least two other requirements. As Henle correctly observes (I do not know why he thinks I would disagree) we cannot ' discover the rules of a ballroom dance simply by doing it ' (*op. cit.* p. 753). The first requirement is that the dance which is being danced is indeed the eightsome

reel ; the second is that it is being danced right. These are not the same ; for one may dance the eightsome reel but dance it wrong. Though the distinction between dancing a dance and dancing it right is not essential to my argument, it is in many contexts a crucial one (and with games, even more crucial than with dances ; it must, *e.g.* be possible to play poker but, while playing it, cheat). Even Körner, who on page 759 of his paper objects to the distinction, uses it himself on page 762, where he says, ' If it [*sc.* a performance of a dance] is relevant but uncharacteristic, it is incorrect '. For both these requirements, we have to rely on the *memory* of the dancers ; and, as I have said, to remember something is not (or at any rate not obviously) to make an empirical discovery.

IV

The sort of situation which I have been describing is different from the situation in which an anthropologist observes and describes the dances of a primitive tribe. This, it might be said, *is* an empirical enquiry. The anthropologist observes the behaviour of the members of the tribe, and *he* selects for study certain parts of this behaviour, namely those parts which, by reason of certain similarities, *he* classifies as dances. And within the class of dances, *he* selects certain particular patterns of behaviour and names them by names of particular dances—names which *he* (it may be arbitrarily or for purely mnemonic reasons) chooses. Here we have nothing which is not included in the characteristic activities of the empirical scientist ; we have the observation of similarities in the pattern of events, and the choosing of words to mark these similarities.

In the situation which I have been discussing, however, there are elements which there could not be in a purely anthropological enquiry. If a party of anthropologists sat down to dinner before starting their study of a particular dance, they could not fall into the sort of argument that I have imagined. Nor could they fall into it *after* starting the study of the dance. This sort of argument can arise only between people who, first of all, know how to dance the dance in question or to recognise a performance of it, but secondly are unable to say how it is danced. In the case of the anthropologists the first condition is not fulfilled. This difference between the two cases brings certain consequences with it. The anthropologists could not, as the people in my example do, know *what* dance it is that they are disputing about. In my example, the disputants know that what they are disputing

about is how *the eightsome reel* is danced. They are able to say this, because they have learnt to dance a certain dance, and can still dance it, and know that if they dance it it will be distinctively different from a great many other dances which, perhaps, they can also dance. The anthropologists, on the other hand, have not learnt to dance the dance which they are going to see danced after dinner ; and therefore, even if they have decided to *call* the dance that they are to see danced ' dance no. 23 ', this name is for them as yet unattached to any disposition of theirs to recognise the dance when it is danced. The anthropologists will not be able to say, when a particular point in the dance is reached, ' Yes, *that's* how it goes '. They will just put down what happens and add it to their records. But the people in my example, when they say ' eightsome reel ', are not using an arbitrary symbol for *whatever* they are going to observe ; the name ' eightsome reel ' has for them already a determinate meaning, though they cannot as yet say what this meaning is. It is in this same way that a logician knows, before he sets out to investigate the logical properties of the concept of negation, *what* concept he is going to investigate.

The second consequence is that, when my dancers have put down in words the way a dance is danced, the words that they put down will have a peculiar character. It will not be a correct description of their remarks to say that they have just put down how a particular set of dancers danced on a particular occasion ; for what has been put down is not : how a particular set of dancers *did* dance on a particular occasion, but : how *the* eightsome reel *is* danced. It is implied that if *any* dancers dance like *this* they are dancing an eightsome reel correctly. Thus what has been put down has the character of universality—one of the two positive marks of the *a priori* noted by Kant (we have already seen that what has been put down has the negative characteristic which Kant mentioned, that of not being empirical). What about the other positive mark ? Is what we have put down (if we are the dancers) *necessarily* true ? Is it necessarily true that the eightsome reel is danced in the way that we have put down ?

What we have put down is ' The eightsome reel is danced in the following manner, *viz.* . . . .' followed by a complete description of the steps and successive positions of the dancers. We may feel inclined to say that this statement is necessarily true. For, when we have danced the dance, and recognised it as an eightsome reel correctly danced, we may feel inclined to say that, if it had been danced differently, we *could* not have called it, correctly, an eightsome reel (or at any rate not a correct

performance of one) ; and that, on the other hand, danced as it was, we could not have denied that it was an eightsome reel. The statement which we have put down seems as necessary as the statement ' A square is a rectangle with equal sides '. I do not wish my meaning to be mistaken at this point. I am not maintaining that there is any temptation to say that the statement ' The dance which we have just danced is an eightsome reel ' is a necessary statement ; for there is no more reason to call this necessary than there is in the case of any other singular statement of fact. The statement which I am saying is necessary is ' The eightsome reel is danced as follows, *viz.* . . .' followed by a complete description.

We may, then, feel inclined to say that this statement, since it has all the qualifications, is an *a priori* statement. But there is also a temptation to say that it is synthetic. For consider again for a moment the situation as it was before we began to dance. Then we already knew how to dance the eightsome reel, and so for us the term ' eightsome reel ' had already a determinate meaning ; and it would be plausible to say that, since we knew the meaning of ' eightsome reel ' already before we started dancing, anything that we subsequently discovered could not be something attributable to the meaning of the term ' eightsome reel ' ; and therefore that it could not be something analytic ; and therefore that it must be something synthetic. Have we not, after all, *discovered* something about how the eightsome reel is danced ?

There is thus a very strong temptation to say that the statement ' The eightsome reel is danced in the following way, *viz.* . . .' followed by a complete description, is, when made by people in the situation which I have described, a synthetic *a priori* statement. Perhaps this temptation ought to be resisted, for it bears a very strong resemblance to the reasons which made Kant say that ' Seven plus five equals twelve ' is a synthetic *a priori* statement. Yet the existence of the temptation should be noted. Certainly to call this statement ' synthetic *a priori* ' would be odd ; for similar grounds could be given for considering all statements about how words are used as synthetic *a priori* statements. If, which I have seen no reason to believe, there is a class of synthetic *a priori* statements, it can hardly be as large as this. Probably what has to be done with the term ' synthetic *a priori* ' is to recognise that it has been used to cover a good many different kinds of statement, and that the reasons for applying it to them differ in the different cases. It is, in fact, an ambiguous label which does not even accurately distinguish

a class of statements, let alone explain their character. What would explain this would be to understand the natures of the situations (as I said, not all of the same kind) in which we feel inclined to use the term ; and this is what I am now trying, in one particular case, to do.

V

The peculiar characteristics of the situation which I have been discussing, like the analogous characteristics of the language-situation which I am trying to illuminate, all arise from the fact (on which Professor Ryle has laid so much stress) that we can know something (*e.g.* how to dance the eightsome reel or use a word) without being able yet to say what we know. Professor Henle has objected to the extension of Ryle's distinction to the language-situation. ' This distinction is no longer clear ', he says, ' when one comes to language, and it is by no means apparent that one can always know how to use a word without being able to say how it is used ' (*op. cit.* p. 750). But, although I do not claim that the distinction is entirely clear in any field, in language it is perhaps clearer than elsewhere. To say how a term is used we have, normally, to *mention* the term inside quotation marks, and to *use*, in speaking of the quoted sentence or statement in which it occurs, some such logician's term as ' means the same as ' or ' is analytic '. In saying how a term is used, we do not have to use it ; and therefore we may know fully how to use it in all contexts without being able to say how it is used. For example, a child may have learnt the use of ' father ', and use it correctly, but not be able to say how it is used because he has not learnt the use of ' mean ' or any equivalent expression. Henle seems to confuse being able to ' decide on logical grounds ' that a statement is true with being able to say ' the statement is logically true '. A person who did not know the use of the expression ' logically true ' could do the former but not the latter.

Besides noticing that the dance-situation has the characteristics which I have described, we should also be alive to certain dangers. There is first the danger of thinking that it could not have been the case that the eightsome reel was danced in some quite different way. It is, of course, a contingent fact, arising out of historical causes with which I at any rate am unacquainted, that the dance called ' the eightsome reel ' has the form it has and not some other form. If it had some different form, what my dancers would have learnt in their childhood would have been different, and what they would have learnt to call ' the eightsome

reel ' would have been different too ; yet the statement ' the
eightsome reel is danced in the following manner, etc.' would
have had just the same characteristics as I have mentioned
(though the ' etc.' would stand for some different description of
steps and movements).

Next, there is the danger of thinking that if *anthropologists*
were observing the dance, and had been told that the dance which
they were to observe was called ' the eightsome reel ', *they*, in
reporting their observations, would be making the same kind of
statement—namely a non-empirical, universally necessary state-
ment which at the same time we are tempted to call synthetic.
They would not be making this sort of statement at all, but an
ordinary empirical statement to the effect that the Scots have a
dance which they dance in a certain manner and call ' the eight-
some reel '.

<h1 style="text-align:center">VI</h1>

There is also a third thing which we must notice. If a com-
pletely explicit definition were once given of the term ' eightsome
reel ', it would have to consist of a specification of what consti-
tutes a correct performance of this dance. To give such a
definition is to give what is often called a ' rule ' for the perform-
ance of the dance. Now if we already have such a definition,
then statements like ' The eightsome reel is danced in the follow-
ing way, *viz.* . . .', followed by a specification of the steps, will
be seen to be analytic, provided only that we understand ' is
danced ' in the sense of ' is correctly danced '. It might therefore
be said that, once the definition is given, there remains no pro-
blem—no proposition whose status defies classification. Simi-
larly, if we were to *invent* a dance and give it explicit rules of
performance, there would be no problem. But in this latter case
there would be no *discovery* either. It is because, in my problem-
case, we do not *start off* by having a definition, yet do start off
by having a determinate meaning for the term ' eightsome reel ',
that the puzzle arises. It is in the *passage to* the definition that
the mystery creeps in—in the passage (to use Aristotle's terms)
from the ἡμῖν γνώριμον to the ἁπλῶς γνώριμον.[1] What we have
to start with is not a definition, but the mere ability to recognise
instances of correct performances of the dance ; what we have
at the end is the codification in a definition of what we know.
So what we have at the end is different from what we have at the
beginning, and it sounds sensible to speak of our *discovering* the

[1] *Eth. Nic.* 1095 b 2 ; *An. Post.* 71 b 33.

definition—just as those who first defined the circle as the locus
of a point equidistant, etc., thought that they had discovered
something about the circle, namely what later came to be called
its essence.   We see here how definitions came to be treated as
synthetic statements ; and, since the real or essential definition
(the prototype of all synthetic *a priori* statements) is one of the
most characteristic constituents of metaphysical thinking, this
explains a great deal about the origins of metaphysics.

Briefly, there are two statements whose status is unproblem-
atical, both expressed in the same words.   There is first the
anthropologist's statement that the eightsome reel (meaning ' a
certain dance to which the Scots give that name ') is (as a matter
of observed fact) danced in a certain manner.   This is a plain
empirical statement.   Secondly, there is the statement such as
might be found in a book of dancing instructions—the statement
that the eightsome reel is danced (meaning ' is correctly danced ')
in a certain manner.   This statement is analytic, since by ' eight-
some reel ' the writer *means* ' the dance which is (correctly)
danced in the manner described '.   Should we then say that the
appearance of there being a third, mysterious, metaphysical,
synthetic *a priori* statement about the dance, somehow inter-
mediate between these two, is the result merely of a confusion
between them, a confusion arising easily from the fact that they
are expressed in the same words ?   This, it seems to me, would
be a mistake.   For how do we *get* to the second, analytic state-
ment ?   Only *via* the definition or rule ; but if the definition is
not a mere empirical description, then there is, on this view,
nothing left for it to be but a stipulative definition, the result of
a decision.   So there will be again no such thing as discovering
how the eightsome reel is danced.   There will only be something
which might be described as ' inventing the eightsome reel '.   It
is preferable, therefore, to say that there is a third kind of
statement, intermediate between the first and the second, which
forms, as it were, the transition to the second—we settle down
in the comfortable analyticity of the second only after we have
discovered that this definition of the term ' eightsome reel ', and
no other, is the one that accords with our pre-existing but un-
formulated idea of how the dance should be danced.   And this
discovery seems to be neither a mere decision, nor a mere piece
of observation.   But, since I am still very perplexed by this
problem, I· do not rule out the possibility that, were I to become
clearer about it, I should see that there is no third alternative.

Before I conclude this section of my paper, and go on to
describe more complicated kinds of dances which resemble

talking even more closely, I have two remarks to make. The first is that, unless *some* people knew how to dance dances, anthropologists could not observe empirically how dances are danced ; and that therefore there could not be empirical statements about dances unless there were at least the possibility of the kind of non-empirical statement that I have been characterising. The situation is like that with regard to moral judgments ; unless *some* people make genuine evaluative moral judgments, there is no possibility of other people making what have been called ' inverted commas' moral judgments, *i.e.* explicit or implicit descriptions of the moral judgments that the first set of people make.[1] So, if philosophical analysis resembles the description of dances in the respects to which I have drawn attention, empirical statements about the use of words cannot be made unless there is at least the possibility of these other, non-empirical statements about the use of words. This perhaps explains the odd fact that analytical enquiries seem often to start by collecting empirical data about word-uses, but to end with apparently *a priori* conclusions.[2]

The second remark is that I have nothing to say in this paper which sheds any direct light on the question (often confused with the one which I am discussing)—the question of the distinction between logic and philology. The features which I am trying to pick out are features as well of philological as of logical discoveries, and this makes them more, not less, perplexing.

VII

I will now draw attention to some differences between the comparatively simple dance-situation which I have been discussing so far and the language-situation which is the subject of this paper. Talking is an infinitely more complex activity than dancing. It is as if there were innumerable different kinds of steps in dancing, and a dancer could choose at any moment (as is to a limited extent the case in ballroom dancing) to make any one of these steps. Talking is in this respect more like ballroom dancing than like reels—there is a variety of different things one can do, and if one's partner knows how to dance, she reacts appropriately ; but to do *some* things results in treading on one's partner's toes, or bumping into other couples and such further

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[1] See my *Language of Morals*, pp. 124 f.

[2] See the remarks of Professor Ayer on Mr. Wollheim's valuable paper La Philosophie Analytique et les Attitudes Politiques ' in *La Philosophic Analytique*, ed. *Béra* (Cahiers de Royaumont; Editions de Minuit, forthcoming), and compare also Aristotle, *An. Post.* 100 a 7 and *Eth. Nic.* 1143 b 4.

obstacles as there may be, however well she knows how to dance. Nevertheless there are a great many things which one can do ; and not all of them are laid down as permissible in rules which have been accepted before we do them. There can be innovations in dancing and in speech—and some of the innovations are understood even though they are innovations.

Both dancing and talking can become forms of creative art. There are kinds of dancing and of talking in which the performer is bound by no rules except those which he cares to make up as he goes along. Some poetry is like this ; and so is ' creative tap-dancing ' (the title of a book which once came into my hands). The most creative artists, however, are constrained to talk or dance *solo*. It is not about these highest flights of talking and dancing that I wish to speak, but about those more humdrum activities which require the co-operation of more than one person, and in which, therefore, the other people involved have to know a good deal about what sort of thing to expect one to do, and what they are expected to do in answer. It is in this sense that I am speaking of ' knowing how to dance ' and ' knowing how to talk '.

What makes co-operation possible in both these activities is that the speaker or dancer should not do things which make the other people say ' We don't know what to make of this '. That is to say, he must not do things which cannot be easily related to the unformulated rules of speaking or dancing which everybody knows who has learnt to perform these activities. The fact that these rules are unformulated means that to learn to formulate them is to make some sort of discovery—a discovery which, as I have said, cannot be described without qualification as an empirical one. If a person in speaking or dancing does something of which we say ' We don't know what to make of this ', there are only two ways of re-establishing that *rapport* between us which makes these co-operative activities possible : either he must explain to us what we *are* to make of what he has done ; or else he must stop doing it and do something more orthodox. He must either teach us his new way of dancing or talking, or go on dancing or talking in our old way. I should like to emphasise that I am not against what Körner calls ' replacement-analysis ' ; the last chapter of my *Language of Morals* is evidence of this. But we need to be very sure that we understand the functioning of the term that is being replaced before we claim that a new gadget will do the old job better.

It might be said, dancing is not like talking, because dancing is a gratuitous activity, and talking a purposeful one ; therefore

there are things which can go wrong in talking that cannot go wrong in dancing—things which prevent the purposes of talking being realised. This I do not wish to deny ; though the existence of this difference does not mean that there are not also the similarities to which I have been drawing attention. And the difference is in any case not absolute. Some talking is gratuitous ; and some dancing is purposeful. When dancing in a crowded ballroom, we have at least the purpose of avoiding obstacles, human and inanimate. If we imagine these obstacles multiplied, so that our dance-floor becomes more like its analogue, that elusive entity which we call ' the world ', dancing becomes very like talking. And all dance-floors have at least a floor and boundaries of some kind ; so no kind of dancing is *completely* gratuitous ; all dancers have the purpose of not impinging painfully against whatever it is limits their dance-floor (unless there are· penitential dances which consist in bruising oneself against the walls—but this too, would be a purpose). And there are some markedly purposeful activities which, though not called dances, are like dances in the features to which I have drawn attention—for example, the pulling up of anchors (old style).

This analogy points to a way of thinking about our use of language which is a valuable corrective to the more orthodox representational view, in which ' facts ', ' qualities ', and other dubious entities flit like untrustworthy diplomats between language and the world. We do not need these intermediaries ; there are just people in given situations trying to understand one another. Logic, in one of the many senses of that word, is learning to formulate the rules that enable us to make something of what people say. Its method is to identify and describe the various sorts of things that people say (the various dances and their steps) such as predication, conjunction, disjunction, negation, counting, adding, promising, commanding, commending —need I ever stop ? In doing this it has to rely on our knowledge, as yet unformulated, of how to do these things—things of which we may not even know the names, and which indeed may not *have* names till the logician invents them ; but which are, nevertheless, distinct and waiting to be given names. Since this knowledge is knowledge of something that we have learnt, it has, as I have said, many of the characteristics of memory— though it would be incorrect, strictly speaking, to say that we *remember* how to use a certain word ; Plato's term ' recall ($\dot{\alpha}\nu\alpha\mu\mu\nu\dot{\eta}\sigma\kappa\epsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$)', is, perhaps more apt. As in the case of memory however, we know, without being, in many cases, able to give further evidence, that we have got it right. And often the only test we can

perform is: trying it out again. In most cases there comes a point at which we are satisfied that we have got the thing right (in the case of speaking, that we have formulated correctly what we know). Of course, the fact that we are satisfied does not show that we are not wrong ; but if once satisfied, we remain satisfied until we discover, or are shown, some cause for dissatisfaction.

VIII

Meno, in the Platonic dialogue named after him, is asked by Socrates what goodness is (a question much more closely akin than is commonly allowed to the question, How and for what purposes is the word ' good ' used ?). Being a young man of a sophistical turn of mind, Meno says ' But Socrates, how are you going to look for something, when you don't in the least know what it is ? . . . Or even if you do hit upon it, how are you going to know that this is *it*, without having previous knowledge of what *it* is ? ' [1] In more modern terms, if we do not already know the use of the word ' good ' (or, in slightly less fashionable language, its analysis), how, when some account of its use (some analysis) is suggested, shall we know whether it is the correct account ? Yet (as Socrates goes on to point out) if we knew already, we should not have asked the question in the first place. So philosophy either cannot begin, or cannot reach a conclusion.

It will be noticed that my dancers could be put in the same paradoxical position. If they know already how the dance is danced, what can they be arguing about ? But if they do not know already, how will they know, when they have danced the dance, whether they have danced it correctly ? The solution to the paradox lies in distinguishing between knowing how to dance a dance and being able to say how it is danced. Before the enquiry begins, they are able to do the former, but not the latter ; after the enquiry is over they can do the latter, and they know that they are right because all along they could do the former. And it is the same with the analysis of concepts. We know how to use a certain expression, but are unable to say how it is used (λογὸν διδόναι, give an analysis or definition, formulate in words the use of the expression). Then we try to do the latter ; and we know we have succeeded when we have found an analysis which is in accordance with our hitherto unformulated knowledge of how to use the word. And finding out whether it *is* in accordance involves talking (dialectic), just as finding out whether the account of the dance is right involves dancing.

[1] *Meno*, 80 d.

Dialectic, like dancing, is typically a co-operative activity. It consists in trying out the proposed account of the use of a word by using the word in accordance with it, and seeing what happens. It is an experiment with words, though not, as we have seen, an altogether empirical experiment. In the same way, we might dance the dance according to someone's account of how it is danced, and see if we can say afterwards whether what we have danced is the dance that we were arguing about (*e.g.* the eightsome reel) or at least *a* dance, or whether it is no dance at all. There is no space here to give many examples of dialectic ; but I will give the most famous one of all.[1] It is a destructive use of the technique, resulting in the *rejection* of a suggested analysis. An account of the use of the word ' right ' is being tried out which says that ' right ' means the same as ' consisting in speaking the truth and giving back anything that one has received from anyone '. The analysis is tried out by ' dancing ' a certain statement, *viz.* ' It is always right to give a madman back his weapons which he entrusted to us when sane '. But the dance has clearly gone wrong ; for this statement is certainly not (as the proposed definition would make it) analytic, since to deny it, as most people would, is not to contradict oneself. So the analysis has to be rejected.

Plato was right in implying that in recognising that such a proposition is not analytic we are relying on our memories. It is an example of the perceptive genius of that great logician, that in spite of being altogether at sea concerning the *source* of our philosophical knowledge ; and in spite of the fact that his use of the material mode of speech misled him as to the *status* of the analyses he was looking for—that in spite of all this he spotted the very close logical analogies between philosophical discoveries and remembering. He was wrong in supposing that we are remembering something that we learnt in a former life—just as more recent mythologists have been wrong in thinking that we are discerning the structure of some entities called ' facts '. What we are actually remembering is what we learnt on our mothers' knees, and cannot remember learning.

Provisionally, then, we might agree with the metaphysicians that philosophy has to contain statements which are neither empirical statements about the way words are actually used, nor yet expressions of decisions about how they are to be used ; but we should refuse to infer from this that these statements are about some non-empirical order of being. The philosopher elucidates (not by mere observation) the nature of something which exists

[1] Adapted from *Republic*, 331 c.

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before the elucidation begins (for example, there is such an operation as negation before the philosopher investigates it ; the philosopher no more invents negation than Aristotle made man rational).   He neither creates the objects of his enquiry, nor receives them as mere data of experience ; yet for all that, to say that there is such an operation as negation is no more mysterious than to say that there is such a dance as the eightsome reel.   But even that is quite mysterious enough.

Balliol College, Oxford

II.—ON THE RATIONALITY OF PERSUADING

By J. N. Garver

IT has become fashionable of late to characterise the method of moral argument as persuasion,[1] and this dictum has found such general acceptance in some quarters that it has become a fixed part of the framework that many philosophers use for thinking about moral matters. It is undeniable that there is an initial presumption in favour of such a view, for our aim in controversies about what to do is almost always to *persuade* the other person to accept our point of view. But when a word becomes a part of our framework for discussing such a subject as morals, it is apt to be left unexamined, and thus to hide by some obscurity in its meaning the truth of what we are talking about. In this essay I shall attempt to throw light on the common conception of morals by looking more closely at what we mean when we speak of persuading, and thereby to dispel some errors and confusions.

1. *Spadework*

' Persuade ' is what might be called a *boundary verb* ; it cannot be explained without reference to other psychological verbs. Knowing, believing, intending, and wishing are all different ways in which we can have something in mind. Persuading is not still another way, but refers rather to a difference between what it is that we have in mind in one of these ways at two different times. The primary reference of ' persuade ', therefore, is to a *change* of mind rather than a state of mind. What is necessarily involved when I am persuaded is that I do not, say, believe *P* prior to being persuaded and that I subsequently do believe *P*.

' Persuade ' is also what Ryle has called an achievement word rather than an activity word. It indicates success. If Collins has persuaded me, he has accomplished something : he has succeeded in changing my mind. In this respect ' persuade ' falls into a class with a number of other psychological verbs—for example, certain other verbs of suasion such as ' convince ', ' induce ', ' convert ', and ' deceive ', and certain verbs of commitment such as ' decide ', ' resolve ', and ' make up (or change) one's mind '. Because ' persuade ' is an achievement word, we draw our examples from the past tense or the infinitive mood. Other tenses are rarely used ; and indeed, they do not

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[1] See especially *Ethics and Language* by Charles L. Stevenson (New Haven, 1944).

often make sense. The ordinary present indicative is never used
because we can never be in the *midst* of persuading someone ; we
can only be *trying* to persuade him. (The present tense may be
used, however, to refer to repeated success : " Silsbury always
persuades the town council." Or perhaps boastfully : " Don't
worry, I am persuading him. Just give me another two or three
days.") Similarly in the future tense ; we say, except in moods
of cocky self-confidence, simply that we shall *try* to persuade
someone.

Typically ' persuade ' stands for a triadic relation, *viz.* one
holding between two persons and some object (a belief or commit-
ment or action). This typical case can be represented by a simple
schema : "Y persuaded X that (to do) S." In this schema we
shall call X the subject of the persuasion (*i.e.* the person whose
mind is changed), S the object of the persuasion (that concerning
which his mind is changed), and Y the agent of the persuasion.
The problem of understanding persuasion is very largely the
problem of understanding what sorts of things can serve respec-
tively as the subjects, objects, and agents of ' persuade '. In
the next sections we proceed to a consideration of these three
topics.

2. *Subjects of Persuading*

The matter of possible subjects of ' persuade ' can be dealt
with rather briefly. Certainly all human beings can be subjects
of persuasion. We might also include animals, although I think
we usually coax animals rather than persuade them, and that
when we do speak of persuading them, part of the effect of this
way of speaking is to raise their status above that of mere brutes
(see Sec. 5). Conversely, when we speak of coaxing our fellow
human beings, the effect of this way of talking is to disparage their
intelligence. Certainly nothing other than a being to which we
ascribe intelligence can be a subject of persuasion, except in
a derivative and metaphorical sense.

3. *Objects of Persuading*

We must now consider the sorts of things that can serve as
objects of persuasion. What is it that we can be persuaded of ?
A number of candidates appear in the daily speech with which we
are all familiar. I can be persuaded *to do* something—*e.g.* to cut
a class, to take up rowing, or to trust Taylor ; or I can be persuaded
of something—*e.g.* of the truth of a theory, or of the shallowness
of Tchaikovski's music ; or again, I can be persuaded that

something is so—*e.g.* that the world is round, or that real wages have steadily risen over the past century. As an object of ' persuade ', in other words, we can have either an infinitive phrase, a ' that ' clause, or a phrase beginning with ' of '.

For philosophical purposes we need not avail ourselves of all the richness of ordinary language ; we may safely omit consideration of the phrases beginning with ' of '. Suppose, for example, that I have been persuaded of the truth of the continuity theory of learning, or of the honesty of Greeks, or of the bestiality of the police. We can easily rephrase the statement of these facts by saying that I have been persuaded that the continuity theory of learning is true, that Greeks are honest, that the police are bestial. Nothing is lost in such transformation, except perhaps stylistic effect. It will, therefore, be both convenient and proper to leave the phrases beginning with ' of ' without further comment.

We must note, too, that we cannot use the whole range of infinitives as objects of persuading. You can persuade me not to eat sprouts, but you cannot *persuade* me to dislike them. You can persuade me to avoid Jones, but it would not be proper to say that you *persuaded* me to despise or hate him. You can persuade me to buy some vintage port, but you can only *make* me long for it. We can only be persuaded to do what we can also quite consciously decide to do or not to do. The infinitives which can serve as objects of persuasion, then, are only those which refer to actions and not those which refer to dispositions.[1]

The distinction between the remaining infinitive phrases and ' that ' clauses as objects of persuasion appears at first glance to be more solid than that between the ' of ' phrases and the ' that ' clauses, but we must not let ourselves be intimidated. For there is a close connection between ' that ' clauses of a certain sort and these infinitive phrases—one that will throw considerable light on the relation between morals and persuading. The connection may be stated as follows : A sentence of the form, " Y persuaded X to do S ", can always be changed, without damaging the sense of what is said, into a sentence of the form " Y persuaded X that X ought to do S ". More exactly : the transformation can be made provided that (*a*) the ' that ' clause refers to the same action as the infinitive phrase ; (*b*) the

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[1] For a further elaboration of this distinction see G. Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Hutchinson's University Library, London, 1949), *passim* and esp. pp. 116-125. It should be borne in mind, however, that Ryle's illustrations are not always felicitous : ' believe ', for example, is ambiguous with respect to this distinction, since it can mean ' adopt the belief ' as well as ' have the belief ', and the former expression does not refer to a disposition even though ' belief ' itself may always be a disposition-word.

' that ' clause contains one of the moral words which can charac-
terise actions, such as ' ought ', ' should ', ' right ', or ' wrong ';
and (c) these moral words are understood in the sense where ' I
believe that I ought to do S ' means that upon deliberation I
decide to do S.

In some cases this translation will appear quite unobjectionable
—*e.g.* where the utterance is " My lawyer persuaded me to tell
the whole story ", or " Johnson persuaded me to treat the old
lady with more respect ". The hesitancy which we may feel
about accepting the proposed analysis in general does not arise
from there being certain non-moral, purely decision-marking uses
of infinitive phrases as objects of persuading. The difficulty has
two sources. The one is a certain license (to be discussed later
in Sec. 5) which common usage gives to ' persuade '. The other
lies rather in one of the ambiguities of statements of moral
obligations : We use ' ought ' and ' should ' to refer *either* to a
course of action (what we decide to do in a given set of circum-
stances), *or* to *prima facie* duties we must take into account
when we make a decision about what to do. The moral ' that '
clauses which we take as possible substitutes for infinitive phrases
as objects of persuading will always contain ' ought ' in the first
sense, referring to the outcome of deliberation rather than to
factors which must enter into it. And it is perfectly proper—
linguistically, at least—for an ' ought ' in this sense to be set
against an ' ought not ' in the second sense.

We have seen first that ' of ' phrases which appear as objects of
persuading can be rephrased as ' that ' clauses (and *vice versa*),
and second that infinitive phrases as objects of persuading are
equivalent in sense to moral ' that ' clauses in the same person as
the subject of the persuading—*substitui possunt, salva veritate*.
We can therefore take the class of objects of persuading as a
certain class of ' that ' clauses. We shall not be concerned to
analyse in more detail the various sorts of ' that ' clauses which
can be members of this class. They are numerous. Suffice it
here to point out (i) that they can be either moral or non-moral :
" Gerald persuaded me that I should treat Mrs. Hunter with more
respect "; and " 15th century geographers were persuaded,
by the heroic exploits of the navigators of their day, that the
world is really round ". And further, (ii) that at least some
of these non-moral objects of persuasion are what Stevenson and
other advocates of the pragmatic theory of meaning would
agree to call beliefs rather than attitudes—the truth-value of
' the world is round ', for example, is appropriately determined
by ordinary empirical methods.

4. *Agents of Persuading*

We must now turn our attention to the agents of persuading. In all of our examples, the agent of the persuasion has been a person. It seems quite natural to think of one *person* persuading another ; and just as it is out of the ordinary to make, say, an animal the subject of persuading, so also it is somewhat unusual not to have a person as the agent. The examples we have chosen bring this out. But although this may be the way in which we most commonly think and speak of what goes on, it gives us only a superficial view of the matter, and we must pay heed to two qualifications.

We find, first, that it is not only persons that can, linguistically speaking, serve as agents of persuading. We can say, " The facts persuaded me that the butler is innocent ", or, " It was the second argument which persuaded me ; I did not think that the others were to the point " or, " My mother's plea finally persuaded me to come home ". We are often persuaded by facts, data, circumstances, arguments, reasons, etc., rather than directly by another person.

It is important to note that, in cases where the agents are of this nature, there is an implication of some standards by which to judge the relevance of facts or arguments presented. To say that the second argument persuaded me is inconsistent with my denying the relevance of the second argument to the issue at hand ; to maintain both would be absurd. We say that a reason is relevant if, taken in conjunction with other facts or reasons which are insufficient by themselves, it yields the conclusion it is meant to support. This it can do only if we have some definite way of arranging the facts and arguments so as to give us a conclusion. This way of arranging the facts, or the pattern of argument, gives us a standard by which we can judge the soundness of reasons or arguments. To say that such and such an argument had persuaded me, in other words, implies that I judge (tacitly at least) this argument to be relevant ; and to make such a judgment, I must have had certain standards in mind (perhaps just implicitly) when I was persuaded.

Nor is it always the case, just because the name of a person appears as the grammatical subject of a persuading sentence, that it is the person *qua* person that is responsible for persuading me. More often than not it is instead something which the person says or does. It is your examples, rather than you yourself, which persuade me of the bestiality of the police ; you yourself could not persuade me without examples. Similarly

it was Gerald's argument that persuaded me to treat Mrs. Hunter
with more respect, not simply Gerald apart from what he said ;
and it was specifically by comparing the records of the respective
teams that Collins persuaded me that Wales would win.   When-
ever someone says, " Y persuaded X that S " (where ' Y ' is the
name of a person), we may ask *how* Y did it.   By probing in
this manner we often get behind the apparent agent of the
persuading, and see that it is properly to be construed as the
fact of Y's saying (or doing) something rather than as Y *per se*.
And this will be true not only when the apparent agent of the
persuading is a person, but also when it is a sign, a pamphlet, an
advertisement, or anything else capable of presenting arguments.

Notice that here again we find the suggestion of criteria for
the relevance of what persuades us.   It is *always* appropriate—
and this condition is a part of the meaning of ' persuade ', in
the sense that it is a part of the tacitly understood background of
any successful use of 'persuade '—whenever someone talks of
being persuaded to ask the probing question, " How ? "   This
question carries with it the expectation of uncovering some facts,
reasons, or arguments relevant to the question about which the
person was persuaded ;   that is what we are probing for.   To
speak of being persuaded, therefore, carries the implication of
some standard pattern of reasoning by which we can judge the
relevance of arguments presented—a standard relative perhaps
to the issue at hand, but not to individual persons.

5. *Is Persuading Rational ?*

It is our view that persuading is sometimes rational, rather
than that it is always so or never so.   At the end of the present
section we shall discuss some possible criteria for deciding whether
an instance of persuasion was rational or not.

It is necessary to point out at the start that we have *not*
maintained that the mere fact of being persuaded indicates that
we have acted or decided rightly, nor even that there is an objec-
tive procedure for determining whether we have decided rightly.
It is not standards which are implied, but only the belief in
standards—and even this may be merely implicit, and may be
mistaken.   The same goes for the relation between ' persuade '
and ' ought '.   If I say, " Alice has been persuaded to go to
Cape Cod ", there is no implication that it is right and proper
for her to do so, however much she may think that it is ; indeed,
we can easily imagine circumstances in which quite the contrary
would be insinuated.   This may be contrasted with my saying,

" Alice ought to go to Cape Cod ", where there can be no doubt that I imply that it is right and proper for her to do so.

With this in mind, we must now consider an interesting flexibility in the use of ' persuade '. Suppose that John hailed me as I was coming out of the library one evening and simply shouted, " Come along to the movies ! " He urged me a few more times, and finally I went, although I had intended to read a book and write some letters. The next morning I might report that he had *persuaded* me to go to the movies, even though I had never considered what I *ought* to do and there could hardly be a question of my having made a rational decision.

Here my use of ' persuade ' has a *dignifying function*. Far from being incompatible with the sense of ' persuade ' which our analysis has brought to light, this function rather depends upon it. To say that I was *persuaded* makes out that I acted rationally, and it does so in a way which is impossible for a semantically more accurate description (*e.g.* to say that I was coaxed into going). The sense of ' persuade ' is used to ennoble some more or less unworthy aspect of our behaviour.

A word has a dignifying function if it is used to apply to a situation where, according to its sense, it is not strictly applicable, and the result of this application is to put what we have referred to in a better light. ' Persuade ' often has a dignifying function— *e.g.* when the private eye says, " The ·38 he nudged into the small of my back persuaded me to comply with his wishes ". Cases where it is entirely obvious that a man responds to force, not persuasion, are facetiously referred to as ' persuasion ', and here ' persuade ' appears in inverted commas in order to call attention to the inappropriateness of the dignifying function and to make fun of it. The dignifying function may also be more subtle, so that we are unaware of it when it occurs—as was the case when John ' persuaded ' me to ' come along to the flicks '. We frequently speak of animals being persuaded to do something, and this use of ' persuade ' serves to increase the stature of the animals and tacitly to ascribe intelligence to them. As we mentioned above, such a use of ' persuade ' is derivative rather than primary, for it would have no point if ' persuade ' did not have the rational connotations we elaborated in the previous section.

Any verb, so long as it refers to an activity or a way of behaving we generally approve of, may acquire derivative uses in which it has a dignifying function—*e.g.* if I say that I decided to stay at home for the vacation, when in fact I had simply dragged my heels until there was no other choice left to me, or when I say that my car finally decided to start. ' Ought ' is sometimes used in

this way—as when I say that I really ought to go in a situation where I am simply bored and haven't given a thought to what I ought to do. In military communiqués we read that the B Regiment ' withdrew to new positions ', sometimes as a report of a chaotic retreat.

The warrant for calling the dignifying function of a verb ' proper ' is simply that such a use of the verb is regularly allowed and commonly exploited. We cannot use consistency with the *sense* of the verb as a criterion, since it is precisely a lack of such consistency which is being exploited. Nor is it necessary that we be aware that it is a dignifying function of a verb we are introducing when we permit some particular usage—indeed, the verb functions more effectively in its role if we lack such awareness. All that is required is (*a*) that the verb have an approved or laudable sense, (*b*) that it is used in situations where this sense is not quite appropriate, and (*c*) that such use is general enough to be accepted by the man-in-the-street as not involving falsification or misrepresentation of what occurred.

Actual instances where ' persuade ' is used with a dignifying function may involve any degree of correctness of sense. There is a certain correctness in saying that John persuaded me to go to the cinema ; since I did hesitate and (in some sense) consider his proposal. There would have been less correctness if I had given no resistance at all.

We call persuasion *rational* when it is the case both (*a*) that reasons, facts, or arguments are the agent of persuasion (either directly or as revealed when we probe behind the apparent agent), and (*b*) that these reasons, arguments, etc., are to the point. Conversely, we shall call persuasion *irrational* when either of these two conditions fails to obtain—*i.e.* when either (1) it is the person *per se* or the advertisement in itself that has persuaded me—such cases as when John has simply said " Come along ! " and continued urging, or where the advertisement is a bare sign, " Buy Luckies "—or (2) the ' reasons ' advanced are not to the point : a ' reason ' such as " You should eat all things which contain lots of protein ", advanced to persuade me to eat turnips, falls into the same class as no reason at all.

One of the difficulties with the verb ' persuade ' is that it is used in such a way that it refers equivocally (or ambiguously, to use Russell's phrase) to rational or irrational persuasion. We may recognise individual cases on each side of the line, but we cannot say out of hand that a person who has been persuaded has changed his mind either rationally or irrationally. Even when we have the context fully specified there may remain

controversial cases—witness those occasions when we are persuaded on matters of morals, for example. In a few general cases, however, we can give criteria for deciding whether the persuasion has been rational or irrational.

There are two related tests for determining that persuasion has been irrational. The first is that if we can replace an occurrence of ' persuaded ' in the report of what happened by ' induced ' or ' coaxed ' or some similar expression, without changing the sense or truth of the statement, the persuasion referred to must have been irrational. If one can take the place of another, the sense of the former must already be in this particular use of the latter, and all these words (' coax ', etc.) indicate an irrational change of mind. To speak of someone being cajoled is to speak disparagingly of him : we normally speak of cajoling dogs, cats, and other animals we do not credit with reason—*e.g.* " Doug coaxed the rabbit to come out of its hutch ". The second criterion we may use is that the persuasion has been irrational whenever we can see that ' persuade ' has been used with a dignifying function. This follows simply from what we mean by these terms ; for if an instance of persuasion has been rational this *means* that the subject has changed his mind in accordance with the recognised rules for deciding questions of that sort, and there would not be any occasion for ennobling the situation ; the laudatory sense of ' persuade ' would be entirely appropriate to the facts of the case. These two tests are intimately related because the first is also a test for whether or not ' persuade ' has been used with a dignifying function ; and conversely, if ' persuade ' has been used with a dignifying function, then it has the sense of ' inveigle ' or ' coax '.

We can say that persuasion has been rational whenever it is the case that there is some decision procedure applicable to the question under consideration—that is, when men have agreed (as they have in science) upon a set of standards or criteria which determine either if a proposal is to be accepted or if it is to be rejected. In science and logic it is often quite a simple matter to show the rationality of persuasion, because decision procedures are well established. If we agree upon a decision procedure for ethics, or show that some criteria are in fact generally accepted, then we can decide in the same manner whether instances of moral persuasion have been rational. Similarly for aesthetics, religion, or any other field of discourse.[1]

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[1] An interesting, though incomplete, discussion of different fields of argument can be found in Chapters 1 and 3 of *The Uses of Argument*, by Stephen E. Toulmin (Cambridge, 1958).

We are left, then, with two ways of deciding whether an instance of persuading has been irrational, and one test for deciding if it has been rational. We should remember, however, that these alone, although helpful guides, will not by any means suffice to decide about all the instances of persuading which come before us.

6.   *Stevenson's Conception of Persuading*

The main thing which needs to be made clear about Stevenson's remarks on persuasion in *Ethics and Language* is that they entirely neglect the ambiguous reference of ' persuade ' and systematically misconstrue persuasion as necessarily irrational, or, as he prefers to say, non-rational.   Stevenson is not altogether blind to what he is doing.   He admits—what might be taken as the epitome of understatement—that he is using the notion of persuasion " in a somewhat broadened sense " (p. 139), a sense which he requires to bolster and round out his thesis of ethical relativism. He then maintains, quite out of hand, that persuasion cannot be rational (p. 140) and that in matters where we change one another's minds by persuasion there can be no validity of any sort analogous, say, to that in science (p. 152).   Persuasive methods " depend on the sheer, direct emotional impact of words—on emotive meaning, rhetorical cadence, apt metaphor, stentorian, stimulating, or pleading tones of voice, dramatic gestures, care in establishing *rapport* with the hearer or audience, and so on " (p. 139).   In fine, he seems to have in mind *enticing* or *inducing* rather than *persuading* when he speaks of ' persuasion '.

Stevenson is led into his error in a number of ways :   (1) The verb ' persuade ' does not enter the discussion at all, but only its cognates 'persuasion ' and ' persuasive '.   For some reason which I do not fully comprehend, the noun and the adjective seem more easily adapted to a neglect of the rational connotations. Analysis of the verb, as we have seen, reveals significant instances of rational persuading.   (2) His conception of persuading is probably further biased by the fact that he limits himself to cases where the object of persuasion is an infinitive phrase—usually one beginning with ' to approve '.   Restricted to such examples, one might easily overlook the rational side of the matter, for these cases are precisely the ones in which decision about rationality is most difficult and most controversial.   (3) The most basic factor behind Stevenson's mistake is that he did not obtain the meaning he assigns to ' persuasive ' by analysis, but by decree : " The most important of the non-rational methods *will be called* ' persuasive ' . . . " (p. 139, emphasis added).   It sounds here as if Stevenson is introducing a technical term, and assigning to it a meaning independent of any it may have had previously ;

but he later relies heavily on the ordinary sense of ' persuade '.
(4) His technical definition of the term ' persuasive definition '
suffers from the shortcoming that he limits its use to definitions
which redirect or are designed to redirect what he calls attitudes—
that is, states of mind which, unlike what he calls beliefs, cannot,
by definition, be criticised by reference to any accepted criteria.
This again is a biased definition. It would be more in keeping
with the sense of ' persuade ' to consider any characterisation of
something which redirects our way of thinking about it as a
persuasive definition. We should then find that the term covers
not only what Stevenson calls persuasive definitions, but also his
definition of ' persuasive definition ' (this is probably persuasive
in his sense, too) and a whole range of scientific definitions, such
as the definition of the whale as a mammal, the definition of
temperature in terms of the expansion of mercury, and the
definition of numbers as classes of classes. The fact that a
definition is persuasive in this more basic sense does not necessarily
preclude criticism of it by reference to accepted criteria.
(5) Stevenson evidently misunderstood a logical truism which
lies on the base of his analysis, and consequently he had made an
improper generalisation of it. What is true is that persuading
never can be valid ;—nor can it be invalid. This is a logical
point because it is of the nature of words of logical appraisal
that they apply just to relations between propositions and not
to relations between states of mind. Some words of logical
appraisal (' valid ', ' sound ', ' conclusive ', etc.) apply to patterns
of statements or to methods of argument ; others (' true ',
' warranted ', ' confirmed ', etc.) apply to individual statements ;
and still others (' good ', ' sound ', ' relevant ', etc.) to reasons.
The family characteristic of such words and their negatives—the
surname, one might say—is that they pass judgment on the way
in which propositions are related to one another. They cannot
be used of instances of persuading because what ' persuade '
refers to is a relation of two states of mind, not of two propositions.
This is the element of truth in Stevenson's proposition ; his
fallacy was to jump to the conclusion that there can be *no*
question of validity where persuasion is involved, and that
persuading cannot therefore be rational. This is a mistake ;
for the reasons and arguments used certainly can be appraised for
their logical worthiness, and this gives us ground· for saying
whether the persuasion is rational or is not.

In one sense Stevenson's error in this regard is not of funda-
mental importance for his ethical views. His relativistic thesis
could easily be restated in other terms without using the word
' persuade '. We might, for example, simply·put the word

' kambose ', or one of its cognates, wherever ' persuade ', or one of its cognates, appears in Stevenson's text.   ' Kambose ' would then be far from a meaningless word, for it would be tied very precisely to other meaningful words by the text.   We would have a clear idea what kambosive methods are, and what a kambosive definition is, and that kambosion depends upon the sheer impact of emotive meaning.   In this way the main theme of Stevenson's argument could be preserved in equally precise and vivid terms. All that would be lost would be the word ' persuade ' and the associations which it calls up for the person familiar with everyday English ; and these, as we have seen, are mistaken or misleading in the present context anyway.   My remarks on persuasion, therefore, do not by any means disprove the emotivist thesis.

But from another point of view Stevenson's mistake about the sense of ' persuasion ' and ' persuasive ' bears directly upon the value of what he has to say, and is seriously misleading for the reader.   For these words do not have only the meaning he assigns to them ; they also have their ordinary sense, and this is exploited in the discussion of the examples of genuine persuasion ; we would never think of referring to them as enticing or inducing or kambosion.   It is therefore natural to refer to them as persuasion because of the ordinary sense of the word, whereas it would be very difficult to show that they were kambosion, assuming ' kambose ' to have only the meaning assigned to it in the revised text.   We might say that Stevenson has inverted the dignifying function of ' persuade ' : Instead of using the sense of ' persuade ' to make cases of inducing stand in a better light, he has arbitrarily assigned a sense to ' persuade ' so as to make instances of real persuading appear to be less than rational.   He ought to have made a choice : either to be arbitrary about the meaning he wished to have, and then see whether moral discourse corresponds to it ; or else to take persuasion as the prototype of methods of moral argument, and then to examine what is involved in persuading. By compounding the two meanings in the way he does, Stevenson achieves an effectiveness far above that which his argument warrants.   It is not fair to take the cream from two bottles to fill your pitcher.

From this second point of view, then, Stevenson's distortion of persuading is of the first importance, for upon it depends the whole plausibility and persuasiveness of his argument.   Once we come to understand just how we have been misled, we put ourselves in a much stronger position for examining the real issue raised by the emotivists—*viz.* whether there is or can be a decision procedure in ethics, whether persuasion in matters of morals is in fact ever rational.

University of Minnesota

III.—DIVINE NECESSITY

By Terence Penelhum

This paper is a discussion of certain limited aspects of traditional theological doctrines of the necessity of the divine existence and attributes. In spite of being greatly indebted to a number of recent treatments of these themes, I still feel that something worth while remains to be said about them, and that certain important morals can be drawn from them regarding the relation of theistic belief to metaphysics and philosophical analysis. The traditional doctrines seem to me to be a paradigm case of the impossibility of presenting basic religious assertions as answers to metaphysical demands for explanation ; but when the demonstrative trappings are carefully stripped away, what remains is seen to be of the very essence of theism, and any difficulties inherent in it are distinct from those associated with traditional attempts to *demonstrate* theism.

I shall be concerned throughout with general and not historical considerations ; but those illustrative references I shall make will all be taken from the Thomistic system, since this is the most enduring and meticulous example of the doctrines I discuss, and is in one way or another normative for a great many religious thinkers. It is also considered by many to be the most modest in its metaphysical claims, but I hope to indicate that its relative agnosticism regarding the powers of the human mind does not make it less open to the criticisms to which all forms of demonstrative theism are subject.

I

Apart from the Ontological Proof, demonstrations of God's existence have taken the form of insisting that there is some fact about the world which requires explanation, and that no explanation short of a deity will do. The fact chosen will vary from thinker to thinker or chapter to chapter, but there is one clear division among those facts said to be puzzling in the way required : on the one hand there is the bare fact that there *is* a world at all, that anything exists whatever ; and on the other there is the fact, or indefinitely large group of facts, that the world is as it is, that it contains the particular sorts of quality or relation that it does. Since Kant there has grown up a habit of thinking of all the demonstrations based on each of these as just one argument, and forgetting the great variety of arguments

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that have been offered of each sort ; this may not be very harmful
in the first case, but it certainly is in the second : the world is a
very varied place, and its orderliness is not the only feature of it
that has been picked out as requiring God to explain it, even
though this is the feature emphasised in the traditional Argument
from Design. To avoid any restrictions associated with longstand-
ing titles, I shall talk of Existential and Qualitative arguments.

In both there are certain features of great importance :

(1) In each case the force of the argument depends upon
undermining the tendency to explain the fact singled out by
means of more normal explanatory procedures, *e.g.* scientific
ones. The most effective method is to render these *irrelevant*
by making the puzzle too *general* for ordinary procedures to
solve it. In the Existential case, temptations to explain the
existence of a given object in terms of the causal action of an-
other are circumvented by showing that such explanations are
congenitally incomplete because they leave unanswered the
general question of why anything exists at all. ˙ In the Quali-
tative case, if a certain natural feature were scientifically ex-
plained it could be said that the natural regularity of which it
was thereby shown to be an example, or at least some all-em-
bracing one of which it in turn was an example, required explana-
tion ; the fact of order itself might be picked on for this ; or one
could just ask why it was that we had the sort of world which,
however naturally, gave rise to this or that feature.

(2) Although less perceptive theists have often not seen this,
especially in the Qualitative case, the demands for extra-scientific
explanation should logically force its users to be discontented
with the mere reference to a higher being. If it is puzzling that
anything exists, it should seem puzzling that *God* does ; if a
certain feature's presence in the universe is puzzling, then it
should seem puzzling that it, or that which gives rise to it,
should be present in God. In neither case is the explanation
complete. To complete it more has to be built in : the being
referred to has to be one whose existence, or whose possession of
the relevant attributes, is self-explanatory. The potentially
endless series of " Why ? "-questions has to end in an answer
that covers not only the last " Why ? " but the next one too.
So we have the doctrines of a being who necessarily *is*, or necessarily
is *what* he is. It is very important to see that exactly the same
theoretical move is involved whether it is said that the divine
existence or nature is self-explanatory to us or merely in itself ;
what is essential is that the explanation should be said to lie
in the divine being, even if we do not know it.

(3) As Kant saw in part, and Aquinas saw very clearly, the Qualitative question presupposes the Existential. One cannot finally answer the question of why the world is as it is without explaining why it exists, for nothing can have features unless it exists ; though this is naturally only a part of the answer, since showing why anything exists is not enough to show why this sort of thing rather than that does. A theist who saw this would naturally begin by asking the Existential question, and then try to show that the being needed to answer it is implicitly enough to answer the Qualitative. This is in part the procedure Aquinas adopts : the Existential query is clearly basic in the Five Ways, but the Qualitative is answered by implication in the discussion of the Divine Attributes, and is, I think, operative also in the Five Ways themselves.

A word here about these famous arguments. They are regularly treated, since Kant, as though they are in effect *one* argument, called The Cosmological Proof, which turns out when stated to be identical with the Third Way, or argument " from possibility and necessity ". This is not confined to non-Thomists anxious to refute the arguments. E. L. Mascall, for example, says [1]

> " As I see it, the ultimate function of the Five Ways is to make it plain, by calling attention to five outstanding features of finite being, what the fundamental characteristic of finite being is. And that fundamental characteristic is its radical inability to account for its own existence."

In other words, there is at bottom only one argument : since all the beings we know are such that their existence cannot be explained by reference to them, they must derive it from outside, and ultimately from a being whose existence does not require outside explanation, and who accounts for the existence of anything whatever. This certainly fits the Second and Third Ways well enough, and perhaps the First also ; and it can be made to seem a reasonable reading of the Fourth and Fifth, which involve it. But it is surely over-simple to emphasise it to the exclusion of the Qualitative query. Aquinas is surely concerned not only with the contingency of the being of finite things, but also with that of their manner of being ; in the Fourth and Fifth Ways he begins with the degrees of perfection things have and the order they exhibit, and not with their mere existence, which is more immediately his theme in the Second and Third. To borrow

[1] E. L. Mascall, *Existence and Analogy* (Longmans), p. 71.

his language, just as the essence of finite things does not account for their existence, so the fact of their existence does not account for their essence. The ultimate answer required here is a being whose possession of the attributes necessary to cause those of finite things is self-explanatory, *i.e.* to be accounted for in terms of him. This explanation, however, would seem to have to be in terms of his existence. What else in him could his essence be explained by? So the two questions coalesce, the second vanishing into the first, perhaps, and we conclude with a being who must, by the sort of being he is, exist, and also must, by the mere fact that he exists, be the sort of being he is : one in whom essence and existence are identical. While granting Aquinas the credit for seeing that the two questions merge, and that the Existential is primary, I think it is mistaken to stress it to the extent of ignoring the presence of the Qualitative dimension from the very beginning.

II

Whether this historical excursus is sound or not, we have two archetypal questions, which seem to have clear requirements for answers, and which tend to merge.

Those who ask for them recognise that the required explanations are of quite a different order from scientific ones. We have to step out of such mundane explanatory processes and enter upon another, for they are inevitably never complete—this is the import of St. Thomas's troublesome remarks about infinite regresses. The psychological mechanism of this transition is easy to share in, but its rationality is dubious from the start, just because the kind of process we step into is of such a different order from the one we step out of. For this same reason it cannot be regarded as the completion of the ordinary explanatory processes. This is easy to see when we reflect that the only reasons for stepping out of them into it, say, six finite causes back in the series rather than sixteen or six hundred are impatience or fatigue. Philosophers, contrary to common opinion, are prone to both, but they should not found arguments upon them. In the sense in which a Necessary Being explains, contingent causes do not explain incompletely, but are not attempts to explain at all. Sceptics might say that since the concept of explanation is formed by reference to contingent causes, the demands for explanation made in our questions are spurious ; a question does not become intelligible merely because of the co-presence of a curiosity-feeling.

To this the metaphysical theist might reply that it is the spuriousness, and not the genuineness, of a question that needs demonstrating, and that in the present case it is possible to explain quite clearly what sort of answer would satisfy the questioner. I would be the first to agree that when both sides insist that they are dealing with a unique case, considerations based upon this fact cannot be more than persuasive. But we do not need to rest content with these ; nor do we need to consider the perplexing problem of whether there can be a question to which, in fact, there just is not any answer ; [1] we need merely to assert that there can be no genuine question where the only possible answer to the purported one is demonstrably absurd. And both the Existential and the Qualitative questions are like this.

III (a)

" Why does anything exist? " is a total question. There can be nothing not mentioned in the question to bring in to explain what is mentioned in the question. There are therefore three possible ways of answering it. We could say that every individual thing is self-explanatory ; we could say that the totality of things is self-explanatory, and individuals explicable by reference to it ; or we could say that one part of what exists is self-explanatory, and the rest explicable by reference to that part. Of these three only the last is of interest, since all three make use of the same crucial concept of a self-explanatory being, and the first two have extra problems of their own beside this. The objection to this form of argument centres on the self-explanatory being. Kant held that the argument from contingent to necessary being in the Cosmological Proof reduced that argument to the Ontological Proof, and in spite of the fact that he located this reduction in the wrong place,[2] his claim is correct.

First, what is wrong with the Ontological Proof? It amounts to the claim that " God exists " is an analytic proposition. The standard, and correct, objection to this is that which Kant raised, viz. that to assert the existence of something is quite different from asserting what sort of thing it is, and to know that either assertion is true is not to know the other is. If someone came in unannounced and said, " It's blue! " we should not have much idea what he was talking about, but we would automatically

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[1] R. L. Franklin, " Necessary Being ", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, August, 1957.

[2] J. J. C. Smart, " The Existence of God ", *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, ed. Flew and MacIntyre (SCM).

know it was a visible physical object and not a philosophical theory or an Act of Parliament. But if he had come in and said " It exists! " we should know *nothing* about what sort of thing it was. Existence cannot vary in quantity or intensity, belong to some members of a class and not others, or be interrupted and then resumed.[1] Moore has brought out some of the peculiarities of the word " exist " in a very well-known paper.[2] From all this it follows that existence cannot be held to be a quality which a perfect being would have to have, since it is not a quality at all. So it further follows that no existential assertion *can* be analytic.

So much for the Ontological Proof. It is important to see that what refutes it is not a discovery about the structure of things, which might in a given case be different, but a logical discovery about the concept of existence, which sets it apart from other concepts ; that no tautology can be existential is a consequence of this. Another consequence is the refutation of our Existential argument. For the distinctive character of the concept of existence precludes our saying there can be a being whose existence follows from his essence ; and also precludes the even stronger logical move of *identifying* the existence of anything with its essence. These are the Anselmian error all over again. The only other way of explaining God's existence by his essence would be by asserting a causal relationship between them, but this would run us into absurdities like saying that God would have to pre-exist himself, or that his essence would have to have something almost, but not quite, amounting to existence in order subsequently to express itself in being.

So there is no way in which the existence of *any* being could be held to be a fact explicable by reference to that being itself. Before passing to the Qualitative argument, there are two important side-issues to discuss. One is the argument of G. E. Hughes [3] that " God exists ", though not analytic, might still be necessary, *i.e.* synthetically necessary ; the other is the important historical claim that the Thomistic position is further removed from the Ontological Proof than any position I have considered, and is therefore unaffected by what I have said.

(i) To say that " God exists " is synthetically necessary is to run counter to fashionable views about necessity in propositions,

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[1] *Analysis* Competition No. 11, June 1957.

[2] G. E. Moore, " Is Existence a Predicate ? ", in *Logic and Language*, Second Series, ed. Flew (Blackwell).

[3] J. N. Findlay, G. E. Hughes and A. C. A. Rainer, " Can God's Existence be Disproved ? ", *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*.

but, as Hughes insists, one can be out of fashion and right. The difficulty for our present purpose is the notorious one for believers in synthetic necessity, of *explaining* the necessary character of the examples offered. If all necessary propositions are tautologies, this explains *why* we cannot deny them; failing an equivalent explanation, purported cases of synthetic necessity seem to have a merely subjective certainty. I do not see what sort of explanation could be had in the present case : certainly a Kantian type of explanation is unsuitable.

(ii) Since Aquinas differs from Anselm in holding that God's existence has to be inferred from his effects and not from the mere concept of God, he is traditionally credited with having seen what was wrong with the Ontological Proof. He did see it was wrong, but not *why* it was, for he commits the same error himself. He says that we do not have the requisite knowledge of the divine nature to deduce God's existence from it ; but his own argument leads us from finite beings to a being whose existence does follow from his nature, and this entails that *if* we knew God's nature we *could* deduce his existence from it—and *this* is the mistake. To say that although God's existence is self-evident in itself it is not to us is to say that it *is* self-evident in itself, and the error lies here. It is not our ignorance that is the obstacle to explaining God's existence by his nature, but the logical character of the concept of existence.

In order to introduce the morals I wish to draw from this, I shall discuss briefly a recently-expressed view of Necessary Being put forward as the basis of discussion by R. L. Franklin.[1] This is that a Necessary Being is just a being in whom the question " Why? " stops, a being about whom it makes no sense to ask it. This looks to claim less than the Thomistic position, and Franklin claims that it offers an intelligible answer to the question of why anything exists, but not a demonstrable one. It is instructive to see why this is unsatisfactory : if we cannot ask why a given being exists there must be a reason why we cannot ; if there were no reason, then we *could* ask this question—such at least is the assumption made in the initial stages of any version of the Existential argument. There are two possible reasons there could be. The first is that the being in question is self-explanatory, which I have already tried to show to be an absurd reason. The second is that although the being in question is the cause of all other beings, there is no other being to be found which is the cause of *it*. In this case there would be one unexplained being,

[1] R. L. Franklin, " Necessary Being ", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, August 1957.

by hypothesis, and it would not answer the question of why *anything* existed. Franklin says that " Why does anything exist? " may not have an answer, but that if it does a Necessary Being (in his sense) would provide it. But a Necessary Being in his sense would not provide it, unless we went on to make it a self-explanatory being and thus reduced it to absurdity. It is not that something could provide an answer to the Existential question but maybe nothing does, but that nothing *could*.

Now for the morals :

(i) It is absurd to ask why anything exists, because the only possible answers are in terms of the logically *im*possible notion of a self-explanatory being. This is still logically impossible when it is softened by its user's saying that we personally do not know the explanation.

(ii) This in itself does not prevent us from saying that the existence of everything in the universe *except one* is due to that one (though we would presumably believe in that one for reasons not related to our present argument). ·But it does prevent us from going on to ask why that one exists, for *in this context* that would be *equivalent* to asking why *anything* does.

(iii) But unless you assume independently that a given being has no cause, you always can ask why it exists, *i.e.* what caused it. If you do assume it has no cause, you *ipso facto* make it impossible to ask why it is there.

(iv) So there *may* be a being who is the cause of everything else, but if there is he cannot explain the baffling fact of existence. For it is logically impossible to explain *everything*. The Principle of Sufficient Reason is demonstrably false.

(v) So the fact that things exist cannot entail the existence of God ; it could only do so if God were self-explanatory. Failing this, the " Why? "—questions would only come to a halt if we had independent reasons for holding that the being we had reached was uncaused. And it would be these independent reasons that would bring us to theism. And it would not be a theism that *explained*. Theism cannot explain any more than atheism can.

III (b)

We turn now more briefly to our Qualitative question. The search for the complete explanation of the presence in the universe of any property is bound to lead to the claim that there is a being who has it, or some higher cause or analogate of it,[1] self-explanatorily. The objections in this case are similar :

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[1] This qualifying phrase will be assumed, but not stated, in what follows.

(1) Let us call the property P. Our doctrine could mean that God has P because of some other properties he has, the relationship being causal. This clearly only pushes the problem back to these other properties themselves.

(2) The doctrine could mean "God has P" is a necessary proposition. I will assume this to mean "analytically necessary", since, as before, its being synthetically necessary might give it certitude, but not explanatory power. Now to say that "God has P" is analytic does not solve our problem, which is that of accounting for the occurrence, in the whole realm of being, of P. If it is analytic that God has P, this just tells us that having P is part of what is meant by the word "God", *i.e.* that no being would be accorded the title who lacked P. But this merely means that there is a connection between the *concepts* of divinity and P-hood, not why either the first or the second has instances (or even *whether* either has). To know that "Birds have wings" is analytic is to know something important about the words "bird" and "wing", but nothing at all about why winged creatures came to be.

The analyticity of statements about God has been thought to raise more problems than it does. C. B. Martin [1] has claimed that since "God is good" is analytic, God cannot be identified with the man Jesus, for "Jesus is good" is synthetic. This can be resolved by using Martin's own distinction between "God" as a proper name, and "God" as a *concept*.[2] "God(concept) is good" is analytic; but "God(proper name) is good" is synthetic, and learned, if at all, by experience. In our present case the problem posed by the Qualitative query is that of explaining the fact reported by "God(proper name) has P". This is not explained by showing that "God(concept) has P" is analytic, even though it is.

(3) Only one recourse remains. Since the divine possession of P cannot be explained by reference to the divine nature, it can only be explained by reference to the divine existence. Let us say, then, that God's having P is a deducible consequence of the fact of his existence. This would only explain his having P if his existence were previously said to be necessary, but let us ignore this. What is said of P would apply, by parity of reasoning, to all the divine attributes; so we come once more to the identity of the divine essence and existence, with some kind of priority being accorded to the divine existence. The connection

[1] C. B. Martin, "The Perfect Good", *New Essays Phil. Theol.*

[2] Alan Donagan, *Review of New Essays Phil. Theol.*, in *Philosophical Review*, July 1957.

between the Existential and Qualitative arguments is closer than Kant recognised.

The objections are not hard to find :

(i) Quite apart from the difficulties involved in saying God necessarily exists, we have gone in a circle if we fall back on this here. For we began by explaining his existence in terms of his essence, and we now find ourselves explaining his essence in terms of his existence.

(ii) The logical character of the concept of existence is not only enough to render it inadmissible to infer God's existence from his essence, but also renders it inadmissible to infer his essence from his existence—or, again, to identify them.

The morals to be drawn are the same :

(i) It is absurd to ask why anything has P, for the only possible answers are in terms of the logically *im*possible notion of a being in whom the presence of P is self-explanatory, etc.

(ii) This in itself does not prevent us from saying that the presence of P in any being in the universe *except one* is due to its presence in that one, etc. But it does prevent us from going on to ask why that being has P, for *in this context* that would be *equivalent* to asking why *anything* does.

(iii) But unless you assume independently that a given being has P without cause, you can always ask why it has P, etc.

(iv) So there *may* be a being who is the cause of all *other* beings' having P who have it, but he cannot explain the baffling fact of P itself, etc.

(v) So the fact that P can be found cannot entail that there is a God who has P ; it could only do so if God's having P were self-explanatory. Failing this, the " Why P? "-questions would only come to a halt if we had independent reasons for holding that the being we had reached had P without cause, etc.

IV

There can, then, be no metaphysical compulsion to believe in God ; for the sort of metaphysical questions which would necessitate theism are spurious. This does not refute theism, however. It would only refute it if the sort of explanatory demand we have been considering were inevitably involved in belief in God. This has been argued by J. N. Findlay ;[1] he says that the attitude of worship entails God's complete independence of all other beings, both in his existence and his possession of his

[1] J. N. Findlay, G. E. Hughes and A. C. A. Rainer, " Can God's Existence be Disproved ? ", *New Essays in Philosophical Theology.*

excellences, and entails that he possesses these in the highest conceivable degree ; if this is accepted, and it seems it must be, he claims we have to go on to say that God exists and has his excellences in some necessary manner ; given the absurdity of this, God's non-existence follows.

Theism can be rescued from his argument. One can agree with Aquinas that it is no limitation on God that he cannot perform logical absurdities ; and one can adapt this and say it is no limitation on him that he cannot *be* a logical absurdity ; and that is what a Necessary Being, *in the sense we have examined,* is. I think the readiness of Findlay's disputants to agree that God's existence and excellence are necessary is due to a dangerous and crucial ambiguity in the terms " necessary " and " contingent " (an ambiguity almost, but not quite, recognised by Rainer). It is pedantic of philosophers to insist that these words only apply to propositions and not to things ; but our previous discussion should show that they will mean something different in each case. We do not need to say precisely here what propositional necessity is : let us say that, roughly, a proposition is necessary if its truth can be known without reference to anything other than a clear understanding of what is said or implied in it ; contingency in propositions is the absence of necessity (and of its contrary, *viz.* necessary falsehood or, if this is the same, self-contradiction). As applied to things or events, " contingent " will mean " dependent " or " caused ", one thing or event being contingent *upon* another ; " necessary " will mean " not dependent on any other ", and, in addition, " having others dependent on it ". A thing is necessary if it is indispensable. For want of a better phrase I shall call necessity in this sense " factual necessity ". To be a theist is to believe that there is a being, God, who is factually necessary, all other beings being dependent, contingent, upon him. But the *assertion* of this will be a contingent assertion, in the propositional sense (and not in the Thomistic sense that Rainer adopts, viz. contingent to us but necessary for God.) God's existence and nature are unique in the universe in being free of factual contingency, but the assertions of them share in propositional contingency with all other assertions of fact.

Theists believe that God exists, that he is supremely great and good, that no other beings would exist if he did not, and that all their multitudinous features have their source in him. I have denied none of this. It merely means that God is factually necessary, indispensable. I have denied he can be necessary in any other sense, that he explains either his own existence or nature, or, ultimately, that of other things. Since this ideal is

bogus, God is not denigrated if he is not held to realise it. If there is a factually necessary being then, this fact, though the most important fact there is, could not be proved.

" Why, then, be a Theist? " Well, theism is older than the Cosmological Proof, and can survive it. Some have tried to present it as an ordinary empirical hypothesis, but this has seldom impressed. If theism is to be seen to be true at all, it looks as though this will have to happen through individual confrontation with what purports to be God's self-revelation. A person who accepts this and then proclaims it to others is not free from philosophical criticism just because he does not proclaim his belief as metaphysically necessary ; for he still makes statements which do not always appear to others to have the relationship to evidence which all statements (they say) have to have ; and if " metaphysics " is defined in the required way, what he says will be metaphysical to them still. But the objections thus raised against theism when it is expressed in undemonstrated assertions by such a person, however strong they are, are distinct from those much stronger ones that can be brought against offering theism as the answer to the sort of confused question we have examined above ; and the sort of " metaphysics " that may be contained in them or spun around them is likely to be immune to the objections we have stressed, whatever its other defects may be. Philosophical analysis will not progress much in understanding religious assertions, especially their relationship to metaphysical speculation, unless these distinctions are carefully borne in mind.

University of Alberta

IV.—META-ETHICS AND NORMATIVE ETHICS

By Alan Gewirth

CONTEMPORARY moral philosophers frequently describe what they are doing by means of a distinction between two kinds of ethical doctrine. One kind consists in normative judgments, of various degrees of generality, as to what things, acts, or qualities are good or bad, right or wrong ; the other kind consists in logical analysis of the meanings of such ethical predicates and of the methods of supporting the judgments. This distinction has been expressed in various ways : as between " ethical pronouncements " and " ethical philosophy," " normative (or ' evaluative ') ethics " and the " analytic or methodological study . . . of ethics ", " moral systems " and " ethical theory ", " moral theory " and " philosophy of ethics ", " specifically ethical beliefs " and " theory about the status of ethical sentences ". The distinction is also suggested by R. M. Hare's definition of ethics as " the logical study of the language of morals "; for here " the language of morals " is distinguished from " the logical study " of that language. To have a uniform terminology for referring to this distinction, let us, following one of its main advocates, express it as the distinction between " normative ethics " and " meta-ethics ". Examples of normative ethical doctrines, then, are such general theories as hedonism, or that to be morally good an act must be done from duty, or the ethics of self-realization, as well as particular or singular normative judgments. Examples of meta-ethical doctrines are intuitionism, or naturalism, or emotivism, or " metaphysical ethics " in the sense defined by G. E. Moore in *Principia Ethica*.

Most of the contemporary writers who uphold this distinction say that their own task, as philosophers, is to do not normative ethics but meta-ethics. And many of them assimilate this distinction to such other distinctions as those between science and the philosophy of science (or, variously, epistemology), or between object-language and meta-language, or between first-order statements and second-order statements, in each of which, similarly, the philosopher's business is said to lie in the second, " meta-" discipline. Recently this last distinction has also been used by T. D. Weldon to express, in the sphere of politics, a distinction very similar to the one in ethics: it has been said that the proper concern of political philosophy is with " second-order talk about politics " as against the " first-order political principles " which express basic political beliefs or judgments.

Without committing myself as to the uniformity or correctness of all these assimilations, I wish in this paper to examine the legitimacy of the distinction between meta-ethics and normative ethics, with the correlative restriction of the philosopher to meta-ethics. Some of the insistence on this restriction seems to derive from such currently popular ideas as that the sole proper concern of the philosopher is with the logical analysis of language ; that the logical status of normative ethical judgments is unclear, so that the philosopher should not make such judgments until he has cleared this status up ; that anyway to make such judgments is to preach, which is philosophically quite unrespectable. I am doubtful about some of these ideas, and I wish to present here the grounds of my doubts.

The distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics has, of course, some obvious initial justifications. There is the general distinction between use and mention, between using an expression and talking about it. And there is the more specific distinction between knowing how to use a language and knowing how to explicate that use, with regard to the logic of the expressions in question, how they are to be classified and otherwise related to one another. However, philosophers who distinguish meta-ethics from normative ethics intend that the distinction involves a far more radical differentiation. They interpret the distinction as meaning that normative ethics and meta-ethics are independent of one another, in the two following ways : (*A*) Meta-ethics implies or presupposes no specific normative ethical doctrines, so that *the same meta-ethics is compatible with different and even opposed normative ethics* ; and (*B*) Normative ethics implies or presupposes no specific meta-ethical doctrines, so that *the same normative ethics is compatible with different and even opposed meta-ethics*. It will be noted that these two views are logically distinct. It might be possible to hold that the same meta-ethics, *e.g.* emotivism, is compatible with such different normative ethics as hedonism and deontologism, while at the same time denying that the same normative ethics, *e.g.* hedonism, is compatible with both emotivism and intuitionism. The reverse is also possible. Hence I shall examine each of these two views in turn. Such an examination is called for not only because of the intrinsic interest of the views in question but also because of their pervasive influence on the conceptions had by many contemporary moral philosophers concerning what they are doing and what, as philosophers, they ought to be doing.

A. The first of these two views has come into special prominence in the recent arguments over whether the emotivist meta-ethics

has any logical consequences for normative ethics. Opponents of the emotivist theory have frequently claimed that it is an " attempt to discredit ethics ", that it constitutes a " denial that there really is any obligation or anything good ". To this it has been replied that the emotivist theory is neutral so far as any normative ethical commitment is concerned. Just as Max Weber held that the study of values can itself be " value-free ", so the emotivists have held that their meta-ethics is " a relatively neutral study " which must " retain that difficult detachment which *studies* ethical judgments without *making* them " (Stevenson). A meta-ethical proposition is " a purely scientific statement, merely expressing knowledge, and not in any way evaluating the world or intervening in it " (R. Robinson). " A strictly philosophical treatise on ethics should therefore make no ethical pronouncements " (Ayer).

> Those who hold it [the emotive theory] do not maintain any *ethical* view, such as that the enjoyment of cruelty is good, that the Fuehrer ought always to be obeyed, that our only duty is to do as we please. By accepting this theory, a philosopher does not commit himself to any specifically ethical views at all. . . . an ethical theory such as this is quite neutral between the various views about how we ought to behave (Harrison).

While all these statements are quoted from writers who are concerned to discuss or defend the emotivist meta-ethics, there can be little doubt that they regard other meta-ethical theories as being similarly neutral in regard to normative ethics. And the same point has also been made by other writers.

It is by no means an adequate or cogent refutation of this view to point out that meta-ethicists make normative judgments, or even that they make such judgments in the same books in which they present their meta-ethics. For to hold that meta-ethics is neutral with regard to normative ethics does not entail that the meta-ethicist, as a person but not *qua* meta-ethicist, may not have normative ethical convictions and express them in his works. All that is required is that such convictions not be presented as necessary consequences or antecedents of the meta-ethics.

Now it is, of course, the case that meta-ethics presupposes normative ethics insofar as the latter is what the former purports to analyse. The neutrality claimed for meta-ethics in relation to normative ethics, then, must mean that to engage in such analysis does not involve committing oneself to any *specific* normative ethics. And such non-commitment would seem to apply in two closely related ways : (*a*) In respect of *selecting* the subject-matter to be analysed, the meta-ethicist can achieve his aim

without having to restrict himself to one normative ethical doctrine as against another. (b) In respect of *evaluating* the subject-matter to be analysed, the meta-ethicist can achieve his aim without having to make a moral (*i.e.* normative ethical) judgment that the normative ethical doctrine which he has selected for analysis is itself morally (*i.e.* normatively-ethically) good or bad. That (b) is upheld by supporters of the ethical neutrality of meta-ethics, we have seen above. That (a) is also upheld is likewise clear from many recent discussions. Thus it has been said by Kaplan that examples of the normative ethical systems which the meta-ethicist analyses include the Sermon on the Mount, Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, and the *Rubaiyat*. Similarly, Hare concerns himself indifferently with the normative ethical language of missionaries, cannibals, and Communists. And Stevenson explicitly undertakes to use the word " moralist " in " a wholly neutral and very broad sense ". Moreover, since words like " good ", " right ", and " ought " are frequently used in non-moral (*i.e.* non-normatively-ethical) contexts, the meta-ethicist in his analysis of meanings and methods can concern himself with occurrences of these words in sentences which are not specifically moral or normatively ethical at all. Thus Stevenson writes that " The moral senses of the ethical terms are no more interesting, for our purposes, than the non-moral ones ; for the topics that they introduce raise no special problems of language or methodology ". And Hare likewise devotes much of his book on *The Language of Morals* to prescriptive and evaluative utterances which are not specifically moral ; when in his ninth chapter he finally comes to " ' Good ' in Moral Contexts " he writes that " the special status of morals . . . does not require a special logic to back it up " (p. 143).

In order to be clear about the issues involved here, it is important to note certain distinctions bearing on evaluation generally and ethical evaluation specifically. First there is a distinction as to the *objects* which are evaluated, and these objects may be either *human* or *non-human*. For example, we may talk of a " good fellow " or of a " good auger ". Second, within the human there is a further distinction as to the *respects* which are evaluated, and these respects may be either *ethical* (or *moral*) or *non-ethical* (or *non-moral*). For example, we may talk of a " good man ", on the one hand, or of a " good carpenter " or a " good fellow ", on the other. When writers like Stevenson and Hare refer to the " moral senses of the ethical terms " and to " ' good ' in moral contexts ", they use the word " moral " in this sense in which we are distinguishing the " moral " or " ethical " from the

" non-moral " or " non-ethical ". It is easier to give examples
of this distinction than to analyse it. The trouble stems partly
from the fact that the distinction is interpreted differently in
different moral philosophies, so that it is difficult to give a neutral
specification of it. For the hedonist, the ´eudaemonist, the
deontologist, the " ethical " is defined by that which affects,
respectively, pleasure, happiness, duty. For our present pur-
poses, however, the distinction between the ethical and the non-
ethical, within the general sphere of human " goods ", may be
described as the difference between the goodness of traits which
men have *qua* men, and those which men have in some more
restricted capacity. Contrasting pairs of terms like " character "
as against " temperament ", or " virtues " as against " talents ",
may help to suggest aspects of the distinction ; but it would be
interpreted differently by Aristotle, by Hume, and by Kant.

In addition to these two distinctions, there is a third which is
ïmportant for our present problem. Within the ethical or moral
there is a distinction as to the *meanings* or *uses* of the words
" ethical " and " moral ". Even when these words are used
to refer to humans alone, and to their traits of character in virtue
of which they are called good men, these words may be used in a
positive or a *normative* sense. When used in a positive sense, the
user intends them to refer to any system of rules or norms of
human character and conduct, regardless of whether or not he
himself approves of them. In this sense one may talk of the
" ethics " or " morals " of Jesus, of Nietzsche, of Albert Schweit-
zer, of Al Capone, of various aboriginal tribes, of Middletown,
etc. In this sense, the words " ethics " and " morals " are
themselves morally neutral, where " morally " refers to the
normative sense now to be indicated. When used in a normative
sense, on the other hand, the user intends the words " ethics "
and " morals ", and the corresponding adjectives " ethical "
and " moral ", to have an approbative force : they refer to the
system of rules or norms of human character and conduct which
in his view are the good or right ones. The words are used in this
way when we say, about a man who has cheated, lied, stolen,
etc., " Where's his ethics? " or when we say, " He has no morals ".
By this is meant not that he has no rules or norms or standard
ways of acting of which *he* approves, but that these are wrong.
This is likewise evident in such expressions as, " It was the
ethical thing to do ", " He is a moral man ", etc.

The distinction between the positive and the normative uses
of " ethical " or " moral " is often made unclear in any given
context because of failure to notice that the positive uses are

other-reflecting, while the normative uses are *self-reflecting*.
When I talk of the " ethics " of Nietzsche, my use of the word
" ethics " is a positive use, for I do not share or approve of his
standards ; it reflects his, not my, evaluations ; but when
Nietzsche talks of his own " ethics ", his use of this word is
normative and reflects his own evaluations. Thus the uses of
" ethics " are relative to their users. This distinction bears, of
course, not on the basis, scope, or content of evaluations, but
solely on their relation to their users ; it applies as much to
the utterance of a Kantian universalism as of any subjectivistic
or relativistic position. Whether " ethical " or " moral " is
used positively or normatively depends on who is using it and on
whose evaluations it reflects. The words always reflect evalua-
tions, even in their positive uses ; but in positive uses they reflect
the evaluations not of their users but of other persons whose
evaluations are being talked about.

Now from these distinctions, the following emerges as an analytic
consequence : When a meta-ethicist analyses ethics *in a way
which aims to fit indifferently what are for him both the positive
and the normative senses of " ethics "*, then no normative ethical
judgment of his own is presupposed by his engaging in such analy-
sis, for his use of " ethics " does not uniquely reflect his own
evaluations. When, on the other hand, a meta-ethicist analyses
ethics *in what is for him the normative sense of " ethics "*, then his
engaging in such analysis does presuppose a normative ethical
judgment of his own, for his use of " ethics " does reflect his own
evaluations. Indeed, in such cases his meta-ethical analyses
are indistinguishable from what has traditionally been an im-
portant part of the task of normative ethicists.

We must now show that these consequences actually apply
to the practice of current meta-ethicists. For it is not enough to
establish these assertions as analytic, since as such they might
reflect only our own idiosyncratic definitions. What is important
is not merely the particular terms we have used, nor even that
they fit the empirical facts, *i.e.* the actual practice of meta-
ethicists, but also that the latter seem to be driven, as it were,
to a concern with normative ethics as against positive ethics by
the demands of their subject-matter. Their task is incomplete
so long as they deal with the moral language of cannibals and
missionaries, Capones and Schweitzers, as if they were morally
on a par.

There can be, of course, no question of an exhaustive survey ;
but some chief tendencies must be noted.   In the first place, there
are emotivists like Stevenson and prescriptivists like Hare, who

explicitly tell us that the " ethics " or " morals " whose language they are analysing has its main traits in common with various non-moral kinds of emotive and prescriptive language. Now, in terms of the distinctions indicated above, this means that such writers are concerned as much with non-ethical as with ethical respects, and with positive as with normative ethics. Their aim is to present an analysis which shall fit all the uses of " good " and " ought ", and all the chief methods by which sentences using these words are supported. Hence Stevenson can correctly describe a large variety of methods, ranging from consideration of consequences to appeals to prejudice, whereby " ethical judgments " are supported. " *Any* statement about *any* matter of fact which *any* speaker considers likely to alter attitudes may be adduced as a reason for or against an ethical judgment ". No normative ethical questions enter—no questions as to what is the morally better way of using these words or the morally better way of supporting such sentences. The approach is purely descriptive, *i.e.* positive. Let us therefore call such a meta-ethics *positivistic*.

But even if the positivists' interpretation of the meaning of ethical terms is justified insofar as they are looking for a generic analysis of what is common to all ethics, this still leaves unsettled the question of the proper analysis of normative ethics. Granted that we can find something common to the utterances of Schweitzer and Capone, still, insofar as we do not regard Capone as a (normatively) moral man, while we do regard Schweitzer as one, can our meta-ethics enable us to tell what is the difference between them? Recent meta-ethicists have been answering this question in the affirmative through the device of centring attention on questions of method as against questions of meaning. Thus Hare, for instance, while recognizing the differences between the " criteria of application " which missionaries, cannibals, and others may have for the application of the word " good ", yet insists that the " meaning " of the word is the same in all these cases—namely, the word is being used for commending. This seems to suggest that the meta-ethicist concerned with the " logical study of the language of morals " can do nothing more than point out such generic traits, that he cannot help us to ascertain the difference between justified and unjustified, or morally correct and incorrect applications of " good " and other moral terms. But the picture changes when Hare talks about the methods of justifying moral decisions:

> a complete justification of a decision would consist of a complete account of its effects, together with a complete account of the principles which it observed, and the effects of observing those

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principles. . . . Thus, if pressed to justify a decision completely,
we have to give a complete specification of the way of life of
which it is a part. . . . Far from being arbitrary, *such a decision
would be the most well-founded of decisions*, because it would be
based upon a consideration of everything upon which it could
possibly be founded (p. 69).

Here, it will be noted, Hare is distinguishing between good and
bad methods of justifying moral decisions, or between the various
degrees to which a decision is " well-founded ", according to the
extent to which the decision is " based upon a consideration "
of all relevant factors. This means that his meta-ethical or
logical analysis is at the same normatively ethical, in that it
distinguishes between what he himself regards as morally good
and bad. Hare recognizes this when he adds, directly after the
sentence last quoted: " It will be noticed how, in talking of
decisions of principle, I have inevitably started talking value-
language.":

The same point emerges when Hare goes on to say that " To
ask whether I ought to do A in these circumstances is (to borrow
Kantian language with a small though important modification)
to ask whether or not I will that doing A in such circumstances
should become a universal law " (p. 70). Does Hare intend here
that *every* occurrence of " ought to do something " has this
quasi-Kantian meaning, or only where the phrase is used by men
whose decisions are at least approximately such as are, in his
view, " well-founded "? Surely the latter answer is the correct
one ; for many men use " ought " sentences without recognizing,
even implicitly, such universalistic considerations as Hare has
called " well-founded ". That this invocation of Kant involves
distinguishing the moral (or normatively ethical) from both the
non-moral and the immoral (*i.e.* positively ethical) uses of such
words as " good " and " ought " Hare further recognizes when
he subsequently cites Kant as having dealt with " judgments
which are properly moral " (p. 196). Similar considerations
arise when Hare, emphasizing with Kant that " we have to make
our own decisions of principle ", goes on to distinguish the
competing claims of tradition and novelty, and concludes :
" *To become morally adult* is to reconcile these two apparently
conflicting positions by learning to make decisions of principle ;
it is to learn to use ' ought '-sentences in the realization that they
can only be verified by reference to a standard or set of principles
which we have by our own decision accepted and made our own "
(pp. 77–78, my italics). In thus distinguishing the " morally
adult " from the morally puerile or adolescent, Hare is analysing

the method of making moral judgments which he considers the correct method, and by the same token he is himself making a moral—a normatively ethical—judgment. For he is telling us what he regards as the distinguishing characteristic of a morally adult person, just as before he told us what he regards as a well-founded decision. And to tell us this is to indicate what he regards as morally good or normatively ethical, at least so far as concerns the method which is normatively ethical in contrast with the method which is not. In so doing, Hare is not "preaching", nor is he presenting us with ready-made lists of virtues and vices, goods and evils, duties and prohibitions, though I would argue that this is not done by such philosophical ethicists as Aristotle and Kant either. Rather, he is dealing with the central question of what methods of arriving at normative ethical judgments distinguish the morally adult man— what an older tradition would have called the "man of practical wisdom"—from one who is not.

There are many signs that other recent meta-ethicists have been grasping this point that to deal generically with the evaluative or prescriptive or emotive features of the language common to positive and normative ethics still leaves unsettled the question of the distinctive logic of the language of normative ethics. In contrast with the generalizing approach, they have been emphasizing the methods of " moral reasoning " as against " persuading ", " guiding " as against " goading ", " moral valuation " as against " expression of attitudes "; and one of the central points of these distinctions is that ethical judgments must be, or must be based on considerations that are, impartial or universalizable, as against the subjective, partial, or idiosyncratic traits of judgments that are non-moral or immoral. From these emphases it follows that their meta-ethics is not morally neutral in either of the two senses indicated above. For (a) in respect of *selecting* the subject-matter to be analysed, the meta-ethicist selects for study those kinds of language and action in which what he regards as peculiarly moral traits—those of *normative* ethics— are discerned, as against the various kinds of language or conduct in which persuasion, goading, or expression of attitudes occurs. And (b) in respect of *evaluating* the subject-matter to be analysed, the meta-ethicist, by thus selecting, is at least implicitly making a normative ethical judgment ; for he is distinguishing the " moral " not only from the *non-moral* but also from the *immoral*.

Let me give some examples of such selective-evaluative emphases by recent meta-ethicists. First, Falk : " Part of the common understanding of ' moral persuasion ' is that it should be

distinct from unprincipled goading ; and it would not be
necessarily distinct from this if its aim were to advance persuasive
arguments simply for the sake of bending the hearer's will to the
expressed will of the speaker " (MIND (1953), p. 167). Here, it
will be noted, Falk is attempting to distinguish the " moral "
from " unprincipled goading "; thus " moral," as he is using it,
is not merely a descriptive term whereby he distinguishes the
moral from the non-moral, but also a normative term whereby
he distinguishes it from the " unprincipled goading " which is
immoral. And to make the latter distinction is to make a moral
judgment. Similarly, Toulmin writes that " If, in justifying an
action, we can carry our reasons back to such universal principles,
our justification has some claim to be called ' ethical '. But if
we cannot do so, our appeal is not to ' morality ' at all : if, for
example, the most general principles to which we can appeal still
contain some reference to us, either as individuals or as members
of a limited group of people, then our appeal is not to ' morality '
but to ' privilege '" (*The Place of Reason in Ethics*, p. 168).
Here again the meta-ethical account of the nature of a moral
judgment distinguishes it from an immoral one appealing to
" privilege ", and thereby the meta-ethicist makes a normative
ethical judgment approving the former and disapproving the
latter. In like fashion, Duncan-Jones writes that " a man
cannot be making a moral judgment unless his attitude is free
from partiality for particular places, ages, and social groups, and
from self-partiality," although he then goes on to recognize
the practical difficulty of determining " how far someone's
attitude was vitiated by partiality, and so not universalizable "
(*Butler's Moral Philosophy*, p. 172). Likewise, Hampshire
writes that " the characterization of such [moral] judgments as
purely, or even largely, reports of feelings or attitudes is at the
least incomplete and misleadingly incomplete, because the typical
procedures of deliberation on which the judgment is based are
suppressed or ignored. . . . If I am not prepared to produce
such practical arguments, pointing to what ought to have been
done, I shall admit that I am not making a genuine moral judg-
ment, but merely expressing or reporting my own feelings . . . "
(MIND (1949), pp. 470, 471).

I think it will be granted, then, that recent meta-ethicists have
been trying to get at what is " genuinely moral " or " peculiarly
ethical " in our moral judgments, as against other species of
practical judgments or decisions or prescriptions to which they
may be generically related. But it may perhaps still be asked
whether such discriminative selection of the peculiarly ethical

necessarily commits the meta-ethicist to making a normative ethical judgment as to the normative ethical goodness or value of what he has thus discriminated. Is it not still possible for a meta-ethicist to say : " I am myself, *qua* meta-ethicist, completely neutral in this regard ; I am simply reporting and analysing what is peculiarly ethical in our -talking, thinking, feeling, and acting, but am in no sense myself approving it or otherwise judging it to ethically good " ? May we not distinguish between (*a*) describing and analysing what is distinctively moral in our language and conduct, and (*b*)₊ approving of the content which is thus described and analysed? We can imagine this distinction being made, for example, by an " outsider " or an " underground man " who reports what is " ethical " while at the same time disavowing it for himself.

The reason why these questions must be answered in the negative has frequently been presented in recent meta-ethical literature, although in a different reference from the present one. To say that something is normatively ethical is to say that it is morally good, and to say this is to express moral approval of it. This comes out in the normative disvalue terms which the meta-ethicists cited above use to contrast with the " ethical " or " moral ": " unprincipled ", " vitiated ", " privilege ". For our hypothetical " outsider ", what we and the meta-ethicist have referred to as " normatively ethical " or " distinctively moral " would be only positively ethical, and he would have his own normative ethics, perhaps one of individualistic nonconformity, to oppose to it. But this very example supports our point, for the outsider, in setting up his own meta-ethics of the meaning of normative ethical terms and the methods of supporting normative ethical judgments, would have to consider his own normative ethics as the source for his meta-ethics.

It is also to be noted that even though the analysis of normative ethics requires a normative commitment on the part of the analyst, this does not necessarily involve either that he be a " reformer " or that, in particular, he be aiming to reform ordinary language or to set up a different language in its place. What the analyst regards as normative ethics is expressed in ordinary language by ordinary men just as much as other modes or methods of behaving. This was recognized by such philosophers as Aristotle, Hume, and Kant in their use of the " common " as a source of ethical principles : " common opinions ", " common life ", " common rational knowledge of morality ".

B. We turn now to the second of the two views mentioned above in support of the independence of meta-ethics and normative

ethics. This is the view that normative ethics implies or pre-
supposes no specific meta-ethical doctrines, so that the same
normative ethics is compatible with different and even opposed
meta-ethics. This view has been urged most frequently perhaps
by W. K. Frankena. Thus, having distinguished three current
meta-ethical doctrines, the intuitionist, naturalist, and non-
cognitivist, he says that the proponents of these three doctrines
" might quite possibly maintain the same opinions as to what is
right or good in normative ethics " (*Philosophical Review* (1951),
p. 45). For example, " the belief that all men qua men have
certain essential rights is a tenet of normative ethics. It follows
that it is compatible with all sorts of meta-ethical theories "
(*Amer. Phil. Assn., Eastern Division*, i. 190). For differences in
meta-ethics " do not necessarily entail any disagreement in
normative ethics, that is, on questions about what is good or
bad, right or wrong, etc." Indeed, a normative ethical statement
" does not presuppose any meta-ethical theory about its own
nature or semiotic status ".

The question which this view raises is that of the character and
content of that " normative ethics " which is held to remain
constant or identical amid changes in meta-ethics. As in the
previous section, the expression " normative ethics " refers
to judgments and rules of conduct which the user of the expression
regards as the good or right ones. Now the user may be an
ordinary man or a philosopher, and of course there may be
further alternatives ; but, as we saw before, the normative
ethical philosopher may correctly regard himself as making
explicit or developing rather than contradicting what ordinary
men say and do in " common life ". If, then, we turn to the
traditional philosophical systems of normative ethics, we find
that, with certain qualifications to be indicated below, they deal
with the same questions, of the meanings of ethical terms and the
methods of making and supporting ethical judgments, as are
dealt with in meta-ethics. Nor does this involve a confusion of
functions in the sense that traditional philosophers discussed
together two separate kinds of questions, " normative " ones
and " meta-ethical " ones, which subsequent analyses have
shown to be distinct. The point is that for such normative
ethical philosophers the meta-ethical questions of meaning and
method are intrinsic to the content and bases of normative
ethical evaluations—*i.e.* these meta-ethical questions are also
normative ethical ones. For what makes the difference between
good and bad ethics, for philosophers like Aristotle and Kant,
and hence for the " common " ideas which they purport to reflect

and develop, is precisely the psychological and methodological features which are the subjects of different meta-ethical analyses. Consequently, the view which holds that the same normative ethics is compatible with different and even opposed meta-ethics can achieve its conclusion only by unduly restricting the scope of normative ethics, in a way which is not in keeping with its content either in traditional philosophical ethics or in the opinions, language, and actions of ordinary men.

Two serious kinds of restriction are incorrectly imposed on normative ethics by the view under consideration. The first is that it represents normative ethics by isolated sentences separated from the context in which they have their full meaning. The practice of many recent meta-ethicists, in keeping with their analytic aim, is to give, as examples of normative ethics, such expressions as " X is good ", or sometimes more copiously such sentences as " It is wrong to kill one's parents ", " We ought to help the weak ", " Cordiality is good "; and then they go on to ask about the " meaning " of the " ethical " terms figuring in such sentences. But a normative ethics which is even minimally complete does more than affix an ethical predicate to a term signifying an act or a quality. It also specifies what we may generically call the " psychological conditions " in the agent, in virtue of which the agent's act or quality has, or deserves, that ethical predicate. Thus, for example, Aristotle writes that " if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them ; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character." Similarly, Kant writes that " when moral value is in question, we are concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with their inner principles, which we cannot see . . . what is essentially good in the action consists in the mental disposition, let the consequences be what they may ". These examples of traditional normative ethics, which could be multiplied, show that in judging an act to be good, such an ethics refers not only to the act itself but also to the " condition " or " mental disposition " of the agent. Now meta-ethics, in inquiring into the meanings of ethical terms and the methods of supporting ethical judgments, likewise concerns itself with " psychological conditions ", in the sense that it asks whether the judgments are expressions of emotion, or commands, or derive from empirical cognitions, or from intuitions, etc. To this

extent, then, there is a *rapprochment* between meta-ethics and normative ethics.

The characterization of meta-ethics as being concerned with *psychological* conditions is not in conflict with the view that meta-ethics engages in *logical* analysis. Both the words " psychological " and " logical " are ambiguous. But " logical ", as it is used here and in the meta-ethical analyses under discussion, refers to study of the kinds of meanings had by terms and the kinds of methods used in arguments. And both of these, meanings and methods, can be explicated not only in syntactical and semantical terms but also in psychological or " pragmatic " ones, as Stevenson, for example, recognizes when he selects as the most serviceable sense of " meaning " that in which " the ' meaning ' of a sign must be defined in terms of the psychological reactions of those who use the sign ". In this sense, also, Hare's approach to meta-ethics in terms of such concepts as " prescription ", " commending ", and " choosing " is at once logical and psychological, in that it defines the meaning of ethical terms by reference to psychological acts like those just mentioned.

At this point, however, a second restriction on the content of normative ethics comes into view. For it may be held that while normative ethics presents judgments evaluating agents with special reference to the psychological conditions *in the agents* underlying their overt acts, meta-ethics on the other hand presents analyses of such normative judgments with special reference to the psychological conditions *in the judges or critics*. Consequently, in view of this difference in the loci of the psychological conditions, there is no overlap between normative ethics and meta-ethics : normative ethics is restricted to dealing with the *agents*, not with the *judges* or *critics* of the agents. More generally, this difference between normative ethics and meta-ethics is a consequence of the different levels at which they operate: normative ethics judges acts and agents, while meta-ethics analyses these very judgments.

This tidy differentiation does not, however, correspond to the full scope of normative ethics as found in traditional ethical philosophies. Normative ethics consists not in isolated judgments of acts, but in the statement of rules or norms to which the acts must conform if they are to be judged as good. Now these norms, as suggested above, refer not only to the acts themselves but also to the psychological conditions of the agents who perform the acts. And these psychological conditions, in turn, include not merely the states of desire and cognition which directly motivate or accompany the acts, but also the methods or

processes whereby the agents form their normative judgments as to what they ought to do. In Aristotle's ethics, for example, an act is not done virtuously unless it is done with practical wisdom, which is the intellectual virtue whereby one deliberates correctly and quickly concerning good ends. Consequently, " it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom "; and Aristotle's analysis of practical wisdom involves reference to " practical intuitive reason " and the various kinds of desire, inquiry, and command which enter at once into " good action " and into the good agent's judgment as to what he ought to do, this judgment coming frequently as the conclusion of a practical syllogism. For Kant, similarly, a good act requires the self-determination of the agent through a judgment based on concepts of reason which are valid for all rational beings. In each of these cases—and the examples could be multiplied—normative ethics contains as a basic part the analysis of the psychological methods or processes, rational and volitional, whereby normative ethical judgments are formed by agents both as leading to and as justifying their acts. The analysis of these methods is descriptive of how good ethical judgments are formed, or—what is the same thing—it presents criteria for good ethical judgments and is thus prescriptive of them. But the analysis of these methods is precisely what meta-ethics likewise presents. Consequently, it is incorrect to differentiate normative ethics from meta-ethics on the ground that normative ethics deals with methods or psychological conditions in agents while meta-ethics deals with methods or psychological conditions in judges or critics of the agents. The agent, when he is such as is dealt with in a full normative ethics, is not one who acts uncritically, but rather he is himself the judge or critic of his acts and is aware of, and voluntarily conforms to, the criteria for his acts' being good ones. And meta-ethics, in describing the methods by which these criteria are applied in judgments, is describing what makes the difference between good and bad ethics. Consequently, the same normative ethics is not compatible with different meta-ethics.

The position here presented may be further elucidated in the following way. Proponents of the view that meta-ethics and normative ethics are independent of one another appear to assume a differentiation of four separate levels :

(1) Acts or qualities of an agent.
(2) Normative ethical judgment about (1).
(3) Psychological conditions of (2).
(4) Meta-ethical analysis of (3).

On this view, just as there can be conflicting normative ethical judgments about the same acts or qualities, so there can be different psychological conditions of the same normative ethical judgment, and meta-ethical analyses (at level [4]) would differ according as they held that there were such different psychological conditions. But since the normative ethical judgment can be the same amid the different psychological conditions attributed to it by different meta-ethical doctrines, it follows that meta-ethics does not make a difference to normative ethics : the same normative ethical judgment is compatible with different meta-ethics. The assumption here is that the persons directly involved at levels (1), (2), and (4), may all be different : at level (1) we have the agent, at levels (2) and (3) the judge or critic of the agent, and at level (4) the logical analyser of the judge or critic. Let us call this the *differentiation* point of view.

There is, however, an alternative point of view about these levels, namely, that the first three are contained in the agent himself. For insofar as (1) he acts morally, (2) he judges that he should so act, and (3) he arrives at this judgment by certain rational and volitional methods. And when (4) the moral philosopher states what are these methods of judging what to do, he is describing what the moral agent does and the ways in which he arrives at his judgment. Let us call this the *identity* point of view, since it views the persons at levels (1), (2), and (3) as being identical both numerically and qualitatively.

Both the differentiation and the identity points of view preserve the idea of differences of levels insofar as they regard the meta-ethical analysis of the psychological conditions of normative ethical judgments as being on a different level from those judgments themselves. But there remains an important contrast. On the differentiation view, the meta-ethical level (4) is held to be independent of level (2) in that there can be different meta-ethical analyses of the " same " normative ethical judgment. For the judgment is viewed in abstraction from any specific psychological conditions which may motivate it or otherwise characterize it, since it is not part of the moral quality of the agent or of his act. But on the identity view, the meta-ethical level (4) is not independent of level (2). For since the normative ethical judgment is now viewed as being made by an agent concerning his own acts, not by a spectator of the agent, the judgment contains the psychological conditions of level (3) as part of its meaning. For example, the judgment " I ought to pay my taxes " has one kind of normative ethical meaning if it is motivated by fear of punishment, and a different kind of

meaning if it is motivated by conscientious convictions as to
the common good, or universality, so that in the cases of these
two different motivations there are, strictly speaking, two
different judgments expressed by the same words. Consequently,
the meta-ethical analysis at level (4), if it analyses (2) in terms of
fear, will be analysing a quite different judgment than if it
analyses (2) in terms of convictions as to the common good.
*The meta-ethical analysis hence makes a difference as to the normative
ethical character of the judgment which it analyses*, in that the kind
of motivational or other psychological condition which it attri-
butes to the judgment determines, in a complete normative
ethical doctrine, whether the judgment, or the person who makes
it, is morally good or bad. This is so regardless of the overt act
which the judgment may be approving or disapproving. For
example, the Kantian would regard as immoral the Hobbesian's
judgment that one should pay one's taxes from motivations that
were ultimately egocentric and based on fear ; while the Humean
in turn would regard as immoral the Kantian's judgment that a
direct inclination to do a benevolent act has nothing to do with
the moral worth of the act. It is in this context, I believe, that
we can regard as something more than misinterpretation such
criticisms of the emotivist meta-ethics as Paton's statement
that " it discredits morality as it is understood by the objecti-
vist " (*Arist. Soc. Supp.*, xxii. 119). This is so because of the
kinds of psychological conditions which the emotivist attributes
to all ethical judgments.

The identity view is, I think, sounder than the differentiation
view. For the latter abstracts the judgment from its psy-
chological conditions so as to view it as something neutral amid
the differing interpretations of it. But such abstraction ig-
nores the fact that these conditions make a difference as to the
judgment's meaning and ethical character. This point is often
overlooked for several reasons. One is that there are moral
philosophies in which the criterion of value is found not in the
psychological conditions of the agent's acts or judgments but in
such other areas as consequences. In such cases it would make
no moral difference whether an act was done or a judgment made
from motivations of fear or of respect for the common good, so
long as the consequences were the same. A second reason why
the point is overlooked is that on the differentiation view the
options between different meta-ethical analyses are often viewed
in terms that are much broader and more general than on the
identity view, so that the normative ethical import of the meta-
ethical analysis is obscured. Whether a moral judgment is

prescriptive or descriptive, non-cognitive or cognitive, empirical or non-empirical, seems less relevant to its normative ethical status than whether it is an expression of fear or some other subjective inclination or is a recognition of objective duties which hold regardless of one's inclinations.

Nevertheless, even on the differentiation view meta-ethics and normative ethics coalesce in the way we indicated earlier. Suppose that the meta-ethicist is analysing what for him is positive ethics, *i.e.* that he is intending, like Stevenson and Hare, to present a morally neutral analysis of the psychological methods and conditions motivating or accompanying any judgments which use words like " good " or " ought ", without himself necessarily agreeing with those judgments. In this case he is still dealing with the same psychological conditions and methods as is the normative ethicist. Whether the " judgment " here referred to is made by a moral agent or by a critic or spectator of the agent makes no difference in this respect. The normative ethicist is saying that for a moral judgment to be morally good, certain psychological conditions and methods—let us refer to them as " X "—must motivate or accompany the judgment. The meta-ethicist, on the other hand, is saying that any judgment which uses words like " good " or " ought " (hence including the kind of judgment which the normative ethicist has called a " moral judgment ") will in fact and in logic be motivated or accompanied by certain psychological conditions and methods—let us refer to these as " Y ". Now these references to X and Y both stand as analyses of moral judgments, and they may be in disagreement. Suppose, for example, that the normative ethicist says that a necessary condition of a morally good judgment is that he who makes the judgment must intend to take into account the needs and interests of others as well as himself, so that his judgment must in this sense be universalizable; while the meta-ethicist says that any and every evaluative judgment expresses the emotions of the person making the judgment without any necessary restriction to considering the needs and interests of others. Note the logical relations which obtain in such a case. (i) The normative ethicist and the meta-ethicist are talking about the same kind of judgment, the former specifically, the latter generically. (ii) The normative ethicist is affirming about this judgment something which the meta-ethicist is denying about it. (iii) Consequently, far from being independent of one another, meta-ethics is included in normative ethics, and differences in meta-ethics entail differences in normative ethics.

By way of summary, we may list the following relations between

normative ethics and meta-ethics which have emerged from the above discussion. (1) When the meta-ethicist analyses what for him is positive ethics as well as normative ethics, with the aim of ascertaining what meanings are common to these, then no specific normative ethical judgment of his own is presupposed or implied thereby ; from *his* standpoint his meta-ethics is compatible with different or opposed normative ethics. (2) But from the standpoint of a normative ethics which places the criterion of ethical value in specific psychological conditions, the meta-ethical analysis of the meanings and methods of ethical judgments in terms of psychological conditions may present an alternative criterion of ethical value, so that the meta-ethical analysis does make a normative ethical difference. In this situation, from the standpoint of such a normative ethics there is a mutual implicative relation between it and meta-ethics : the meta-ethics implies or presupposes one kind of normative ethics as against another, so that the same meta-ethics is not compatible with different normative ethics ; and normative ethics implies or presupposes one kind of meta-ethics as against another, so that the same normative ethics is not compatible with different meta-ethics. (3) This logical relation between normative ethics and meta-ethics may not, however, obtain either when the normative ethics in question places the criterion of value in something other than specific psychological conditions or when the meta-ethics deals with questions of meaning in a very general way. (4) When the meta-ethicist analyses the specific meanings or methods of what for him is normative ethics, then his meta-ethics implies or presupposes one kind of normative ethics as against another, so that here too the same meta-ethics is not compatible with what, for different moral evaluations, are different normative ethics. (5) At least under cases (2) and (4), the task of the meta-ethicist is not distinguishable from that of the normative ethicist.

University of Chicago

V.—SOME USES OF "GOOD" IN CRITICISM

By BERNARD HARRISON

I

In this paper I wish to consider some of the ways in which saying of a work of art, " This is good " (" excellent ", " a fine piece of work ", etc.), differs from saying simply " I like this ". The conviction that there *is* a distinction of some kind is deeply embedded in our commonplace talk about the arts. Obstinately we want to say that the taste of X, who admires Henry Moore, is better than, and not merely different from, that of his neighbour who buys plaster figures of ducks to hang on the parlour wall ; and the same unwillingness to admit that there is no disputing about tastes lurks behind much discussion of the level of public interest in the arts. Again, even if we try to dismiss all occurrences of " good " in statements like " I don't like X but I think it's good ", or " I suppose I enjoy X as much as Y, but of course, Y is better ", as examples of what R. M. Hare calls the " inverted-commas " use (" people in general accept that X is good ", or " X is admired by the best critical opinion "), we succeed only in pushing the whole problem a stage further back, for unless the whole game is a sham, we must now give some account of what it is for one critic's opinion to be better (" sounder ", " weightier ") than another's. And in any case, if the " inverted-commas " argument were applicable to cases of this kind, then the goodness of a work of art could never outweigh its pleasantness as a reason for paying attention to it, except for people moved by social considerations, such as the desire to be thought clever, or fashionable. And this seems plainly not to be the case.

My way of approaching this problem will be a roundabout one, by way of a familiar doctrine about the nature of criticism, namely, that the critic, when he says that a work is good, is recognising some quite definite quality (in R. G. Collingwood's terms, *e.g.* " that which distinguishes what is art from what is not art ") either in the object before him or in his own state of mind as he contemplates it. This theory, to my mind, is intimately connected with a complementary one which has determined the form and the method of most " theories of art ", namely, the feeling that the proper business of aestheticians is to elucidate and define the essential nature of art. For to do this, after all, is to make

clear the nature of that quality which the critic recognises, and it seems as if, unless this can be done, it will be impossible to make a distinction between the sort of judgement a good critic makes, and the judgement of the stereotype who " doesn't know anything about art, but knows what he likes ". I shall try to show that this battery of views must be altogether rejected ; that critics are not concerned with a special kind of recognition, that it is thus idle to try to discover what exactly it is that they recognise, and that it is possible to preserve the common-sense distinction between judging something to be a fine work of art and merely liking it, without having any dealings with the " essential nature of art ".

By way of clearing the ground, however, it will be necessary to spend some time elaborating on the theme of past errors, before coming to what I hope are at least the bones of an adequate solution.

II

The notion, that the business of the philosopher in aesthetics is to provide a definition of the essence or nature of art, is an astonishingly deep-rooted one, and it should be instructive to consider why this is so. W. B. Gallie [1] traces the tendency to the central idealist proposition that " there is one total Spiritual Activity (or Notion or Logos), and that Art is one of the distinguishable grades or categories in which it acts ". Now no doubt this is the ultimate, pervasive influence determining people to approach aesthetics in a spirit of definition. But not all the writers who take this line nowadays are conscious idealists, and I am inclined to think that there are certain more immediate and particular reasons determining the approach, which may be interesting, and even crucial, to uncover.

The two main motives, it seems to me, which have made aesthetics a subject of philosophical concern are (i) the desire for some solid basis on which to distinguish between critical approval and the " mere liking " of gourmets and philistines, and (ii) the desire to show why art is important as a human activity. Croce's wish that art should be rescued from the status of an " aristocratic club ", and the general concern of expression theorists to represent art as a very special variety of knowledge, are examples of the second motive at work, and the first probably needs no illustration.

To begin with, philosophers have wished to show that the

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[1] " The Function of Philosophical Aesthetics ", in *Aesthetics and Language*, ed. Elton, p. 16.

critic's " good " is somehow inherently more solid than that of
the philistine ; independent of mere liking, and in some sense
" objective ".   Now, the notions of solidity and objectivity lead
naturally to those of guarantees and verifiability.   The lure of a
definition of art has in part been, I think, that if it could be
successfully achieved it would automatically provide a verifica-
tion process—with Tolstoy, for example, whether the work is
morally sound ; with Croce and Collingwood whether it is a
successful " expression " in their special sense of that word—
which will guarantee the critical judgements which its observance
produces and distinguish as judgements of some other sort those
which neglect it.   If art is expression, then to attend to a work
as an expression is to be concerned with it *as art*, and the judge-
ment which ensues will be both a specifically *critical* one and a
substantially correct one.   On the other hand, if one attends to
the work without bothering about its expressiveness, then one is
not dealing with it *as art* at all, and whatever judgement one
passes on it will not be a *critical judgement*, but one of some other
sort, of pleasantness, for example, or of sentiment (" it's exactly
like Mother ").

The distinction between critic and philistine thus stands ex-
plained, and there remains only the question of justifying art as
a worthwhile activity.   But in solving the first problem we have
automatically solved the second one as well.   To have successfully
defined art is to know its essential nature, and if this turns out to
be something which is not obviously important or venerable,
then, *ex hypothesi* almost, our definition is not successful.   Not
unnaturally, the definitions which most philosophers have put
forward are from this point of view persuasive ones.   Collingwood's
" Art is Expression ", for instance, is explicitly intended to make
us realise the importance of art in our lives.   And in a way it
succeeds, but its effect is also to commend to us a certain *type* of
art ;   to make us restrict our use of " art " to those works which
are " truly ", or " properly " art, namely, those which can best
be represented as expressive in Collingwood's sense.

The attractiveness of definition-giving in aesthetics thus seems
to have two sources.   First of all, it must if successful solve both
the main problems of aesthetics at one stroke.   Secondly, there
seems to be no third course between on the one hand admitting
the distinction between criticism and mere liking and disliking
to be bogus, and on the other hand showing critical judgements
to be assertions about some verifiable matter of fact.   And to
achieve the latter end one must represent the critic as a man
whose business it is to know whether particular works are really

art or not, *i.e.* whether they conform to the points of the definition of the essential nature of art in general.

There has of late been a good deal of criticism of definitionist aesthetics, much of it in William Elton's anthology *Aesthetics and Language*, and for the moment I propose to take the case as proven. There remains the problem of how we are to avoid the definition-seeking approach and yet answer the perfectly genuine questions which give it impetus. If what I have said so far is correct, then I think it points the way to a possible solution. To begin with, the two questions which philosophers have traditionally tried to answer at one fell swoop, by discovering the essence of art, are plainly quite different and require different methods of approach. The second one, of the importance of art as a human activity, seems to invite an indefinite range of answers, depending on the kind of art under consideration. The medieval mason for whom art was a means of glorifying God, the expression theorist for whom it is a means of making known to us our buried emotions, so bringing them under the scrutiny of reason, and the musician who is concerned with form and harmony for their own sake, all have reasons for their concern with art which cannot be dismissed out of hand, and time may show us further and better ones. In any case there seems to be no compelling reason for trying to discover one single explanation of the importance of all the diverse things which have been classed as art. In general the insights of philosophers into the value and functions of particular varieties of art have only been confused and obscured by the compulsion to universalise. Thus, something very like what Collingwood describes as " expression " ; the becoming clearly aware of certain emotions which before I had known only as vague " feelings ", is characteristic of certain plays and novels, but not of much music or painting. To point this out is an easy way to criticise Collingwood and others like him, but one which in a way misses the point.

Once the confusion between problems has been brought to light there remains the difficulty of distinguishing between critic and philistine by some means other than giving a definition of the nature of art. To do this it will be necessary to show that we are not faced with a simple choice between (i) dismissing the distinction as bogus, and (ii) exhibiting some abstruse quality which is the essence of art, and which it is the critic's job to recognise in particular works or in his own state of mind while contemplating them. In the remainder of this paper [I shall argue that there is in fact a third and more satisfactory alternative.

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III

It seems to me that the main defect of the idea that the business of criticism is primarily the execution of a special sort of recognition, is that it makes criticism appear much more cut-and-dried, and much less valuable as a source of new ideas, than it actually is. It implies that the only difference between a good critic and someone who is completely baffled by the arts is that one of them sees (knows how to look for) some quality in works of art which the other does not. It is as if the two men were in the position of two would-be judges of cattle, one of whom knows that a deep chest is an infallible sign of a good beast, while the other does not. Presented with a particular cow, the first is able to say " yes, a fine animal ! ", whilst the other does not know what to say (though he may like her soft brown eyes). But if he knew the rule that his colleague knows (understood the essential nature of a good beast), he would no longer be in doubt. Similarly, on the theory which we are considering, the good critic sees, or is receptive to, some quality which the layman does not see, but the seeing of which would put him on the same footing with his colleague. Judging beauty is a matter of being in the know or out of it ; of being able to apply certain abstruse but definite tests.

Now the difficulty with this, it seems to me, is that it tends to make the work of criticism appear either impossible or superfluous. For either, (1) The critic sees the work of art properly, whilst his audience do not. In saying that it is good he is thus asserting what is to him an obvious truth, but one which to his audience is incomprehensible, since the quality which makes the work good is invisible to them. Or, (2) The critic and his audience both see the work properly, so that anything which the critic can tell them will be obvious to them already, by the very fact of their clear sight.

Now plainly, on this showing, nothing that critics say can ever enlighten us about art. For either we know what it is that distinguishes art from not-art, in which case we are clearly in no need of critical assistance, or else we simply do not know what we ought to be looking for. And from this it would follow that the only way in which anyone " in the know " about art could assist anyone out of the know, would be by explaining the essential nature of art to him, and thus by implication showing him what things he should be looking for in particular works.

Now this is in general what philosophers have taken to be the purpose of aesthetic theories. But I doubt whether any philosophical theory gives us the sort of enlightenment that we expect

from good criticism. Philosophers, it seems to me, do sometimes discern good reasons for thinking art worthwhile, and by stating these in the form of persuasive definitions they may succeed in focusing our attention on particular aspects of art, but certainly they rarely lead us to revise our opinions about the value of particular works in the way that good critics often do. Moreover, critics are apt to be reluctant to generalise, and try, though with some philosophically-minded exceptions, to avoid stating rules for reaching evaluative conclusions—there is, as we shall see, a good logical reason for this. It might be argued that critics are really working, perhaps obscurely, to enable people to " see works in the right way " ; to make them apply those criteria, or notice those qualities, whose nature philosophy makes explicit. But this seems to entail that there is a " right way " of looking at a work of art, some mental posture which alone can enable the work to fulfil its proper function. This, in turn, seems to imply that there is an end to the process of " seeing in a new light " ; some point at which it can be said, " *now* the true work has been revealed ", after which judgement ensues, the success or failure of the work is noted, and the matter, so far as criticism is concerned, is closed.

But this is not how criticism works. It is still, for example, thought worthwhile to devote books to the study of " Hamlet " and some of them still succeed in shedding new light on the interpretation of the play. The kind of thing that criticism often does in this direction is, for instance, to show us that a poem whose visual images are lifeless deserves attention for its rhythms, that Mahler should be listened to as contrapuntal rather than harmonic music, that abstract painting begins to affect one when one stops looking for the meaning, and so on. But for most works of any stature, there is no discovery of this kind which is final ; no ultimate definition of the correct attitude of an aesthetically-minded person before the work.

IV

At this point someone might argue that unless critics did make use of standards and criteria it would be quite impossible for them to distinguish between successful works and works which are failures. Since they quite evidently do this every day, it is surely reasonable for philosophers to try to formulate and systematise critical criteria into a theory of art.

But here, I think, a further mistake is being made about the nature of criticism, for it is assumed that the primary, or central business of the critic is to judge whether or not works have

succeeded, rather than to grade them as better or worse than one
another on some fairly wide scale. If this assumption were true
it would indeed support the traditional method in aesthetics.
There is much more point in looking for a quality common to all
good works of art if good works of art are not differentiated
amongst themselves. To observe that this is a sheep implies that
one has recognised some quality of sheephood, which, like the
philosopher's quality of being a work of art, seems likely to repay
the attempt to give it a precise definition. But to say that this is
a *better sheep than that* implies no such thing. There may be an
ideal sheep in our minds, to which the better members of the
flock approximate more or less closely, but then again there may
not, for we may mean on one occasion " better for the pot ", on
another " better because of its friendliness ", or on another
" better because at last it has turned and bitten the sheepdog ".
In fine, to succeed must be to succeed *at* something, and if critics
really did wish to divide all the works that come before them into
one fairly homogeneous class of successes and another of failures,
then philosophers would probably be justified in asking for the
principles on which they were working.

But in fact, critics do not simply separate sheep from goats.
To say, for example, that Mantegna is better than Dante Gabriel
Rossetti, or that Mahler is better than Telemann, is not to thrust
Rossetti and Telemann beyond the pale of critical interest—as it
would be if the distinction were one of success and failure. The
same situation arises when we differentiate between the works of
a particular artist : one may hold, for example, that Beethoven's
late quartets are more mature works than the " Eroica ", without
at all denying that the " Eroica " is a fine work. If it comes to
that, the " Eroica " is a far better work than " Swan Lake ", but
few people, I think, would wish to call " Swan Lake " a failure—
not even a qualified failure.

These instances are suggestive, but I think it is worthwhile to
go after the root of the matter and ask, what seldom is asked,
whether the whole notion of the success or failure of the " artistic
enterprise " is at all central or important to criticism.

Mozart, in the aria " Dove Sono " was trying to write a sad,
nostalgic tune—this is all one can say without knowledge of
Mozart's inaccessible feelings-at-the-time—and so was whoever
wrote " September Song ".[1] They are both, I should say, about
equally sad and nostalgic. So far as success goes then, Mozart
and his rival are equals, and yet I should not hesitate to call
" Dove Sono " better music. And I should not feel called upon

[1] A once popular song, now defunct.

to justify my judgement by exhibiting any shared problem which
Mozart has solved better than the composer of " September Song "
—very likely all I should do would be to tell my questioner to go
and listen to both pieces again.   Furthermore, to say that Mozart
is a good composer is not necessarily to say that he is *successful in
doing something*.   It might mean that he knows how to use the
rules of composition, or how to achieve certain effects of balance
and proportion in an orchestra, but these rules are obviously only
rules because they produce results which people enjoy or think
aesthetically admirable.   We could, in fact, ask :   " Why are the
results produced by the rules of composition which Mozart follows
aesthetically good ? ", and here there is much less temptation to
say that it is because they constitute an unusually successful
solution to a problem.   As Stuart Hampshire says :   " A work of
art is gratuitous.   It is not *essentially* the answer to a question or
the solution of a presented problem ".[1]

But now it might be suggested that one can generally say
something about the purposes of artists more profound than " he
wanted to write a sad song ", and in a way this is true.   Bach
wished to build in sound an architecture of the spirit ;   Jane
Austen to show the real mechanisms of human behaviour which
underlie custom and rationalisation—these are *clichés*, but they
are the sort of thing that people say, and are no doubt true in their
way.   But these phrases, though they may help us to appreciate
Jane Austen and Bach, are useless as bases for judging success or
competence, because they are thoroughly particular and meta-
phorical.   Bach may be doing " architecture-in-sound ", but one
cannot say that it is good or bad architecture-in-sound as
architecture-in-sound goes, because that phrase only has meaning
in relation to our experience of Bach's work.   Bach's music is not
a " good example " of architecture-in-sound, because it is not an
example at all, but the only instance there is.   In general, I think,
the moment a critic's remarks on the purposes of his subject begin
to approach profundity, they are apt to fall into metaphor and
particularity.   If we say that Jane Austen was a successful
writer of sociological novels, which is broadly and uninterestingly
true, we run up against the unfortunate fact that so was Harriet
Beecher Stowe.   And although it is easy to say why Jane Austen's
" sociological novels " are unlike Mrs. Stowe's, the qualities by
reference to which we do so are mostly Jane Austen's alone.
Did she " succeed " in writing with that peculiar kind of wit ?
What would it be to succeed indifferently well at it, or to fail
gallantly ?   To be able to say of a thing that it was achieved well

[1] "Logic and Appreciation", reprinted in *Aesthetics and Language*, p. 162.

or ill, we must be dealing with something which is fairly concrete, and has more than one instance.

One should not be misled by this, however, into forgetting the other side of the coin. It is perfectly true that competent critics can pretty easily distinguish works which are utter failures from those which may prove to be worthwhile. What must be guarded against here is the notion that this sort of decision is the final stage of criticism, for it is in fact only the beginning. To say that a work is good in this sense (which we may label the " acceptive " sense of " good ") is simply to say that it is *not trivial*, that it is *worth further discussion*. But what is important in criticism is precisely this further discussion—the bringing out of the particular merits of a work, and its placing with regard to other works. Beside this, the attribution of " goodness " or " success " in the acceptive sense, is simply a preliminary skirmish.

To decide that a work is not trivial, to accept it as being worth discussion, *is* a sheep-and-goats procedure, and does involve using criteria. One can say, for example, which of a batch of poems, mostly amateurish, is good in the acceptive sense, and there are quite simple, if fluid, rules for recognising bad ones : undue reliance on adjectives, unwillingness on the part of the author to commit himself to statements rather than to strings of " evocative " phrases, the use of the sort of *vers libre* that simply begs the difficulties of more formal writing, and so on. Now, it seems to me that what we do in stating and applying criteria of this kind is simply to refer to past experience. We know from bitter experience that a certain sort of undergraduate verse will not repay any amount of discussion or of puzzling over the meaning, while other kinds of verse will richly repay even a protracted effort to understand. We learn in time to tell the difference at a cursory reading, and then, by considering our practice, to state the criteria which we have come to follow. But quite evidently, I think, a philosophical systematisation of criteria of this kind would not amount to what philosophers have traditionally meant by a " theory of art ". One might as well try to work out what constitutes a good man simply on the basis of the negative virtues.

V

When critics say that a work is good, they sometimes mean simply that it is worth spending time on. But this is not the whole story, for as we have noticed, it makes sense to say that one work, or artist, is better than another, without denying that both are good in the acceptive sense.

Now, when someone is asked to justify a statement like "Mantegna is better than Rossetti", there seem to be two courses which he can take. Either he can attempt to show, or to mention, aspects of the work of the two men which he thinks will tend to make his questioner agree with him (he may, for example, say that Mantegna's pictures are better-organised, or accuse Rossetti of sentimentality or bad drawing); or he can simply refer to the state of critical opinion, in some such phrase as " He is generally thought better ", or " People who know about painting prefer him ".

The latter sort of answer has not been given much philosophical attention, owing, I suppose, to the feeling that the truth about art must lie in deeper waters. But although there are times when, given an answer of this kind, we should say that the speaker was simply evading the issue, yet there are occasions on which it would be perfectly respectable and appropriate ; when what we want to know is precisely " what is generally thought good ".

Now why, apart from purely social considerations, should this be so ? Why should we respect what is sometimes called " educated opinion ", or be interested in its evaluations ? It is important, I think, to notice that the move of referring to authority has a place in aesthetic discussion which it does not have in morals. In a moral dilemma, it is no help at all to be told what the Pope, or the Aga Khan, thinks about X : I want to know simply whether X is right, and why. On the other hand, suppose that I ask whether " Juno and the Paycock " is a good play. There is a level of discussion at which it is a perfectly good answer to this question to be told that Bernard Shaw says so, or that " people who take the theatre seriously " think highly of it, or that it is part of the standard repertory at the Abbey Theatre in Dublin. Here again, " good " is being used quite straightforwardly, and not in inverted commas. On aesthetic questions, it seems, " professional " opinions, of Bernard Shaw or the " interested public ", count, *as such*, as nobody's opinion counts as such in matters of morality.

It is commonplace to distinguish the moral life, as concerned with the choice of courses of action, from the aesthetic life, which is said to concern itself merely with the choice of objects of contemplation. A more profound difference, it seems to me, is that in morals we do not experiment, except perhaps gradually and over long periods of time. We do not as a rule try out new and strange patterns of behaviour simply in the hope of finding out on becoming familiar with them that it has been worth the effort ; that we have experienced an enlargement of moral consciousness.

But this is precisely what is done all the time by the interested following of any art. The aesthetic concern is not simply with choosing what to contemplate, but with choosing in such a way as to develop new capacities for contemplation.

One of the most common experiences of aesthetic appreciation is for a person to hear a piece of music, or see a picture, which at first seems trivial or meaningless but which suddenly or gradually breaks upon him as a work of great beauty or power. He becomes aware of previously unnoticed aspects of it : he " hears " tunes, counterpoint, and movements, where before he had " heard " only a succession of sounds and silences, and " sees " line, proportion, and animation, where before he had " seen " only a daub of colours or an odd, stiff attempt to do what a photograph does. Once having learned how a work may repay attention and effort in this way, we wish to repeat the experience—I shall call it, for convenience, the experience of critical development. But obviously some works of art, and possibly those nearest to hand, really are worthless, and will repay no amount of study. We need to know, roughly, at any rate, which books to read and which gallery to visit, and it is in this sort of dilemma that we ask ourselves what the right sort of critics think good, or what is the state of " educated opinion ". And the point of such questions, it seems to me, is that we expect to discover by them which works would be most likely to reward an effort to understand them by someone with our more or less limited experience of listening to music or looking at pictures.

The reason why this is a reasonable expectation is twofold. First of all, it seems that people are sufficiently alike for the critical development of different individuals to follow a fairly regular pattern. I mean by this, for example, that one goes from enjoying " Swan Lake " via " Eine Kleine Nachtmusik " and Beethoven's early symphonies to enjoying Bach's partitas for violin, and not vice-versa. One would be surprised to find someone who, having started by admiring Picasso's blue period, had now transferred all his admiration to Marie Laurencin. When someone says excitedly that he has discovered a whole new world of music, we expect it to turn out that he has come across Mozart's violin concertos after a diet of Verdi and Bellini, and not the other way about. One could multiply examples of this kind indefinitely. Secondly, and connected with this, the reputations both of critics and of works are formed by processes which, though complex, depend ultimately on numbers of people, at varying levels of competence and familiarity with that particular type of art, finding good reasons for admiring the works

and agreeing with the critics' estimates of them. My use of
" good reason " here is not circular : *this* sense of " good " is not
the one under discussion at present, though I shall try to deal
with it in section VII. To return to the argument : suppose that
X, the critic, writes a book to show that Mantegna, a forgotten
Paduan painter, is an artist of much greater importance than has
hitherto been supposed. If his book sends people to look at
Mantegna in a new light, and if this light really reveals new and
unsuspected beauties, then the reputations both of Mantegna and
of X, and of such other artists as X may recommend, will tend to
rise. In this situation, if someone asks me whether Mantegna is a
good painter in the sense under discussion—which we may as
well call the " directive " sense—I shall answer unhesitatingly
" yes ". But if, on the other hand, I have had a good deal of
experience of Mantegna, and have found myself forced to the
conclusion that he has been grossly overrated, then I shall
issue only a very qualified affirmative, in some such terms as
" he is generally thought good, but I have never been able to
see why ". If enough people come to feel in this way, then
Mantegna's reputation will sink as Rupert Brooke's sank after
the First World War, or as Donne's sank during the nineteenth
century, only to be revived again in the present one.

Changes of taste of this kind are apt to puzzle philosophers who
are out to determine the nature of the beautiful, and to suggest to
them that there must be some " real " scale of values which
remains unchanging throughout periods of blindness and clear
sight. But if I am right then the commonplaces of educated
opinion—for instance, that Keats is a great poet and Wyatt a
silver one—and the canon of works which " everybody knows "
are good, are nothing more than the interim results of a continual
comparing of notes by everyone interested in the arts, the function
of which is to provide a series of signposts to those works which
will repay attention. To know whether there is a likelihood of a
work's being rewarding is simply to know whether and what sort
of people actually are rewarded by it. Works of art, and good
reasons for admiring them, are very various, and the feeling of
one age may be inherently likely to respond to Rossetti, or Donne,
while that of another may not. The logical apparatus of critical
reputation exists simply to register these fluctuations, and to
make knowledge of them easier of access. Thus in general,
to say in the directive sense that a work is good is to say that it
lies near the upper limit of the series in which people at present
come to assimilate the contents of the period or style to which it
belongs, or much the same thing, that it is capable of affording

critical development even to someone who has a great deal of experience of works of that kind. Similarly, to say that Mantegna is better than Rossetti is to say that although Rossetti's pictures are by no means to be dismissed without a glance, still, people who have a great deal of experience of European painting tend to find more satisfaction in Mantegna. This is useful information to have when I have exhausted the local art-gallery and wonder where to go next.

VI

This account of one aspect of the critical use of " good " will, I think, dispose of a type of statement which has caused philosophers a good deal of worry, namely, e.g. " I admit that Raphael is a great painter but I do not like his work; it does not move me ".[1]   What one does in making a statement like this is to disclaim critical authority. One says in effect, " I have not been moved by Raphael, but don't let this discourage you from looking at his pictures—many intelligent people *have* been moved by them ".   The statement is a reassurance, to the effect that there is a *standing likelihood* of people being moved by Raphael. And, related to this, it serves to disclaim the status of an " objective " or " critical " judgement for the unfavourable opinion, " it does not move me ", which it contains.   Such a disclaimer is necessary just because simply to say " Raphael is a bad painter " would be to distract attention from him, to exclude him from the canon of painters worth spending time on—and this would be to do one's hearers a disservice, by temporarily misleading them.

VII

Although we frequently do justify statements like " Mantegna is better than Rossetti " by reference to educated opinion, there are times when this sort of answer will not do. The sense of a demand for justification may be, not " Are they generally so rated? ", but " Is it *justifiable* to rate Rossetti so much lower than Mantegna? ". The sort of answer which this question seems to demand is one which makes reference to actual qualities in the work of the two men. It is this aspect of critical discourse which has chiefly impressed philosophers in the past, and it is very tempting to suppose that it is the only kind of critical discussion that really matters, and that it is plainly concerned with the discovery of aesthetic qualities.

[1] *Cf.* "Some Distinctive Features of Arguments Used in Criticism of the Arts", by Margaret MacDonald, reprinted in *Aesthetics and Language*, p. 121.

But one must beware, it seems to me, of taking the word
" quality " here at its empiricist face-value.   I think I can explain
what I mean by discussing a passage from Helen Knight's article,
" The use of ' Good ' in Aesthetic Judgements ".[1]   Mrs. Knight
wishes to show that statements like " This work is good " are
always justified by pointing out criterion characters which the
work possesses, and in illustration of this she says at one point :

" Suppose I say that Cézanne's ' Green Jar' is a good picture and
someone asks me ' why? ' or ' what do you mean? ' I should
answer by describing it. I should point out a number of facts
about its organisation, for example : that apple is placed so that
it exactly balances the main mass on the right ; the lines of
tablecloth, knife, and shadows repeat each other ; the diagonal
of the knife counteracts the diagonals of the shadows.   All these
objects, I might continue, are exceedingly solid and the shadows
exceedingly deep—each thing is ' infallibly in its place '.   I
might point out a number of important problems that Cézanne
has solved ; for example, that he combines a geometrical scheme
with the variety we get in natural appearances.   And finally I
might allude to the profundity and gravity of the picture."

Now, how would one go about getting someone to agree, for
instance, that the lines of tablecloth, knife, and shadows repeat
each other?   One might, I suppose, show by measuring that
tablecloth, knife, and shadows are roughly the same shape and
are aligned in the same direction—but this is a rather bare fact,
in the sense that it is not interesting critically.   Knowing it
would not even be likely (would not be the *sort* of knowledge)
to make us change our evaluation of the picture.   Its statement
is somehow something less than the statement that the table-
cloth, the knife, and the shadows " repeat " one another.   The
" balance " between the apple and the main mass on the right
is more intangible still, though it still bears some relationship
to measurable distances and colour densities.   And what are we to
say about "infallibly in its place ", " profundity ", or " gravity "?

Getting someone to see that a picture has gravity is not the
same thing as getting him to see that it is square, or that it
measures 3 ft. × 2 ft., or that a certain patch of colour is burnt
umber.   In the latter sort of cases there are public processes of
verification whose use is bound up with the meaning of the words.
When the standard measures and the colour charts and the list
of Ministry specifications fail to convince, we are baffled :
there is nothing more that we can do.   With "'gravity ", the
case is different.   With one person we may simply let fall the

[1] Reprinted in *Aesthetics and Language*, p. 152.

word " gravity " and meet with agreement. With a second we
may fail at this point, try other metaphors—point out the " gloom-
iness " or " earthiness " of certain things in the picture—and in
the end completely fail to make our point ; while in a third case
those very metaphors may meet with success. But what is
clear, I think, is that there is no point of bafflement in this
process, no moment at which we need, logically, despair of success.
Again, when we do succeed, what we have accomplished is in
the nature of a conversion. We have brought our man to " see
the picture our way ", to " see it in a new light ". For works
of stature there seems to be no end to the possibilities of seeing
in a new light.

Let us call this sort of critical discussion " appraisive ". Now,
when I say, in a non-directive tone of voice, " Mantegna is
better than Rossetti ", what I do in effect is to commit myself
to the attempt to convert my hearers to Mantegna by means of
appraisive discussion. But, as we have seen, it is in the very
nature of such discussion that it deals with qualities which are
not in any ordinary sense " recognised ". Recognition of a
particular quality as such, the existence of rules for telling when
examples of that quality occur, and the existence of some sort
of public verification process in terms of which such rules can be
formulated ; these three are bound up together in a system of
discourse from which the appraisive discourse of critics has to
be distinguished. I can tell that this flower exhibits an example
of hypogamy because there are rules in the Flora for doing so, and
because these rules are formulated by reference to a verification
process—investigating the position of the gynoecium with
regard to the receptacle—whose terms all botanists understand.
But no analogous process exists for determining whether, for
example, in a picture, " each thing is infallibly in its place "
or not ; mainly, I think, because critical utterances of this kind
are uniquely related to particular works. Beyond illuminating
this Cézanne—or at most, Cézanne at large—" infallibly in its
place " has no function. One can, of course, particularly if one
has hold of an important aspect of the work, convert others to
see the appropriateness of the phrase : often, I think, this tech-
nique is used to guide others to " see the point " of new works.
But whatever criticism in its most important form achieves, it
does not achieve it through the use or the observance of rules.
This, I think, is what lies at the root of the familiar fact that
critics are shy of enunciating general rules for telling good works
from bad, and I think too that it is the ultimate reason why it is
hopeless to try to explain the nature of art, or of the distinction

between liking and critical approval, by generalising from the criteria by which critics are supposed to operate.

It might be objected that if what I have described as appraisive discussion were really the fundamental process of criticism, then it would be impossible ever to say that a critic was wrong about a work. To answer this, I think, we must consider the purposes for which we do actually wish to say that certain critics are right or wrong. If, for instance, I say that Sir Alfred Munnings is wrong about Picasso, I may wish simply to prevent you from taking Sir Alfred Munnings's opinion too seriously ; to let you know, in fact, that since most competent people do think Picasso worth spending time on, it would probably be worthwhile for you to do so too. On the other hand I may be asking for a justification of Sir Alfred Munnings's views. In this case, an appraisive discussion of Picasso may be begun, and if at the end of it I am half converted I may say, " Well, I must go and look at Picasso again, for I begin to suspect that I have been wrong about him ". Now, I think it very likely that what this means is something like " I begin to suspect that I have been issuing directive judgements on Picasso *viz-a-viz* the Royal Academy which I would not care to have had to back up—to convert others to, that is—and which ought to have been more qualified." I am almost sure that there is no sense in which we wish to say that some critical judgements are wrong, which could not be analysed in one or other of these ways.

VIII

At this point, I think, the nature of the distinction which I have been trying to draw between critical approval and simple liking will have become clear. The puzzling " objectivity ", or " solidity ", of critical judgements flows from the fact that part of their use is to direct other people, whereas " I like it " and its ilk are directively neutral. The important point, I think, is that, as common-sense suggests, statements of aesthetic approval, unlike statements of liking, are not essentially assertions about any state of mind whatsoever, either of the person who uses them or of anyone else. They refer, in the directive sense, not to states of mind, or even to qualities of works of art, but to the probabilities of works providing critical development, or repaying sympathetic attempts to understand them. Thus, the system of directive discourse consists of propositions which are in a way verifiable—and this, perhaps, is the ultimate root of the objectivity of critical approval—since they depend for

their currency and their usefulness on being continually checked
against the actual experiences of people interested in the arts.
But they are not verifiable in the sense that whenever anyone
ascribes goodness to a work of art he is saying that this work, or
the state of mind provoked by it, possesses some set of attributes
which can be recognised simply on experienced acquaintance
with that work or state of mind, and which is of the same type,
or even the same as, that which is recognised by all true and
proper ascriptions of aesthetic goodness.

University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

VI.—PARTICULAR WORKS OF ART

JEANNE WACKER

CRITICS and philosophers of art often appeal to the idea that works of art are *particulars*. As Mr. Stuart Hampshire says in a passage representative of this sort of appeal, " He (the artist) did not set himself to create Beauty, but some particular thing ".[1] But although being a particular is plainly supposed to be an important fact about works of art, the criterion of particularity to be invoked in this connection is not always clear. If we suppose it to be simply the possibility of inserting the name of the thing in question into the phrase " a particular so-and-so ", it is obvious that paintings, operas, novels and indeed examples of any kind of work we care to name turn out to be particulars. The trouble is that so do many things which are importantly different from each other for most theoretical purposes. We can say, for example, " This particular dog won first place in the show this year". But we can also say " This particular breed was poorly represented ". And plainly, whether a work of art is taken to be a particular like a dog or a particular like a breed of dog is bound to have far-reaching consequences for theories about art.

Traditionally, things like dogs—*e.g.* spatio-temporally unique individuals—have been called *sensible* particulars, and it might seem that some writers have these in mind when they assert that works of art are particular things. For example, Hampshire also says—apropos analogies between ethics and aesthetics—that " Virtue and good conduct are essentially repeatable and imitable in a sense in which a work of art is not ", and further that the art-critic's job is to get people to look " at precisely this unique object ; not to see the object as one of a kind, but to see it as individual and unrepeatable " (*loc. cit.* pp. 164 and 165). Unfortunately, he does not tell us precisely how such adjectives apply to specific works, for example, to Mozart's *The Magic Flute*. To say that *The Magic Flute* was a unique opera would surely be perfectly reasonable. But it would be very odd indeed to say that it was unrepeatable. We might readily apply the latter adjective to a performance of the opera, for performances are sensible particulars. But then it is very doubtful that Hampshire would wish to maintain that some performance of *The Magic Flute* was the particular thing that Mozart " set himself to create ".

[1] " Logic and Appreciation ", *Aesthetics and Language*, ed. by William Elton, Basil Blackwell (Oxford, 1954), p. 162.

This difficulty in identifying the particular thing that an artist creates is a familiar problem in connection both with literature and with those arts whose products require performance. But, with the exception of idealists and, among non-idealists, Mrs. Suzanne Langer, philosophers have not often felt the difficulty to be very acute, nor have they always recognized the problem as a general one. Perhaps owing to the easy familiarity of the phrase " a copy of " in other contexts, scant attention has been paid to the role of the phrase " a reproduction of " in discussions of painting and sculpture. As a result, a remark such as Hampshire's " A copy of a work of art is not necessarily or generally a work of art " may still sound entirely convincing. (*loc. cit.* p. 165.) For we still tend to think of a copy of a painting or a piece of sculpture as the sort of thing art students make while sitting in front of old masters at the Louvre. But are we so entirely sure of what we want to say about today's painting reproductions which simulate their originals right down to matters of texture and surface sheen? Consideration of these remarkable " copies " might lessen the persuasiveness both of Hampshire's claim and of a related claim of Miss Margaret Macdonald that " a work of the plastic arts cannot, logically, be in more than one place at one time " (*loc. cit.* p. 123).

I do not mean to suggest that the way out of this difficulty in identifying particular works of art is obvious or that there must be some single answer which will be uniformly satisfactory in connection with each of the arts. In fact, before offering my own tentative ideas on the problem, I may say that I do not share Mr. Paul Ziff's confidence that it is the sort of difficulty which disappears as soon as the expressions " this particular opera ", " this particular painting ", and so forth, are considered in concrete contexts. Unless I have misunderstood the point of his remarks, Ziff's view is that we use a number of different " families " of descriptions of works of art and that the reference— or identity—problem is merely one of keeping the members of these families sorted out. He argues convincingly that if, for example, we knew that a speaker had addressed one remark to an art-critic and the other to a carpenter, we should not be at all puzzled to hear him say of the same painting both " This particular painting has great depth " and " This particular painting is perfectly flat " (*loc. cit.* pp. 170–186). The trouble with Ziff's discussion is that the puzzles arising from cases of this inter-familial kind are, I suspect, of only minor philosophical interest, and he does not consider any that arise from what we might call intra-familial conflicts, *e.g.* conflicts occurring within the art-critic's family of descriptions.

Consider, as an example of what I mean, a mildly puzzling critical remark such as " This particular painting by Degas would have been much better if he had done it in pastels instead of oils ". I say the remark is puzzling because, if we suppose " this particular painting " to refer here to the piece of oil-painted canvas (*e.g.* to a sensible particular), then we cannot suppose that " it " refers to the same thing but only, perhaps, to the unpainted canvas which is plainly no painting at all. Or take an acute case of the same puzzle. Imagine a Romantically-inclined critic who says " Rosetti is a better poet than he is a painter, and this particular painting might have been better if he had done it in words instead ". Here there is something downright absurd in the suggestion that " this particular painting " and " it " both refer to the same thing. Yet it is not obvious at a glance that the latter remark differs radically and in principle from the remark about Degas. I shall have more to say about the nature of this absurdity later on. Here I wish only to point out that no appeal to the differences between critics', carpenters' and chemists' families of descriptions is apt to alleviate puzzles of reference that come up only *after* talk about something as art has been clearly separated from other kinds of descriptions of it.

But from the fact that absurdities result if we try to construe all expressions that refer, for example, to paintings as though they referred to sensible particulars it of course does not follow, as Ziff and others sometimes appear to believe, that paintings must be regarded as *imaginary* entities. There are other alternatives. The one that interests me can best be explained by considering figures and diagrams of the sort that might appear in textbooks dealing with the psychology of perception—for example, the ones that appear below.

Commenting on these figures Rudolph Arnheim, the author of the remarkable book from which they are taken, says : " It will be noticed that the patterns with converging edges create three-dimensionality in a more compelling way than those with parallel edges."[1] Now, if we were asked to indicate what it is

[1] Arnheim, Rudolph, *Art and Visual Perception*, University of California Press (Berkeley, 1953), p. 209.

that Arnheim is interested in here, what it is that he says has been more compellingly created in the second figure, we should I think probably reply " a certain visual effect ", or perhaps " a particular look ", or simply " a look of depth ". We might go on to explain that psychologists use figures and diagrams like these in order to isolate the perceptual conditions under which certain visual effects or " looks " will be seen by normal observers. And we might add that psychologists employ a variety of different kinds of surfaces in making their diagrams, for example, shadows on a lighted screen or chalk on a blackboard, as well as ink on paper.

Now there are I think significant similarities between the things we might say about some surface used by a psychologist for his purposes and the things we might say about some surface on which, for his different purposes, a painter has painted. Concerning either the psychologist's lighted screen or the painter's canvas, for example, we may ask " How can this surface be made to have a look of X, or an X look or an X-like look? " and here X, it should be noted, could be anything at all of which it makes sense to say that it has some look or other. Answers to such questions will have the same general form in both cases : " When shadows are projected on it in such and such specific ways " or " When paint is applied to it in such and such specific ways ". There is a similarity also in what we should ordinarily say had been created in both cases, e.g. a particular look, and in what we should say had been used in order to create it, e.g. a surface of some kind marked in some way. But there are clearly important differences in what we should say as well.

I mentioned before that a psychologist may employ several different kinds of surface materials when investigating a particular look that interests him. We should commonly describe this situation by saying that for his purposes the same look can often be created by means of surfaces that differ widely in, for example, size, texture, transparency, colour, luminosity, and so forth. But we should not commonly describe the situation of a painter in this way, particularly if he were a modern painter. As a rule, *there are no alternative kinds of surface* that will do just as well as means for creating the particular looks that interest painters. For, as a rule, these looks have among their *essential* features the characteristic visual qualities (texture, sheen, luminosity and so forth) of specific kinds of materials—for example, the characteristic visual qualities of oil paint on unsized canvas or of egg tempera on masonite. In order to bring out this difference we might say that a psychologist's criteria for applying

the term " the same look " do not include a requirement that the same kinds of materials must be used for creating the look, whereas a painter's criteria do. But this would not be quite correct. Occasionally, when speaking of reproduction, a painter may be willing to say that a surface of some other material has the same look as the piece of canvas he has covered, say, with oil paint. But he is willing to say this only in those cases where, as with some recent reproductions, the alternative surface *simulates* the characteristic visual qualities of oil-painted canvas ; where, as we should commonly say, the alternative surface happens to be an extraordinarily accurate reproduction of the original. Perhaps the difference would come out even better if we said that a psychologist's criteria for applying the term " the same look " are connected mainly with what the look is a look *of*, whereas the painter's criteria are connected just as much with the characteristic visual qualities of specific materials.

But how will these comparisons aid us in elucidating the phrase " this particular painting "? At the beginning of my remarks I noted that writers who insist that works of art are particular things do not always indicate what criterion of particularity applies in this context, and that this is important because names of things of radically different logical types seem to fit equally well into the phrase " this particular so-and-so ". I also noted that puzzles of reference are created (and take an especially acute form in art criticism) if the criterion adopted is that of sensible particulars, but that to conceive of works of art as imaginary entities is not the only alternative. The above remarks about diagrams and paintings were intended to indicate another. They suggest that where the phrase " this particular painting " is used to refer to what a painter creates, as distinct from the surface he uses to create it, the expression has the force of " this particular look ", and therefore that what can properly be said about paintings considered as works of art is limited by the sort of thing it makes sense to say about looks.

Now the question whether distinctions analogous to that between looks and surfaces can be made in connection with other arts than painting may, I think, for the moment reasonably be left open. If the distinction turns out to be of help with puzzles connected with painting, we shall be in a better position to look for analogues after we have shown this. But 'if the distinction turns out to be of no help, the question of analogues in the other arts will be of little interest.

Suppose, then, that the particular thing a painter may be said o create is a special sort of look. It is now quite easy to see
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why it is absurd to suggest that a particular painting by Rossetti would have been better if he had used words instead of paint and canvas to create it. What this suggestion implies is that the same look would have been created more successfully by means of words than by means of a painted surface, and this strikes us as preposterous because it makes no sense to say of words that they have any look at all. On the other hand, the suggestion that a particular painting by Degas would have been better if he had used pastels instead of oils seems reasonable, if unconvincing, since both kinds of surface are capable of having an indefinite variety of looks.

At this point someone may object that even though construing " painting " as " look " seems to eliminate the puzzles of reference in these cases, the remark about Degas can hardly be considered a straight-forwardly intelligible one. It implies, for example, that a look created by an alternative surface might be both *the same as* and *better than* the look created by the surface Degas in fact employed, and this is surely very odd. For to say that two things are the same is normally thought to exclude saying they are similar (as my saying I attended the same party as you excludes my saying I attended a similar one), while to say that one thing is better than another implies that in some respect the two things are similar, *e.g.* comparable. But is it in fact so odd? We can certainly say of two surfaces that they have the same colour and also that the colour of one is, say, more intense than that of the other. The question is, then, whether we can say this sort of thing about a look.

It seems to me clear that we do talk this way about the looks ascribed to at least one familiar kind of surface, namely, the human face. Consider, for example, the remark of Mr. A. who says " I find it practically impossible to tell the boys apart—they both have the same Adams look ". Now, would we wish to say that Mr. B., in response to this, could legitimately ask " In what respect are their looks similar? " If we did decide that B's question was illegitimate, I think we would do so not on the ground that " same " logically excludes " similar ", but rather on the ground that A has not made any claim whatever about the *looks* of each boy, but only about each boy's *look*, while B's question presupposes that he has. (The confusion here results from the fact that we use the vocable " looks " both as a plural of " a look " and, with a different sense, in constructions such as " to have good looks is always an advantage ".) Although A has not claimed that the boys' looks are similar, he certainly has implied that their *faces* are, if only in respect of having the

same look. But even if A is not prepared to name any other respects in which their faces are similar, it seems to me that his remark is perfectly in order. That is, I think we generally have no trouble in understanding comments of the following sort :

> How extraordinary to see the Adams look on the face of an infant ! I always thought it depended on hollow cheeks and jutting brows, but it doesn't seem to at all. I couldn't say what features it does depend on, but it's unmistakeably there all the same.

The fact that we understand quite well what such a speaker is talking about shows that recognizing the same look on different faces does *not* presuppose recognizing similarities between features of those faces. Another interesting fact about looks can be brought out by the following comment :

> It's very odd about John. He has the Adams look all right, but in his case it seems blurred or watered down—as though it were in weak solution or as though the edges of the die were blunted by the time they stamped out his face !

This sort of comment points to possible respects in which looks that are the same may reasonably be compared, *e.g.* in respect of distinctness and intensity.

But even if it is granted that it does sometimes make sense to say of a look that it is both the same as and better (more intense) than another look, there would still be difficulty in drawing conclusions about paintings from this fact. The sort of look I have been using as an example is a family resemblance, and it is by no means self-evident that the looks painters create can be assimilated entirely to these. The problem would seem to be this : A family resemblance is the sort of look which we are properly said to *recognize*, and it is a necessary condition of recognizing anything that we should have observed at least one other instance of it. But, we want to be able to say of at least some paintings that they are original creations, and to say of a painting that it is original would ordinarily be taken to imply that it is unique, that there are as yet no other instances of it, that, in short, it cannot be a family resemblance. It seems, therefore, that if my suggestion that paintings are a special sort of look is to carry conviction, I need to ask, first, whether we do in fact recognize the looks painters create, and, second, whether critical remarks beginning with " This particular painting . . . " in fact have recognizable looks for their referents.

Now it seems to me clear that anyone already acquainted with even a few works from different periods in the history of the art

of painting will in fact recognize the looks painters create. That is, depending on the range and depth of a person's historical acquaintance with paintings, he may recognize a particular look as, say, late-Degas or Post-impressionist or perhaps merely post-Renaissance. But, from the mere fact that a speaker looking at a painted surface can always name some look he recognizes, I think no one will be tempted to conclude that the look he names is *the* look the painter created. For one thing, it is obvious that another speaker is apt to name a different look. Where A claims to recognize a late-Degas look, B may claim to recognize a Post-impressionist one. It should also be obvious that both speakers may be correct. There is no more contradiction in saying that a painted surface has both a late-Degas look and a Post-impressionist look than there is in saying that a uniformly-coloured surface is both vermilion and red. But then, neither is there any contradiction in saying that a painted surface has both a recognizable look (or recognizable looks) and a nameless look that is peculiarly its own, just as each Adams boy has not only the Adams look but his own peculiar one. In short, even if it is true that a painter always creates some look we *recognize*, it may also be true that he creates a *unique* look to which critical remarks beginning " This particular painting . . . " would ordinarily be taken to refer.

An interesting implication of this last point can be brought out by a single comparison of " This particular painting " with " This particular engraving ". As I have said, remarks beginning with the former expression would ordinarily be taken to refer to the look peculiar to a given painted surface, that is, to a unique look. But remarks beginning with the latter expression would not ordinarily be taken to refer to the look peculiar to a given printed surface. Presumably there is no such look in the case of a work of graphic art, for prints are normally produced only in sets. This raises a question concerning the relation of uniqueness to originality in art, for it would seem that at least in some cases the former is not a necessary condition of the latter. This line of thought would, I suspect, be extremely interesting to pursue. Indeed, it is clear that this and a number of interrelated questions will have to be examined before my suggestion that what painters create are looks of a special sort carries conviction. But I have already strayed too far from the original concern of my paper. That concern was with the view expressed by Mr. Hampshire and others that works of art are particular things.

I hope that by now enough has been said to show that Hampshire's claim that works of art are unrepeatable is false. Using

examples from the art of painting we have seen that although painted surfaces are logically unrepeatable (*e.g.* sensible) particulars, the looks that painters create are not. These seem rather to be the sort of thing modern philosophers have called *types* in order to distinguish them from sensible particulars, in this context called *tokens*. If this is correct, Miss Macdonald's assertion that works of plastic art cannot, logically, be in more than one place at one time turns out to be not so much false as absurd ; for a type is not the sort of thing about which it makes sense to ask, In what place is it ? Finally, Mr. Ziff's claim that when we attribute both depth and flatness to a painting there are " two descriptions, not two objects " turns out to be a misleading half-truth if he means to imply that the descriptions are not descriptions of two sorts of things, namely, looks (types) and surfaces (tokens).

My tentative conclusions are, then, first, that the distinction between looks and surfaces is a specific form, appropriate to the art of painting, of the general type-token distinction and, second, that if there are analogues of this distinction in the other arts, they will also be appropriate specific forms of the general type-token distinction. But this question of possible analogues is, I suspect, of too considerable interest for me simply to let the matter drop here. It is of interest both in itself and for what it seems to imply. To raise it suggests that the search for non-trivial generalizations about the arts may not be, as many contemporary philosophers seem to believe, wholly chimerical. The question is plainly too complex to be dealt with in any detail in these concluding paragraphs. Still, I will try to indicate roughly how I think it may best be approached and in what way answers to it may prove helpful.

I suggested earlier that performances resemble surfaces in being particulars of the sensible sort. It would therefore seem reasonable to inquire whether performances may not stand to operas, ballets, plays and other works of what may be called *occurrent* arts as surfaces stand to paintings and works of graphic art. And it does, I think, seem reasonable to say that a musical performance is the sensible vehicle for a musical work, just as a painted surface is the sensible vehicle for a painting, or a printed surface for an engraving. Thus far the parallel seems clear enough. But discussions of the occurrent arts are complicated by the fact that as a rule performances, unlike surfaces, are *not* subject to the exclusive and direct control of the artist who created the work. Consider in this connection the brilliant discussion of musical performance offered by Mrs. Langer.

In the course of it she suggests that performers ought to be considered co-creators with composers. To be precise, she says that the composer's piece is " an incompleted work ", that " performance is the completion of a musical work ", and that therefore " real performance is as creative an act as composition ".[1] Now, it is not entirely clear to me what the point of these remarks may be. Perhaps Mrs. Langer wishes to emphasize that musical abilities essentially like those of the composer are necessary if someone else is to perform his work well ; if, in other words, someone else is to reproduce for actual hearing the same auditory effect or sound that the composer may originally have heard only in imagination. But if this is her point, Mrs. Langer has put it in an unfortunate way. For the effect of describing the composer's piece as " an incompleted work " and the performance as its " completion " is to suggest that the composer left his proper job *unfinished*, that someone else had to finish it for him, and worse still that we ought as a rule to assign the credit for creating any particular musical work to at least two people. But this is surely an unnecessarily paradoxical construction to put on the facts. We have perfectly good locutions for distributing the credits properly in such situations. We speak, for example, of Schnabel's performance of Schubert's piano sonata, or of his interpretation, in a given performance, of Schubert's sonata. We credit Schubert, that is, with the sonata and Schnabel with an interpretation or a performance of it. Even when we feel, as we may, that Schnabel's interpretation is more creative than are those by other performers, this has not the slightest tendency to make us doubt that they are all alike interpretations and performances of the sonata created by Schubert. Mrs. Langer is clearly right to point out that Schnabel's performance is fully determinate while Schubert's creation is not. But I think it is a mistake to conceive this difference as one of *stages in the completion of* a particular musical work. To say that Schubert's creation lacks full determinateness is not to say that he didn't quite complete his job or that Schnabel or any other performer could conceivably finish it for him. It is merely to make explicit one of the distinguishing features of types in general as opposed to tokens, or of works of art in particular as opposed to their sensible vehicles.

The reader will have noticed that I found it helpful to introduce into these sketchy remarks about musical performances the phrase

[1] Langer, Susanne, *Feeling and Form*, Chas. Scribner's Sons (New York, 1953), pp. 138–139.

" the same auditory effect or sound ", which I used to make a point analogous to one made earlier about paintings in terms of the phrase " the same look ". Now, it would be both dogmatic and wildly premature to insist either that points analogous to all those made earlier about painting in terms of the same look could be made about music in terms of the same sound, or that the concept of a look has in general a clear and complete parallel in that of a sound. I, for one, would be greatly surprised if matters were to turn out so neatly. But if, as I believe, rough analogies and partial parallels are more illuminating than none, the matter is worth inquiring into. For I should be equally surprised if attempts to solve certain puzzles of literary criticism did not meet with modest success through consideration of similarities and differences between, on the one hand, the use of " a reproduction of " and " a performance of " in discussions of painting and music and, on the other hand, the use of " a copy of ", " an edition of ", " a translation of ", " a prose version of ", and " a paraphrase of " in discussions of literature. It seems likely, too, that discussions of architecture might profit from an examination of phrases such as " a scale model of " and " a reconstruction of ". In short, it seems to me that although the search for analogous type-token distinctions may bring fewer returns in connection with some arts than with others, it will hardly ever entirely fail to be worth the effort. A staggering amount of work needs to be done, but it does not seem to me unduly sanguine to say that in this direction the prospects for some interesting philosophical generalizations are tolerably good.

New York City

VII.—DISCUSSIONS

THE PHILOSOPHICAL " REFUTATION " OF PARETO

PARETO's *The Mind and Society* is not widely read. It is, therefore, interesting to find Mr. Peter Winch devoting a chapter to Pareto in his recent book *The Idea of a Social Science*. But while we might expect a critical discussion of Pareto to concentrate on the question whether historical or social facts warrant Pareto's views, this is not Mr. Winch's procedure. Singling out a major thesis of Pareto, about the role of ideas in society (other major theses concern the nature of " social equilibrium " and the " circulation of élites ") Mr. Winch claims to falsify Pareto's account, in general and in particular cases, on purely *a priori*, philosophical grounds. He takes Pareto's thesis to be that " the ideas which people have, in behaving as they do, influence the nature and outcome of their behaviour far less fundamentally than is usually thought " (p. 95) and he also describes it, misleadingly, as an attempt " to eliminate human ideas and intelligence from the sociologist's account of social life " (p. 111), for actually Pareto wanted to say that although ideas often do not have the function they are taken to have, reference to them is essential in understanding social life—compare, *e.g.* " we could not deny the great importance that they [ideas] had had in history and in determining the social equilibrium " (*The Mind and Society*, Section 843—hereafter " Section . . . " refers to this book). Against this thesis Mr. Winch claims to bring out two main points : " First that Pareto mistakes what is essentially a philosophical issue for an empirical, scientific, one ; second, that the conclusion of his argument is in fact false " (p. 96). (It turns out, however, that all Mr. Winch offers in favour of the second point is the first point.) I do not wish to discuss here whether Pareto's conclusions are true or false. But I do want to draw attention to the assumptions and implications of Mr. Winch's argument, and to show that he fails in his attempt to rule out *a priori* Pareto's, and Pareto-like, investigations of ideas or ways of thinking.

Mr. Winch begins by attacking Pareto's account of what he calls " logical actions " and " non-logical actions ". This is a distinction Pareto makes in leading up to his view that it is the business of the sociologist to explain the wide acceptance in society of many false theories. " Logical actions ", in brief, are actions which are intended by an agent to have a result and do have that result, while " non-logical actions " are those which are not of this kind, *i.e.* are actions (*a*) which have neither an intended nor an actual result, or (*b*) which lack an intended, but possess an actual, result, or (*c*) which have an intended but no actual result, or (*d*) which have both intended and actual results but these do not coincide (Sections 150-151). ((*c*) and (*d*) are of special interest to Pareto.) Mr. Winch takes Pareto to task here on the ground that he is unable to distinguish " non-

logical " and " illogical " conduct. Mr. Winch's argument on this
point is aided by his conflation of the ordinary use of the words
" logical " and " non-logical " with Pareto's use in this context,
despite Pareto's express and repeated statements that he is using
such words, not in their ordinary sense, but only as convenient
labels for factual distinctions he wants to make ; a circumstance
which leads Mr. Winch to ignore the fact that in the ordinary sense
of the words Pareto does distinguish between logical and illogical
reasonings within theologies, etc. (compare, *e.g.* Section 1399). Mr.
Winch, however, does make one specific point against Pareto.
Pareto has claimed that wage-cutting measures by business men,
providing they occur under conditions of free competition, are
" to some extent non-logical actions " as they fail to achieve their
intended objective of increasing profits. But he also states that " a
mistake in engineering is not a non-logical action ". This, Mr.
Winch wants to maintain, is an inconsistency for there is no relevant
difference between the two types of mistake.

Now given merely the initial classification of actions (as above) it
is clear that Pareto is wrong on this point ; the intended and actual
results of a mistake in engineering are not the same, and so this, like
the wage-cutting mistake, belongs to class (*d*) above. But, contrary
to Mr. Winch, it by no means follows that Pareto's whole procedure
is vitiated, that he cannot distinguish between erroneous " scienti-
fic " activities and the kinds of " non-logical conduct " he wants to
stress. In his later detailed discussion Pareto adduces a more
ramified set of distinctions, and it emerges that he wants, in particular,
to isolate a large class of theories or sets of ideas, *viz.* those theories
which, in the course of justifying, recommending or otherwise
dealing with human actions, refer to intended objectives, but these
intended objectives are either entirely imaginary, or in any case are
regularly not achieved, *i.e.* whose actual results are regularly different
from the intended or stated objectives. According to Pareto most
socially influential theories are of this kind—compare a characteristic
passage : " The accord of a doctrine, or theory, with fact is one thing ;
and the social importance of that doctrine, or theory, quite an-
other. . . . A theory may not correspond to objective fact,
may indeed be altogether fantastic from that standpoint, and yet
meantime correspond to subjective facts of great moment to society.
A person aware of the social importance of a mythology will have
that mythology real. A person who denies the truth of a mythology
will also deny its social value. But the facts clearly show that
mythologies have no reality and at the same time have the greatest
social importance " (Section 1682). These theories he then wishes
to argue (*inter alia*) owe their influence to their being used to ration-
alize or logicalize human sentiments or types of conduct. (Pareto
concentrates on non-scientific theories, such as religious, moral and
political theories, but he also discusses the social role of false scientific
theories and argues that even true scientific theories may come to be

attached to theories of a different sort and thus contribute to the
rationalizing function he is talking about.)

What, then, is the position of " scientific " mistakes such as mis-
takes in engineering? Misapplications of engineering theories
could conceivably have the role Pareto is discussing (compare the
Lysenko issue in biology, or, as an engineering example, imagine
a society much of whose industrial life was devoted to manufacturing
rockets to send, say, to Mars, but which constantly failed to arrive
there). But in fact ordinary engineering mistakes are not of this
kind ; a disparity between the intended and actual outcomes is
not a characteristic feature of engineering activities. In contrast,
the wage-cutting mistake is in a special position. Misapplications
of economic theory are often comparable to ordinary engineering
mistakes, though there is the difference from engineering that there
are various competing economic theories. But, as it happens, the
practice of wage-cutting has only been vaguely affiliated with definite
economic theories ; it has rather been the application of certain
(false) beliefs of business men themselves, i.e. beliefs which regularly
failed to succeed in their applications. There is, moreover, the diff-
erence (relevant, perhaps, if we were looking for further explanations
of its occurrence) that the practice of wage-cutting does achieve
an actual result additional to the failure of the intended result of
making profits, viz. the fact of wage-cutting itself. (When Mr. Winch
in taking up another of Pareto's examples, magic, suggests that the
the wage-cutting mistake (and presumably the engineering mistake)
is comparable, not to a magical rite, but to a *mistake* in a magical
rite (p. 99), he appears to miss the point of Pareto's discussion :
magic, mistaken or not in its ritual, is surely an example of an activity
whose intended results are regularly not achieved by that activity.)

It emerges, however, that Mr. Winch's interest is not in arguing
out examples with Pareto but in showing that Pareto, who if he had
only known it was really trying to do philosophy, not sociology,
falls into the error of " taking sides ", of trying to evaluate by scienti-
fic criteria the ideas and theories he is studying. Mr. Winch leads
up to this by maintaining that Pareto fails to see that criteria of
logic " arise out of, and are only intelligible in the context of, ways of
living or modes of social life. It follows that one cannot apply
criteria of logic to modes of social life as such. For instance, science
is one such mode and religion is another ; each has criteria of
intelligibility peculiar to itself. So within science or religion actions
can be logical or illogical : in science, for example, it would be
illogical to refuse to be bound by the results of a properly carried
out experiment ; in religion it would be illogical to suppose that one
could pit one's own strength against God's ; and so on. But we
cannot sensibly say that either the practice of science itself or
that of religion is either logical or illogical ; both are non-logical "
(pp. 100-101). There is some difficulty in understanding what
Mr. Winch is saying here ; a difficulty increased because he stresses

" ways of living ", " modes of social life ", " practices ", as distinct
from theories or beliefs. We can, of course, grant that scientific,
religious activities, etc., are different types of activity; each *occurs*
in characteristic ways and as such is neither logical nor illogical.
We can also grant that the beliefs connected with these activities
have conceptual rules, which have to be understood if the beliefs
are to be understood, and which allow them to be appraised as
internally consistent or inconsistent. The same might be said
of magical and astrological practices and of the beliefs connected
with them. But it is a very different thing to maintain that every
set of beliefs has its own criteria of intelligibility in a sense which
exempts them from critical examination. If any set of beliefs
arising out of a mode of life has its own style of intelligibility,
including its own style of truth or invulnerability, then anything
goes. Such a view has to sustain itself by resorting to " private
experiences " or " private conceptual systems " when the fact in
any case is that such sets of belief regularly have points of inter-
section with one another, including points of conflict; at the very
least they have to have points of contact with everyday beliefs
about everyday facts if only to explain to the uninitiated what the
new beliefs are. It would be highly unhistorical, for instance,
to deny this in the case of religious beliefs. Whatever cautious new
" interpretations " of " religious discourse " may be attempted, most
people caught up in ordinary religious ways of life make no bones
about claiming points of contact between religious and everyday
types of " experience " or " reality ", for example in describing
the " intervention " of God in " our world " or in attempting to
justify moral sanctions addressed to all sections of society. As a
result, conflicts break out with other sets of beliefs, including scienti-
fic beliefs, and it becomes a matter of open and critical discussion to
consider whether, for example, the supposed relations between the
supernatural and natural orders are possible.

I am thus maintaining that it is possible to " take sides ", that
inquiry can be critical and need not leave traditional or conventional
beliefs " as they were ". But I should point out (to anticipate
later remarks) that I take this to be *separable* from the question
whether there can be investigations of Pareto's kind into the sociology
of beliefs—criticizing a belief is different from observing its social
conditions and consequences. Mr. Winch, however, appears to
run the two questions together in his account of " intelligibility ",
as comes out in the next stage of his argument when he goes on to
criticize Pareto's distinction between " residues " and " derivations "
(*i.e.* between constant and variable social factors). Mr. Winch does
this by taking two of Pareto's examples (explanations of baptism
and of sexual asceticism) and objecting to Pareto's procedure, not
on the ground that he arrives at the wrong common factor or that
the material happens to be too complex to admit of a common
factor, but on the ground that this type of analysis is mistaken in

principle. The sociologist cannot give a common account of different sets of ideas because " ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that way ; the relation between idea and context is an *internal* one. The idea gets its sense from the role it plays in the system " (p. 107). For " things " to be " intellectual or social, as opposed to physical, in character depends entirely on their belonging in a certain way to a system of ideas or mode of living. It is only by reference to the criteria governing that system of ideas or mode of life that they have any existence as intellectual or social events " (p. 108). So, for example, " A Christian would strenuously deny that the baptism rites of his faith were really the same in character as the acts of a pagan sprinkling lustral water or letting sacrificial blood. Pareto, in maintaining the contrary, is inadvertently removing from his subject-matter precisely that which gives them sociological interest : namely their internal connection with a way of living " (pp. 108-109). From this Mr. Winch concludes that " the whole presupposition of Pareto's procedure is absurd : namely that it is possible to treat propositions and theories as ' experimental facts ' on a par with any other kind of fact " (p. 109).

It can be seen that the general assumption made by this argument is again that each way of living and thinking has a peculiarity and invulnerability of its own—it is this, for instance, which leads Mr. Winch so frankly to assume that religious interest in religion is the same as sociological interest in it. But it is less clear just why Mr. Winch makes this assumption ; we have to some extent to work back from his conclusions about Pareto to discover what exactly are the reasons he has for his line of argument. When we do look carefully at what he says we find that, in addition to his views on " intelligibility ", Mr. Winch's position depends on upholding the special character (a) of the activity of social investigation, and (b) of the material investigated.

On the first point, earlier in his book (p. 87) Mr. Winch maintains that whereas there are scientific rules governing the natural scientist's investigation of his material, social activities, the material of sociology, have their own rules and it is these rules that govern the sociologist's investigation. Consequently, for instance, " a historian or sociologist of religion must himself have some religious feeling if he is to make sense of the religious movement he is studying and understand the considerations which govern the lives of its participants " (p. 88), *i.e.* what Mr. Winch is hinting at and would need to say is that investigation into religion is literally governed by the rules found in religious ways of acting and thinking, that there is no way of studying religion except under its own terms. This points a path which has as its destination the subjectivist view that the only way to know anything about a way of life (or a historical period) is to know all about it, and that the only way to do this is to live it (or through it), when, on the face of it, it is quite possible for a careful student to immerse himself in the concepts and values of a way of

life and yet reject many of its adherents' beliefs.[1] Later, however,
Mr. Winch makes a significant qualification when he allows that an
investigator may use different concepts providing they imply an
understanding of the concepts in the field he is studying (p. 89) ;
for example, a psycho-analyst can apply Freudian concepts to, *e.g.*
the Trobriand Islanders, but he must do so reflectively for " it is
almost inevitable that such an investigation would lead to some
modification in the psychological theory appropriate for explaining
neurotic behaviour in this new situation " (p. 90). That is, it now
appears that a social investigator can understand a set of beliefs
without subscribing to them and can discover connections of which
he is aware, but not the persons he is studying, always providing,
as in all forms of investigation, that the connections really are there
and are not introduced in an *a priori* way. (The last-quoted state-
ment is Mr. Winch's attempt to guard against suggesting that there
can be features common to different groups or ways of life.
But, although we may agree that Freud's original account of incest
relationships has to be modified when extended, particularly to
primitive peoples, the fact, for instance, that special attention will
still be paid to someone (although it be maternal uncle instead of
father) as the object of a certain kind of ambivalence and identifica-
tion shows that in this matter the Trobriand Islanders have resem-
blances to as well as differences from (*e.g.*) the Viennese middle class.)

It appears, then, that Mr. Winch's point about the rules governing
sociology does not really hold ; an investigator like Pareto will not
literally be bound by the social " rules " of his material, he can act
independently and develop his own concepts, his own explanatory
devices, if the occasion arises. (This also follows from another
qualification Mr. Winch makes of his thesis (p. 110) when he admits
that it is after all possible for us to investigate the beliefs of people
without sharing those beliefs, *e.g.* the belief that the earth is flat.)
So Mr. Winch's charge against Pareto (unless he merely wished to
maintain that Pareto is wrong in detail, *i.e.* empirically wrong) has
to be that it is the nature of the material which precludes his kind of
study of it, which makes it impossible to discover general social
connections between theories or beliefs and other social phenomena.

What Mr. Winch has to argue in support of this view is that there
is a basic incompatibility between the peculiarities of a given way of
living and thinking and its having similarities to and connections
with other forms of social life, that to claim to find the latter is to
falsify the former. This appears also to be the source of Mr. Winch's
recurrent attack in his book on the search, not merely for unqualified
social uniformities, but also for qualified statements about tendencies
and the like. But in arguing in this way Mr. Winch is identifying
separate things. We may agree that if an investigator (such as an

[1] Compare S. Hampshire, " The Interpretation of Language : Words and
Concepts ", *British Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, ed. C. A. Mace, esp.
pp. 270-271.

historian) is trying to give a full acount of a way of life he must do justice to its richness and variety—we can, for example, agree with Mr. Winch if he wants to insist that Pareto's account, in any case, by no means says all that is to be said about religions. But it is a mistake to infer from this as Mr. Winch does that the study of the peculiar precludes study of the common (compare his objection that Christian baptism rites are not " really the same in character " as pagan rites—does Mr. Winch mean : not " exactly the same " and that this excludes the possibility of similarities?) The presence of peculiarities along with similarities is also a feature of the material of natural science ; and when natural scientists look for uniformities they should also, according to Mr. Winch, be guilty of " vicious abstraction ", since they leave out of account the individual peculiarities of what they are studying.[1] But in fact the existence of special modes of behaviour of stars, trees and solutions of nitric acid is compatible with their having general modes of behaviour, just as the psychological material presented in a novel may be different from but quite compatible with that presented in a treatise on psychology. Moreover, in the case of the social activities and beliefs Pareto wished to study, it is not just a matter of detecting resemblances which exist alongside their peculiarities or " internality ", it is also a matter of discerning the manifest interaction of particular activities and beliefs with others. Mr. Winch proceeds as if particular social activities and beliefs, *qua* social phenomena, are rigidly self-contained or compartmentalized, as if a given way of life is cut off from others in the way that the Trobriand Islanders have been cut off from other societies. Whereas, for example, it is amply shown by the history of religions that religious beliefs and modes of behaviour have close connections with political and economic activities and have often co-operated or conflicted with other beliefs and modes of behaviour. Ways of living and thinking are not cut off from one another ; their interrelations and ramifications are also occurrences, open to investigation.

As a result, when we do attend to social situations, both in everyday life and in the history of societies, we find that there are various questions which we can intelligibly ask about the social character and connections of theories or beliefs. Some examples will help to make this clear (Pareto himself gives a great many examples indeed).

(1) Suppose we find a certain theory of racial superiority presented. In addition to criticizing it or defending it (for what follows is also open to believers of the theory) we may ask questions in Pareto's manner. These questions, it may be noted, we can ask whilst understanding quite well what the theory says. We may ask whether there are any particular social groups, with particular wants or demands, which are aided by acceptance of the theory ; if the theory now has a greater currency than it had formerly we

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[1] Compare John Passmore, " History, the Individual, and Inevitability ", *Philosophical Review*, (January, 1959), esp. p. 100.

may ask if this has a connection with recognizable increases of
frustration or struggle in the society in which the theory has currency.
If, moreover, we find other racial theories connected with other
particular social wants, unless we subscribe to the *a priori* view that
the peculiarities of each theory exclude the possibility of similarities,
we shall not feel forbidden to inquire whether there is some common
role (in addition to special roles) that can be attributed to these
racial theories. And if we do this we may perhaps (*i.e.* if the dis-
cerned connections warrant it) go on to use concepts like " rational-
ize " or " compensate for " in describing the recurrent role of these
theories.   (2) Suppose we have Pareto's view (here expressed very
generally) that the Christian Church was only partially successful
in combating pagan practices such as the holding of certain festivals,
and the veneration of relics.   " Some of them [superstitious practices]
were demolished and disappeared.   Others could not be conquered
and held their ground.   When the Church realized that resistance
was too great, it ended by comprising, and contented itself with
giving a new garb—often a very transparent one—to an old super-
stition " (Section 1001).   Here it will be only by making the advance
assumption that such social practices are discontinuous, or uniquely
exist in the context of a given set of beliefs, that Pareto's view will be
rejected out of hand ; but if we care to examine records of such
practices (and this has to be done if the assumption is to be supported)
it is a matter of determining whether the evidence does or does not
support Pareto's view. (3) Similarly with sexual asceticism (it
would be especially curious to hear it maintained that there are not
certain well-known criteria by which we recognize sexual asceticism
in general) we find that this type of behaviour has often been justified
by theories of various kinds ; and we may then attempt by investi-
gation to discover whether, for instance, there are connections here
different from those stated by the justifying theories.   (4) It is
obvious that theories of natural law and natural rights have been
prominent in certain periods of history and it is also obvious that
they have been used by spokesmen for quite different groups.   This
may lead us to see whether by detailed investigation we can confirm a
thesis of the kind suggested by Pareto when he says, for instance :
" Theories of ' natural law ' and the ' law of nations ' are another
excellent example of discussions destitute of all exactness.   Many
thinkers have more or less vaguely expressed their sentiments under
those terms, and have exerted themselves to link their sentiments
with practical ends that they desired to attain. . . . ' Natural
law ' is simply that law of which the person using the phrase approves ;
but the cards cannot be ingenuously laid on the table in any such
terms ; it is wiser to put the thing a little less bluntly, supplement
it by more or less argument " (Section 401). (5) Moreover, if
in our social study we happened to discover that the same kind of role
was manifested by a wide variety of theories which defend or justify
types of social behaviour, we might be led to general formulations

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like Pareto's, as when he speaks of " the great importance of theological and metaphysical systems—not the importance they are supposed to have when considered as logical sciences, but as expressing residues that correspond to powerful social forces " (Section 1066) ; and, alternatively, if we happened to falsify such general contentions we should do so by showing the factual incorrectness of Pareto's account of the role of particular theories.

I have not been trying to explain in detail, or to examine, Pareto's views. I have tried to indicate the genuineness of his field of study when he inquires into the social roles of theories or beliefs. It is true (as Mr. Winch protests when he criticizes Pareto for " taking sides ") that this investigation will normally be undertaken by people who maintain that many of the theories and beliefs in question are false (or absurd). This need not be so ; it is possible for an investigator who shares certain beliefs to make a study of their social conditions and affiliations (compare the analogous case of those Christians who are able to accept Freudian explanations). But normally the stimulus to investigation comes from seeing through many theories and beliefs bearing on human behaviour which have great social influence ; the investigator is then led to seek explanations of the strength and persistence of such beliefs in something other than their logical force. For this reason such phrases as " social theory " and " social investigation " have a certain ambiguity, they combine, so to speak, philosophical criticism with empirical investigation. The social theorist, in cutting through to his subject matter, is led to criticize various theories, beginning with some which relate to his own activities such as " the theological interpretation of history " and " dialectical materialism ". But while the social theorist is constantly bedevilled by the fact that his subject matter consists partly of theories, so that his energies and interests may be diverted into arguments about the truth of these theories, his concern as an empirical investigator is with the operation of these theories in society and their interrelations with other social phenomena. What Mr. Winch is compelled to offer against the possibility of this kind of investigation are two general points : (1) what can be called an appeal to " privacy " or " conventionalism ", to the view that all theories and beliefs must be accepted on their own terms and only on those terms, and (2) a tacit assumption of " unique compartmentalization ", or the view that particular beliefs and activities have internal but no external conditions and exchanges. Part of the force of the first point is to obviate critical discussion (except under chosen conditions) of social beliefs, the force of both points together is to reject a priori, without any investigation of social situations, such theories as Pareto's, Marx's theory of ideologies and Freud's account of religion in The Future of an Illusion. In fact, I have argued, if we care to attend to social situations there are various questions we can ask about theories or beliefs, such as: What accounts for their social influence? What are their origins and effects? Do

they have social roles different from, or additional to, those their believers take them to have?   There is, however, the interesting complication that if Pareto's answers are on the right track, social investigation of this kind will be far from influential ; being itself an activity subject to social conditions, it will always have to struggle against strong pressures to make itself heard.

University of Sydney   A. J. BAKER

MRS. P. FOOT ON MORALITY AND VIRTUE

MRS. P. FOOT, in the second part of her paper : " Moral Beliefs " (*P.A.S.* 1958), made the rather startling suggestion that if Justice cannot be shown to be something that a man needs as he needs Courage, Temperance, and the use of his hands and eyes, then it cannot be recommended as a virtue.

Mrs. Foot has the following view of reasons : If someone asks : " Why should I do this or that? ", then he has not been given a reason until he has been provided with a consideration which (1) answers the question : What is that to *me*?, and (2) has the property of being ultimate in the sense described by Hume : " Ask a man *why he uses exercise* ; he will answer, *because he desires to keep his health.* If you then enquire, *why he desires health*, he will readily reply, *because sickness is painful.* If you push your enquiries further, and desire a reason *why he hates pain*, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object."

Benefit to others cannot be a reason for acting in this or that way, unless the others are united to the agent by ties of sympathy. It might be objected that unless benefit to others is counted as a reason in general, there can be no such thing as moral reasoning, since morality is essentially concerned with peoples' treatment of each other. But it seems clear that Mrs. Foot would deny that our treatment of others is the centre of morality. See, *e.g.* page 92, where she says : " Courage is not *particularly* concerned with saving other peoples' lives, or temperance with leaving them their share of the food and drink." She would deny that it is only when such connections with the good of others is relevant that Courage and Temperance are virtues . . . . Temperance is virtuous on the desert island. There is a sense of the word " virtue " in which it is possible to say that wisdom, beauty and learning are virtues, and possibly this has something to do with Mrs. Foot's feeling that there is no necessary connection between the exercise of virtue and the benefit of others.

Mrs. Foot places Justice in the list of virtues, and defines it as : " . . . all those things owed to other people : it is under injustice that murder, theft and lying come, as well as the withholding of what is owed by parents to children and by children to parents, as well as the dealings which would be called unjust in everyday speech ". What is the advantage of ignoring everyday speech here? It is this : if justice retains its everyday sense, which is a quasi-legal sense, then the list of virtues will need the addition of honesty, truthfulness, kindness, promise-keeping, to complete it. Of such a list it is true to say that most of the virtues in it have a necessary connection with the good of others, and the remainder—temperance and so on— are in fact connected with their good. That the good of others is the centre of morality is not a conclusion drawn from this : it constitutes the standard by which it is decided whether or not a list

of virtues is or is not hopelessly incomplete. It is difficult, indeed, to see what secular principle of unity could replace this one. "Human good or harm " is too wide.

If we think of the virtues as Courage, Temperance, Prudence and "those things we owe to others ", in a very broad sense of 'owe' then, it seems, most virtues are not very tightly bound up with the idea of the good of others. But one might question the importance given to such a list of virtues as a starting-point of an account of moral reasoning. On the other hand, if a reader has the "everyday sense " of justice in mind, or at the back of his mind, he will not ask Mrs. Foot what she means by "virtue ". The philosophical advantage of re-defining a word sometimes lies ·in the fact that the "everyday sense " is not completely exorcised.

Mrs. Foot implies that "a reason for acting " means a reason *for* the agent. One of three things could be meant :

(*a*) A reason which will in fact move the agent.

(*b*) An answer to the question : "what is that to me? "

(*c*) A consideration which is, or is somehow connected with, an ultimate answer of the kind described by Hume.

(*a*) What is it for a reason to be a reason for a particular person? "*His* reason " suggests that the reason is somehow imperfect : it hints that "he " is eccentric. Does : "R is a reason for A ", where A is the agent, mean that R is a reason which in fact has already moved A, or can be guaranteed to move him because A's character is of such-and-such a kind? The madman who attacks his companion because a very authoritative person outside his head told him not to, or a very authoritative person inside his head told him he ought to, would be giving a reason, in this sense of "reason ". —Is he not really quite *un*reasonable?

It seems then that R's being consideration which will in fact move A is not a sufficient condition of its being a good or a real reason. Is it a necessary condition of its being a real reason? This would entail that a consideration which was a reason in a certain context would not be a reason in a context which was identical with the first in all respects except that the central agent happened to be a different person with different tastes. . . . This seems to me repugnant.

Also it appears to follow that if R's being a genuine reason depended on its being that which in fact moved A, then it would be impossible for anyone to convince A that he had a reason for acting in a certain way, because there would be no such activity as convincing another person that he had a reason for doing something. For until A was convinced, he would have no reason, and we could not know for certain that R would move him until it had moved him.

(*b*) A reason for acting is an answer to the question : "What is that to me? " This can mean either (1) " What benefit will I derive?", or (2) "Do I want this? " The two questions are not equivalent.

" I want so-and-so " is ultimate in Hume's sense, *i.e.* my wanting is like my pain in the passage from Hume quoted above. One

cannot ask a person why he likes doing what he wants to do. There is also, however, a lack of parallelism between pain, and wanting or not wanting. It is possible to tell someone else that X will cause him pain, but not that he wants something, or even that he will want something. Can one want something that is quite unconnected with one's own good? It depends what is to count as a connection. If sympathy constitutes a link, then antipathy does too : if *his* good is *my* good when we are united in sympathy, then his injury is my good when we are enemies.

There is a sense of ' happiness ' such that getting what one wants always makes one happy, and getting what one wants is to one's own good in this sense. But this sense of ' good ' places insufficient restriction on the kind of thing that can be counted as a good, or a benefit. There is no parallel here with the careful account Mrs. Foot gives (pp. 89 ff.) of the notion of *injury*.—It does seem, therefore, that it makes sense to say that someone wants something unconnected with his own good.

I am inclined to think that there are (i) cases of sympathy which are properly described as "to the agent's good " (the good of dearly loved friends is one's own good), (ii) cases of sympathy (correctly described as sympathy) which are not correctly called one's own good—sympathy for strangers, *e.g.*—(iii) cases of human benefit which are neither cases of sympathy or of the agent's good. For example, a scientist might decide to do research on anaesthetics rather than on cheese, pay and all other things being equal, because he thought it was more important or, needed doing. It seems artificial to say that he does get a good from his choice, namely, a sense of achievement. Why should he get a sense of achievement if he has not achieved anything? What makes it an achievement? Not his feeling that it *is* one.

However, let us assume for a moment that " I want " entails a reference to my own good, in some reasonably restricted sense of " good ". If it is logically impossible to want things totally unconnected with one's own good, then it is possible to tell another person " what he really wants ", or " what he would want if he knew the facts ", just by telling him, *e.g.* that X, or whatever it is, will cause him pain, or bring about a good. It does not follow that he *will* act—as Mrs. Foot points out, " enough has been done if we can show that any man has reason to aim at virtue..."... but it does follow that he has some reason to act, since it cannot be asked : " Why should he like doing that which he really wants to do?"

It does not follow from this that it cannot still be asked : " But nevertheless, what should he/I *do*? " For even a reason having the feature pointed out by Hume can be over-ridden by another reason. Its ultimacy does not consist in its being a reason which always has to operate, but rather in its being something which must always be taken into account. If it is over-ridden, it does not cease to be a reason, but perhaps it is no longer " a reason for *him* ".

The question " why should I hate pain? " is impossible to answer. So is the question : " why should I hate *this* pain? " But it is possible sometimes to answer : " why should I try to prevent this pain? " though the question requires a certain sort of background, for instance a medical one.

" X produces pain " is " ultimate " in the following ways :

(*a*) It is always a reason for hating X, whatever else is the case.

(*b*) It is always *a* reason for avoiding X, all other things being equal.

(*c*) It is always a relevant consideration, whether or not all other things are equal, but it is not ultimate in the sense of always being the best or most powerful reason.

Consider altruistic reasons : " X will help/harm another person not bound to me by ties of sympathy."

(*a*) It is clear that such reasons have no necessary connection with liking or hating X.

(*b*) Are they " reasons, all other things being equal "?

(*c*) Are they " considerations which are always to be taken into account "?

How can these last two questions be settled?

Mrs. Foot appears to be saying that, if R. is a reason, *e.g.* that X is painful or boring, then R's being a reason for hating X is a necessary as well as sufficient condition for R's being a reason for a certain action, for example, avoiding or preventing X ; a reason, that is, at least in the sense of a relevant consideration. Obviously it is sufficient. But is it necessary?

This question, of course, means the same as : Are the altruistic reasons really reasons in the way that self-regarding reasons are? Are they really reasons at all? Well, people frequently treat them as reasons. This is an argument for saying that at the least they are bad reasons, and therefore reasons of some sort or other.

Secondly, it does not seem at all obvious to me that both the rightness and the reasonableness of moral considerations depend on their power to alter the behaviour of tough characters. The rightness and relevance of non-practical reasoning, and of non-moral practical reasoning is not thought to depend on its efficacy with recalcitrant persons. After all, it is a defining property of tough characters that they ignore altruistic considerations.

Thirdly, there are cases of actions which are virtuous or morally good, morally praiseworthy, but which by their nature cannot be connected with the agent's benefit or need. For instance, it seems silly to say that a person who had outlived all his relatives and friends had no reason to leave his money to some charity rather than to a man or an organisation that would use it mischievously. Perhaps it is even possible to leave money to a charity to be chosen by the executors. It is equally silly to say that a man like this is motivated by sympathy when making his will ; or if he is, it should be clear that this is not the sort of sympathy which affects tough characters.

Acts of spectacular generosity and of heroism involve self-sacrifice. So there are good acts which cannot possibly be connected with the agent's benefit or need. It is true that such acts are not enjoined on everyone, and are not perhaps properly described as virtuous, but they are praiseworthy, and therefore good.

I have been discussing examples of particular actions, but I think most of what I have said applies to policies too.

It is true that it would be irrational for someone to adopt a policy which would be to his disadvantage in a serious degree. But it does not follow that the final reason for adopting the policy of Justice is that it is to one's advantage. The negative requirement of reason does not entail anything about the positive reasons there may be for a certain policy.

Further, although in the end it can be seen that the idea of the agent's good and his needs is involved in the idea of the proper functioning of his limbs, eyes, ears, and so on, and also in the idea of courage, and of temperance and prudence, it is not at all easy to see how this idea can be involved in the notion of " that which is owing to others ", and the arguments produced by Mrs. Foot at this point (p. 103) seem to me to be of the kind which can establish the existence only of an empirical connection between the agent's needs, and the policy of " justice ". How could it be otherwise on the above definition of justice? One of her arguments at this point is : If one is to be unjust one must deceive everyone, otherwise one will not be trusted. But whether or not being distrusted is a disadvantage that outweighs other advantages is a point which will depend on circumstances. It cannot be ruled *a priori* that it must outweigh them.

The arguments in support of the view that virtue is always connected in some way with the agent's good have too wide an application. If they were valid, they would apply in general to all reasons for acting, so that the correct conclusion would be, not that justice is not a virtue, but that justice is not reasonable, nor virtue neither.

Finally, the distinction between non-moral and moral reasons becomes very difficult to make, since the difference cannot lie in the reasons themselves—all final reasons are the same in this scheme— but will have to rest on the sets of subsidiary reasons which lead to the final reason. But if I am right about the nature of the connection between the good of the agent and the policy of justice, then the steps in the chain between subsidiary and final reasons will in the case of at least one of the cardinal virtues be empirical, not logical, from which it follows that no conceptual distinction can be made to rest on it.

Somerville College, Oxford   JENNY TEICHMANN

ON CEASING TO EXIST

It is sometimes said to be an important question in the philosophy of perception whether or not physical objects " continue to exist " when not perceived. Berkeley would have denied that they can exist unperceived. In *The Problems of Philosophy* (chapter II) Russell asks the following question : " Is there a table which has a certain intrinsic nature, and continues to exist when I am not looking . . . ? " In the same chapter Russell poses the question of " the existence of matter " by asking whether beside the sense-datum of a table which I am now seeing there is "—something not a sense-datum, something which persists when we go out of the room?"

I should like to examine the expression " continues to exist " in order to find out whether anything is clearly meant when philosophers affirm or deny that physical objects " continue to exist " (or " persist ") when unperceived. Take, for example, this coffee cup. What would you understand a philosopher to be saying if he said that it continued to exist when it was not perceived by anyone? Do we know what it means to say that a cup has " stopped existing "? Well, a cup can be smashed beyond repair. So perhaps when the philosopher says that the cup " continues to exist " when unperceived, he is denying that it was smashed beyond repair when unperceived? Surely that is *not* what is meant for it is patently false that cups are never smashed when no one is looking. This might have happened in a bombing raid. And clearly in any case, if our cup were broken beyond repair, whether when perceived or not, it would be very odd for anyone to report this fact by saying that the cup no longer " continues to exist " or that it no longer " persists ". We should simply say that it was broken beyond being repaired.

Similarly with other physical objects, a table can be smashed, burned, taken apart, exploded, etc. And any of these things may happen to it whether perceived or not. So the philosopher, if he is taken to be denying that any of these things might sometimes happen to unperceived physical objects when he says that they continue to exist unperceived, would be saying something patently false. On the other hand, the phenomenalist who affirms that the table would cease to exist if unperceived surely does not mean to say that one of these untoward things is bound to happen to our table if none of us are perceiving it, for this too is patently false. Perhaps the phenomenalist is saying that the table would disappear if unperceived. It is hard to see how anything as big as a table might just disappear. But it might. I might come home one day and find my table gone and be unable to locate it no matter how hard I tried to trace it down. " It has disappeared." But this means that it has been taken somewhere else, or burned, or . . . etc. But has it " ceased existing "? No one would say *that*.

Perhaps we can find a model for the philosopher's statements if we turn from physical objects and consider whether it is being said that a physical object ceasing to exist is like a headache disappearing, or a colour fading away or a noise ceasing or something like this befalling something non-physical. It should be remarked that all of these things cannot possibly be grouped together under the common heading of " ceasing to exist ".

Well then, suppose I go to bed with a severe headache and when I awake next morning, the headache is gone. It has not " ceased to exist ". Rather, I no longer have it. Or suppose I am unable to get rid of it. It persists. Could this be what happens to the coffee cup when I leave the room? Does it " persist "? Of course not. This will not do as a model. A species of animals can cease to exist by becoming extinct, but a physical object cannot become extinct. A colour can fade away, but a cup cannot do that. Perhaps the model is to be found in dreams. " What happens to the cup I dreamt about last night after I wake up? " But there is no answer to this question anymore than there is an answer to the question, " Where does the flame go, when the flame goes out? " I cannot say of the cup I dreamt about last night that after waking it disappeared or ceased to exist. It never did exist, and how could it disappear? So dreams do not provide our model either.

Sometimes these views are put in these terms : Physical objects continue to be " there " or " out there " when unperceived. But when applied to physical objects we use the words " there " or " out there " to refer to a place. " My car is still out there." And sometimes it is and sometimes it isn't " out there " when unperceived. It may after all in the meantime have been stolen and be somewhere else now when unperceived. But when the philosopher states his abstract principle that physical objects remain " there " or " out there " when unperceived these words can't be taken as referring to a place. But this is the only sense they actually have when applied to physical objects, so that both phenomenalists and realists must be taken to be denying obvious empirical facts or else to be saying nothing clearly at all.

In fact there is no model for " ceasing to exist " or " continuing to exist " which will make the philosopher's contentions seem plausible. My conclusion is that it is wrong to say, as does Russell, that it is part of our conception of a physical object that it continues to exist when unperceived. It is wrong for one of two reasons. (1) If the contention is taken literally, it is without meaning, in that physical objects (as contrasted say, with corporations or the Fourth Republic) are not the kind of thing that can cease to exist. (2) The contention can be taken as a loose and imprecise way of saying that none of the untoward things that can happen to physical objects (burned, smashed, stolen, decayed, etc.) do happen to them when they are not perceived, and this is patently false.

University of Illinois   LEONARD LINSKY

A NOTE ON THE REDUNDANT AXIOM OF
PRINCIPIA MATHEMATICA

THE purpose of this Note is to give an easily followed metatheoretic demonstration that the axiom

$$p \vee . Q \vee r : \supset : Q \vee . p \vee r \qquad (1)$$

in the original *Principia Mathematica* system of the Propositional Calculus is redundant, in the sense of being provable as a theorem in that system modified by excluding (1) from the axioms. Let us label the thus modified system " S ". There are very few readily available proofs that (1) can be established as a theorem in S, and they are direct proofs, in the object language, which are very long, complex, and difficult to reconstruct out of one's own head. In view of the importance of the *Principia Mathematica* system and of S both historically and in teaching, it should be useful to have at hand a simple demonstration of the redundancy of (1).

The axioms of S are

$$p \vee p . \supset p \qquad (2)$$
$$p \supset . q \vee p \qquad (3)$$
$$p \vee q . \supset . q \vee p \qquad (4)$$
$$p \vee q . \supset : r \vee p . \supset . r \vee q \qquad (5)$$

We shall use the capitals A, B and C as metalinguistic variables for the well-formed formulae of S. We shall employ the sign $\vdash$ in the usual current ways, and we shall presuppose that the reader is familiar with the elementary properties associated with it. Finally, we shall presuppose also that the reader is familiar with the Deduction Theorem for S.

We first establish that

$$A \supset C, B \supset C, A \vee B \vdash C. \qquad (6)$$

We begin by showing that

$$B \supset C, A \vee B \vdash A \vee C. \qquad (7)$$

By (5),

$$\vdash B \supset C . \supset : A \vee B . \supset . A \vee C. \qquad (8)$$

Suppose $B \supset C$ and $A \vee B$; then, by *Modus Ponens*, we get from (8) to $A \vee C$. Hence (7).

Next, we show that

$$A \supset C, A \vee C \vdash C. \qquad (9)$$

By (5),

$$\vdash A \supset C . \supset : C \vee A . \supset . C \vee C. \qquad (10)$$

Suppose $A \supset C$ and $A \vee C$; then, by *Modus Ponens*, (4), and (2), we get from (10) to first $C \vee C$ and then to C.

(6) follows from (7) and (9).

By the Deduction Theorem applied to (6),

$$\vdash A \supset C : \supset : . B \supset C . \supset : A \vee B . \supset C. \qquad (11)$$

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By (3) and (4),

$$p \lor . q \lor r, p \vdash q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{12}$$

By (3) and (4),

$$q \lor r, q \vdash q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{13}$$

By (3),

$$q \lor r, r \vdash p \lor r, \tag{14}$$

and, by (3) again,

$$p \lor r \vdash q \lor . p \lor r ; \tag{15}$$

from (14) and (15), and by the transitivity property of $\vdash$, we get

$$q \lor r, r \vdash q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{16}$$

By the Deduction Theorem applied to (13) and (16),

$$q \lor r \vdash q . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r ; \tag{17}$$
$$q \lor r \vdash r . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{18}$$

By (11),

$$\vdash q . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r :: \supset :: r . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r : . \supset : . q \lor r : \supset : q \lor . \\ p \lor r. \tag{19}$$

Suppose $q \lor r$; by (17), (18), (19), and by *Modus Ponens*, we obtain $q \lor . p \lor r$, and thus

$$q \lor r \vdash q \lor . p \lor r ; \tag{20}$$

consequently,

$$p \lor . q \lor r, q \lor r \vdash q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{21}$$

By the Deduction Theorem applied to (12) and (21),

$$p \lor . q \lor r \vdash p . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r ; \tag{22}$$
$$p \lor . q \lor r \vdash q \lor r . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{23}$$

By (11),

$$\vdash p . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r :: \supset :: q \lor r . \supset : q \lor . p \lor r : . \supset : . p \lor . q \\ \lor r : \supset : q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{24}$$

Now suppose $p \lor . q \lor r$; then from (22), (23), (24), and by *Modus Ponens*, we obtain $q \lor . p \lor r$. Accordingly, we have shown that the supposition of $p \lor . q \lor r$ yields $q \lor . p \lor r$:

$$p \lor . q \lor r \vdash q \lor . p \lor r. \tag{25}$$

That (1) is provable as a theorem in S follows from (25) by virtue of the Deduction Theorem.

University of Bristol   PETER NIDDITCH

NOTE ON A LESS RESTRICTED TYPE OF
RULE OF INFERENCE

THE rule of inference which occurs most frequently in conventional axiomatizations of modern logic, that is,

R_1. If $\vdash S$ and $\vdash (S \supset S')$, then $\vdash S'$. (Modus Ponens)

(*I.e.* if S and $(S \supset S')$ have both been set down as axioms or derived theorems, then S' may be set down as a theorem)

can be replaced in such systems by either of the two following alternatives :

R_2. If $\vdash S$ and $\vdash (\ldots(S \supset S')\ldots)$, then $\vdash (\ldots S'\ldots)$.

(*I.e.* if S is a theorem, and there is a theorem, T, which contains $(S \supset S')$ as a component, then a new theorem T' may be formed by substituting S' for $(S \supset S')$ in T.)

R_3. If $\vdash S$ and $(\ldots(S \supset S')\ldots)$ is a well-formed formula, then S' may be substituted for $(S \supset S')$ in the well-formed formula.

To establish the substitutability of R_2 or R_3 for R_1, it must be shown that (1) whenever an inference can be established by R_1 it could be established as well by R_2 or R_3, and (2) that neither R_2 nor R_3, if substituted for R_1 would result in additions or deletions from the class of theorems derivable by R_1.

(1) That R_2 and R_3 will permit an inference whenever R_1 will is established by the fact that R_1 becomes a special case of each of the other two rules ; it is the special case in which S is a theorem and S is also the main antecedent of another theorem in conditional form.

(2) That rules R_2 and R_3 will yield the same set of theorems as R_1 is established by reference to truth-tables. The set of propositional forms validated by truth-tables has been shown to be equivalent to the set derivable from conventional axiomatizations of the propositional calculus which use R_1. Now the application of R_3 to any formula whatever will always yield another formula with a truth-table identical to the first. For when the first formula is of the form $(\ldots(S \supset S')\ldots)$ and S is already a theorem (the conditions laid down in R_3), the column under S will be all T's and thus the column under the component $(S \supset S')$ will be identical with the column for S' alone. For if the antecedent of a conditional is true in a given case, then the whole conditional is true only if the consequent is true and false only if the consequent is false ; since, in this case, by hypothesis, the antecedent is always true, it follows the whole truth-table for the component $(S \supset S')$ is identical with the truth-table for S' alone. This being the case the truth-table for the whole expression $(\ldots(S \supset S')\ldots)$ will remain unchanged when the $(S \supset S')$ is replaced by S'. That the same holds for R_2 is clear, since R_2 is merely a special case of R_3 (in which $(\ldots(S \supset S')\ldots)$ has all T's as its over-all truth-table).

There are some other customary rules of inference which, on similar

grounds, could be replaced by similar alternatives. For example, the rule of inference,

R_1'. If $\vdash S$ and $\vdash (- S \lor S')$, then $\vdash S'$,

may be replaced by analogues, as could various other rules related to *modus ponens* through De Morgan equivalences. Not all rules of inference can be treated in this way however. For example, Nicod's rule of inference,

R_1''. If $\vdash S$ and $\vdash (S/(R/Q))$, then $\vdash Q$

could be shown to be replacable by

R_4. If $\vdash S$ and $\vdash (S/(R/Q))$, then if $\vdash (. . .(S/(R/Q)). . .)$
then $\vdash (. . .Q. . .)$,

but this is not an analogue of either R_2 or R_3. The analogues of either R_2 or R_3 would not apply in the case of Nicod's rule since the truth-table for $(S/(R/Q))$ is not always equivalent to that of Q if $(S/(R/Q))$ is not a theorem even though S is a theorem.

The advantages of R_2 and R_3, in systems to which they apply, are twofold. First, there is perhaps an element of elegance in bringing *modus ponens* into a form which is closer to that of other rules of inference. R_2 and R_3, for example, operate with the same freedom to make substitutions anywhere in a formula that is found in rules of definitional substitution. This introduces greater uniformity into the rules at the base of a system.

Secondly, and more important, the new rules permit greater economy of effort in derivations, especially in systems with a small number of axioms, by cutting down the number of steps required. For example, starting with the Łukasiewicz axiom set,

A1 : $((p \supset q) \supset ((q \supset r) \supset (p \supset r)))$ D1 : $(p \lor q) = df (- p \supset q)$
A2 : $((- p \supset p) \supset p)$
A3 : $(p \supset (- p \supset q))$

if one wishes to prove the theorem $((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (q \lor r))$ using R_1 (modus ponens) one must proceed through sixty-four steps (i.e., sixty-four applications of one or another rule of inference) to get $((q \supset r) \supset ((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset r)))$ [1] from which in four more steps we get the desired theorem :

(65) $((q \supset (- q \supset r)) \supset ((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (- q \supset r))))$ (by substitution for variables in (64)).

(66) $q \supset (- q \supset r)$ (by substitution for variables in A3).

(67) $((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (- q \supset r)))$ (By R1, (65), (66).)

(68) $((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (q \lor r)))$ (By D1, and rule of definitional substitution).

In contrast, if we use R_2 (or R_3) we can derive the same theorem starting from the same axiom set in four steps :

(1) $((p \supset q) \supset ((q \supset (- q \supset r)) \supset (p \supset (- q \supset r))))$ (by substitution for variables in A1).

(2) $(q \supset (- q \supset r))$ (Substitution for variables in A3).

[1] Using the line of proof outlined in A. Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic*, Vol. 1, 1956, in Sections 29.2 and 12.7.

(3) $((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (- q \supset r)))$ (by R_2 (or R_3), (1) and (2)).

(4) $((p \supset q) \supset (p \supset (q \lor r)))$ (by D1, and rule of definitional substitution).

The economy of steps in this case is due to the fact that the principle of the syllogism (Axiom 1) can be used with R_2 without requiring that its major antecedent must be a theorem ; if any antecedent of a component conditional is a theorem, a new theorem may be formed immediately without having to prove another principle of the syllogism with a different order of components.

Note added in proof: It has come to my attention that R_2 occurred as a *derived* rule in Quine's device of " bracketing out ". See *Mathematical Logic*, 1940, p. 101. R.B.A.

Ohio Wesleyan University   R. BRADSHAW ANGELL

PROFESSOR MARGOLIS in a recent article discusses the relationship of 'type' to 'megatype', and to 'prime instance' and 'prime notation'. He does this in an article entitled "The Identity of a Work of Art", and I should like to point out that these relationships, while very interesting in their own right, refer in fact to artifacts and not to art, to theories of which they cannot profitably be extended. The question of the relationship of poem to translation, of the original musical manuscript (in other words, the known intentions of the composer) to performances in other keys and with instruments different from those stipulated in tha. score, of the play 'Hamlet' to the film of that name; these are not the same as the relationship between poem and variant reading, manuscript and accurate performance, the play by Shakespeare and the Old Vic production. The second set of relationships are highly relevant to theories of art, the first set have no bearing whatever upon that subject.

Let us look first at relationships in the visual arts, because here the situation is at its most obvious. Margolis adequately covers the relationship between a painting or drawing and reproductions from it, although I should certainly doubt whether we would ever drop the requirement of a prime instance even if " we could actually reproduce a fully accurate copy of a painting by some mechanical means ". This difficulty can be more clearly seen if we consider the sort of approach we use in looking at copies by hand, i.e. by students or professional copyists. Some of these people are very skilled indeed, but we never consider calling their work art, although for want of a better nomenclature we do tend to call them artists. The most interesting question in the Van Meegeren forgeries was that he had not copied any picture, but had created new pictures in the style of a known master. His only crime was to claim them as being the work of that master, and had it not been for this we might say he was a brilliant stylist, or a minor artist out of his time. If Van Meegeren had simply copied the paintings of Vermeer the question of his status as an artist would not have arisen. (Towards the end of his career, working very quickly, he did indeed copy whole groups of figures which were incorporated into his compositions, but this period is not of interest to the question I have mentioned.) Another relationship of the same type is that between a sculpture and a cast from it. The difference between casts of sculpture designed by the artist to be cast, in which case there is a prime notation, the mould, and copies cast from prime instances of sculpture or carving not so designed. Casting is the most accurate form of reproducing sculpture, (and has recently been employed upon the impasto of oil paintings), but whereas the results of the first of the above processes is a work of art, the second is a copy. This is so because in the first instance, the sculptor built up his clay with the intention of having it cast in a metal, and so all his surfaces will be conceived to look right

in that metal. In the other case the artist creates by attacking a
block of stone with a chisel and the resulting surfaces are conceived in
terms of stone, and this is the artist's intention. The mechanical
processes in the visual arts are very clear in the relationship of type
to prime notation. The relationship existing between the wood-
block and its print provides no difficulty, but that between the
lithographic stone drawn upon by the artist and printed either by
or for him, has always caused some aesthetic perplexity—*e.g.* which
is the work of art? (that this perplexity is needless is seen if we con-
sider this case as similar to that of cast and mould). If, however,
the same plate is inked in by a person not the artist to colours and
textures not those intended by him, the result is very clearly an
artistic rape, and would be of no concern in any matter relating to the
identity of the originals as works of art.

In literature the same situation exists. Variant readings of a
poem are of the greatest interest to the study of art. Translations
of poetry have no aesthetic interest, except as literature in their own
language, and then of course as something quite apart from the
original poem. The translations from the Chinese by Arthur
Waley or Helen Waddell are beautiful to read as poetry in English,
but about the aesthetic concepts of Chinese poetry they tell us
little, and their excellences are different from these qualities of the
originals which make them classics in their own language. There
is much confusion today in certain quarters concerning the desira-
bility of a universal course in literature. This presupposes that most
of the reading must be done in translation, and that, providing the
translations are accurate, this will make little difference to the results
for the student. The student who finishes such a course will be well
acquainted with the subjects, plots, and thoughts of the different
literatures of the different cultures, but about the art of literature
he will know just as much as he has gathered from these works he has
studied in the original. Knowledge of a work in translation is a
partial knowledge, and while it may be enjoyable, it must of necessity
be aesthetically valueless, at least as far as the values of the original
work are concerned. This of course does not rule out the possibility
of its having aesthetic values in its own right, in its own language,
but that is a different matter altogether. In drama a very similar
sort of thing occurs. Margolis says, " it is important to notice that
when a literary composition is regarded as a notation for a drama,
we are inclined to take a very relaxed view of stage instructions and
the like ". This has been brought about in the past by unscrupulous
producers, and by actor-managers bent on self-glorification. In the
better theatres it is fast dying, if not already dead. The author
is the creator of the play, and although, like the composer, he requires
the interpretive talents of others, his intentions, as made explicit
in the final script, are the prime notation from which any deviation
must be an error. No one would dream of altering in reproduction
the colours of a painting, or the position of a limb of a sculpture,

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because they thought it looked better their way; so why should we condone the same thing done in music and the theatre simply because the human element of the interpreter intervenes between artist and audience? It is perhaps well to remember that the art of the actor and the musician is not the art of music or of drama, but the art of interpretation. About the relationship between a play and the film of that play, little need be said. They are as alike as a Raphael painting, and its copy in mosaic (a habit still common in Italy) and for the same reason, namely, that it is not possible to transfer a work of art, even if it be a prime notation, from one medium to another, and expect it to retain its integrity.

All these points can also be made about music. Unfortunately music has been even worse served in the past than drama, and the situation has become so universally accepted that now it is a bit difficult to see the problem in its true light. But the problem is there, and the problem is the same. The composer's manuscript is the prime notation of a work of art, any deviation from it is a deliberate disregard of the intentions of the artist. If a conductor transposes a work into a different key and has it played on instruments not those stipulated by the composer, the result may be very interesting from a technical point of view, may even be pleasant to listen to, but it has no aesthetic relationship to the work of art which is contained in the prime notation. Examples of this sort of thing are very frequent in music and I shall mention only one more, this time a ' classic ' instance. It has become common practice to play the harpsichord works of J. S. Bach, upon the pianoforte. Honesty compels one to admit that pianofortes are more easily come by than harpsichords, and that until a few years ago, the sound of the former was more acceptable, because more usual, in the concert hall ; but the argument usually put forward for this practice is neither of these. It is that Bach, had the pianoforte been fully developed in his day, would have written his works for that instrument. Now this is mere speculation. What is not speculation, however, is that, had he done so, he would, consummate artist that he was, have written them quite differently. As proof of this I mention only that it takes all of the technique of a brilliant performer like Rosalyn Tureck, working through greater complexities than would have been necessary on a harpsichord, to make the results of the attempted translation even partly acceptable to the ear.

I have given these examples to show that though we may use Margolis's division into ' types ', ' megatypes ', ' prime instances ' and ' prime notations ' when discussing the position of the artifact it can take us no farther than this, and can be no help at all in establishing the identity of a work of art, if by this we mean something other than the identity of the artifact. We have not even begun to distinguish the criteria required to establish in a certain few artifacts, their identity as works of art.

<div align="right">W. D. L. SCOBIE</div>

KOLENDA ON SCIENCE AND MORALITY

In his article " Science and Morality " (MIND, April 1958) K. Kolenda has tried to show that moral utterances are sufficiently like scientific utterances to be given the same cognitive status. As a corollary to this, he attempts to explain how the mistaken belief that moral utterances are " non-cognitivist " has arisen. What he says on both these themes is open to serious criticism.

An important feature of Kolenda's main argument is that cognitive utterances require the relating of a particular observation to an appropriate conceptual framework, containing laws, principles and perhaps, in the case of morals, rules. For his purpose, he finds it unnecessary to distinguish between these, and in this I shall follow his procedure.

Kolenda writes, " In relating the observed phenomenon to the features which a conceptual framework formulates, we obtain some new and relevant information about this phenomenon". This, in a limited sense, must be true ; we learn at least that the " observed phenomenon ", O, exemplifies some principle, P, and that it has therefore this quality in common with all other exemplifications of P. But before it deserves to be called " cognitive ", an utterance needs to be informative in other ways than this. To take an absurd example, which nevertheless fulfils Kolenda's criterion : I have a conceptual framework in terms of fairy agencies. This contains, *inter alia*, the two principles, (A) that all cheese is made by goblins, and (B) that all food made by goblins goes bad if kept too long. If I observe a piece of cheese I can discover, by referring it to a framework, that it (A) is made by goblins, and (B) will go bad if kept too long. If I have sufficient experience, I may add that it has these two qualities in common with gorgonzola, camembert, Stilton, etc.

Mere location on a framework is not sufficient to give utterances cognitive status. The cognitive status of the framework itself is also relevant. Kolenda writes " . . . we can affirm that a conceptual framework itself deserves to be called cognitive if it helps us to discover or to become aware of some important or interesting features of experience ". The epithets " important " and " interesting " are of primarily subjective significance. Many frameworks will help us to see relationships between phenomena ; my goblin framework does this. If I find it interesting to interpret things in these terms, does this give my framework cognitive status?

This note is not meant to decide what makes a framework cognitive, but to show that there are differences in the status of scientific and moral utterances arising from difficulties in accepting both the different frameworks to which they respectively refer. Kolenda seems to think that the choice of one framework rather than another is almost a matter of taste. In his view, " the prescriptive aspect of a conceptual framework is a hypothetical imperative ". If you are interested in scientific explanations, use a scientific framework.

Similarly, as he points out, moral frameworks are relevant only if we are interested in the " moral relevance " of actions. The interest must be there before the framework becomes important, and so it is clear that, before we can accept the relevance of a framework of moral rules, we require an " antecedent recognition of the validity of such rules ". According to Kolenda, a farmer may choose to work within an astrological, rather than a scientific, framework. It is true that a farmer could, if he wished, explain all the phenomena connected with his work in terms of the movements of the planets, or, for that matter, of the pleasure and wrath of the gods. What he cannot (logically) do is to accept both a scientific and an astrological framework. (Psychologically, of course, he may hold any number of logically incompatible opinions.) It would be logically inconsistent to accept two frameworks, referring to similar phenomena, and containing contradictory principles. Two points are relevant here. In fact, although we may choose to believe our astrologoical horscopes and to interpret the harvest astrologically, the choice of a framework is not merely a matter of taste. An obvious demand for a farmer to make of his chosen framework is that it should enable him to plan his work by successfully and reliably predicting future events. On this criterion, it will be more rational for him, if he wishes to be a successful farmer, to adopt a scientific framework. The second point is that, just as it would be logically inconsistent to accept two conflicting frameworks in our capacities as farmers, chemists, etc., so it would be logically inconsistent to adopt two conflicting moral frameworks. But the central point at issue in this criticism of Kolenda is that it would be logically inconsistent to accept both a scientific framework and a moral framework which contained conflicting principles.

A difficulty which may also be raised about acceptance of moral rules is that there is little agreement about their content. At present this will be ignored, in order to concentrate on the more general problem concerning the acceptance of any of the many possible frameworks of moral rules.

I suggest that one reason why philosophers have shown reluctance to regard moral utterances as cognitively equal to scientific utterances is that the latter imply a breach of the causal principle frequently invoked by the former. Kant's dictum that " ought implies can " is undeniable, although there is more than one interpretation of the " can ". Kant was, I think, right in seeing a genuine conflict between some of the principles invoked in support of scientific and moral utterances. (In passing, we may note the dangers in speaking, as Kolenda does, of " science " and " morality ". Generally agreed definitions of either would be hard to find. Are " scientific utterances " utterances made by scientists—fallible beings—or utterances about laboratory experiments, or what? The emotive overtones and contemporary prestige of " science " decrease its suitability for use, without careful definition, in philosophical dis-

cussion.) Moral responsibility requires the difficult notion of at least some degree of freedom from antecedent determining causes. Unless we dismiss the problem of free will as a pseudo-problem (as we may), we have to face a contradiction here. By referring utterances to a framework, we may add to our information, but the position of some moral sceptics is that of refusing to accept the framework within which moral utterances are made. One of the sceptic's chief arguments, if he agrees that moral responsibility presupposes freedom, is often that scientists—particularly in the light of recent progress in psychology and the social sciences—promise to offer causal explanations of our motives and actions, as well as of physical phenomena. As Kolenda's opening paragraph implies, if moral and scientific utterances cannot both be cognitive, it is the former which will be regarded as non-cognitive. His view is that if there are sufficient similarities between moral and scientific utterances, this will " justify us in regarding moral utterances as cognitive ". Like our moral sceptic, he sees no question here of having to justify the cognitive claims of scientific utterances.

The task of one who wishes to establish utterances as cognitive is to justify not only the utterances, but also their conceptual framework. Their reference to an almost arbitrarily selected framework may be interesting, but does not help to decide their status. The similarity Kolenda suggests—that both scientific and moral utterances refer to conceptual frameworks—proves nothing about the status of the latter unless the framework itself is recognised as cognitive. One of the problems confronting the moral philosopher is that of reconciling the moral prerequisite of freedom with the deterministic framework of many scientists and philosophers. If the principles of the two frameworks conflict, as *prima facie* they appear to do, either one or both must be modified, or one must be abandoned. To solve this problem requires great labour. This note attempts only to indicate its significance.

A subsidiary intention of Kolenda's article is to show, again by drawing a parallel between " science and morality ", how moral utterances have come to be regarded as " non-cognitivist ". His view is that scientific, like moral, frameworks, have their prescriptive aspect, and there is, as we have seen, no question about the cognitive status of scientific utterances. He argues that laws are not less cognitive because they are prescriptive, although emphasis on the prescriptive aspect of scientific laws has led critics (*e.g.* Toulmin) to claim that such an interpretation " creates the impression that the laws do not really have anything to do with nature, but only with the conduct of scientists ". By analogy, he thinks, it has seemed that " imperatival " theories of morals made moral utterances refer, not to actions, but to an agent—" his feelings, wishes, or attitudes ".

All this completely overlooks a major difference between scientific and moral laws. Whereas, for the former, the feelings of scientists

are irrelevant, the latter have essentially to do not only with actions, but with the agents performing them.   In this area of experience, it is legitimate to refer to motives as well as to actions.   "Moral life", says Kolenda, "needs conceptual frameworks in terms of which the moral worth of actions can be determined".   Moral worth, however, is also an attribute of moral agents.   If I borrow a book, I ought to return it.   However, if I return it in order to gain access to its owner's study, so as to steal his silver cigarette-box, my action (even if its ulterior purpose is frustrated) has no moral worth.   Kolenda errs in supposing that by focusing attention on the agent, we have thereby made our ethics subjective and non-cognitivist.   Some theories of ethics, concentrating on feelings, attitudes, and wishes, do this.   But it is not their being prescriptive which makes such theories subjective.   The greatest of the "imperatival" theories— that of Kant—stresses that to have moral worth an action must not only be in accordance with the moral law, but must be performed *because* it is in accordance with the moral law.   Motives are relevant, but this does not in itself make moral laws non-cognitive.   To justify moral utterances as cognitive partly on the grounds that scientific laws, too, are prescriptive and yet not concerned with the motives of scientists, misses a crucial feature of the former.   In investigating the similarities between scientific and moral utterances, Kolenda seems to have overlooked some extremely relevant dissimilarities.

CHRISTINE NICHOLSON

VIII.—CRITICAL NOTICE

Modes of Being. By PAUL WEISS. Southern Illinois University Press, 1958. Pp. xi + 617. $10.00.

THIS is a book in which there are so many good things that one would wish to commend it ; but at the same time it is based on a highly complex metaphysical structure over whose method and outcome I find it difficult to be enthusiastic. It is the fruit of a conviction that it is, after all, the role of philosophy to provide some larger scheme of understanding in the light of which one can assess the principles and inter-relationships of the various specialist fields of knowledge—a conviction which I share ; Professor Weiss does not waste overmuch time in justifying this conviction, and nor shall I, for in my view a metaphysical system is best justified by its contents, not by its preamble ; and it is the contents in this case which do not convince me.

The book has three parts. In the first of these Weiss devotes a chapter to each of the four modes of being, which he calls Actuality, Ideality, Existence, and God. Each mode is presented by means of a series of over a hundred theses, accompanied by explanatory commentaries. Each mode is explored as far as possible from its own point of view, though since the modes are conceived as being not only co-ordinate but interlocking and mutually dependent, reference to the other modes is unavoidable. Further, the discussion of each mode in its fundamental aspects develops into a treatment of broader applications. Thus, the first chapter deals with the realm of actualities, or spatio-temporal substances, of which the two primary types are simple (such as the ultimate quanta of physics) and complex (such as organisms, including man) ; so that from actualities in general we pass to discussions of causality, man, knowledge, perception, inference, the nature of philosophy, and the ethical life. Ideality is the realm of the possible, and, in so far as it presents realisable possibilities relevant to actualities, of the Good ; chapter two deals also with ethics, politics, law and education. Existence is " being as engaged in the act of self-division ", " sheer vitality, forever passing from one position or guise into another ". It is both ingredient in actualities, and, as apart from them, constitutes their spatial field ; it is akin, for example, to Aristotle's prime matter and to Bergson's *élan vital.* Its treatment leads to a discussion of time, the past, history, art and civilisation, with further remarks on logic and inference. The chapter on God offers an analysis of the proofs of his existence and a discussion of his nature and activity and of religion in its relation to other human pursuits.

Part Two of the book has (chapter 5, sec. 2) some excellent remarks on the scope of philosophical systems and their need to incorporate other opposing systems within their sphere of explanation, and not merely to dismiss them as false or nonsensical. This

is one of the best passages in the book, and leads to one of the most
obscure (pp. 381-386), introducing a recapitulation of the entire 441
theses, each followed by a brief counter-argument.   The purpose of
this eludes me after several careful readings of the explanation of it ;
I wonder if other readers will find it as baffling.

Part Three consists of three chapters devoted to the problem
of the one and the many in relation to the modes, the problem of
knowledge, and the inter-relation of the modes in the cosmos.

This brief summary will show the massive scope of the work ;
its many fruitful insights can only be gained by reading it.   As
a matter of personal predilection, I should commend particularly
the discussion of causality in relation to creativity (theses 1.33-1.45),
the clear distinction of desire, preference, choice and will (2.23-2.26),
the analysis of human rights (2.37-2.60), the section on the creative
enterprise (3.49-3.58) and various remarks on philosophy (see
Introduction, pp. 3 ff., and under theses 1.91-1.93 and the beginning
of sec. 2 of Chapter 5 already referred to).   But the impression is
trong that these insights are largely independent of the main meta-
physical structure and indeed would be better off without it—they
would certainly be more readily communicated in a less esoteric
language.

But that, of course, faces us with the central question ; for the
language would be more than justified if the metaphysical insights
which it expresses were valid.   But the metaphysical framework
seems to me to be too rigid and deductive in nature, and to fail to
demonstrate its own inevitability.   True, it is claimed that the
recognition of the four modes is demanded by the nature of the world
we live in ; and Weiss time and again puts his finger on points which
other philosophies have neglected or failed to see.   But despite
the tremendous subtletly of the argument, one's overall impression
is that Weiss has started from an intellectually appealing scheme
and developed its consequences with insufficient sensitivity either
to the unsymmetrical elements in the universe or even to the way
in which the nature of the very modes he speaks of demands a certain
subordination of one to another, and this seems to be the direct
outcome of some deficiency in metaphysical method.   So much of
what he says seems to be true because he has indeed grasped vital
distinctions within the nature of being ; but a great deal equally
seems to be almost mythological because he treats all the modes as if
they had careers of their own—as if they were independent forces
in a physical field—and insists from the start not only on their
irreducibility but on their absolute co-ordination.   Thus in theses
4.01 to 4.10 we read that each mode of being is ingredient in, needs,
seeks to adjust itself to, partly satisfies, imposes a burden on, and
provides direct and indirect testimony to the reality of, the others ;
each relates two other modes in a primary and a secondary way ;
each enables one to hold any other apart from the rest.   There are
many statements like thesis 2.22—' The Ideal's effort to keep abreast

of existence occurs together with its effort to accommodate the intent of God and its effort to encompass all actualities '—where the architectonic seems to involve not only a strained symmetry but metaphor of a sort which invites criticism : it behooves a metaphysician to be quite clear about when he is talking analogically and when in metaphor—and to make it clear to his readers ; the history of metaphysical speculation has demonstrated the danger of metaphor only too clearly.

In traditional metaphysics we have, for example, the distinction between matter and form, which are strictly irreducible and co-ordinate ; one cannot say that matter has a formal aspect and form a material aspect, for the one notion excludes the other. We also have, for example, the relation of form and matter to substance, in which they are ingredient ; substance is another category, in which the modes of form and matter are ingredient only because they are not co-ordinate with it. But Weiss seems to be led by his insistence on irreducibility and co-ordination to blur the distinction between a distinction of modes and a distinction of types of substance, so that each mode is not only irreducible (like matter and form) but present in a qualified form in each of the other modes (see 4.01). Mysteries thereby spring up on all sides—the quasi-substantialisation (personification, almost) of existence and ideality, the alleged irreducibility of an actuality that yet encapsulates existence, the reality of existence *outside* actualities, although the latter seem to encompass all the ordinarily recognisable denizens of the physical universe, the dependence of God on the other modes, the refusal to relate ideality essentially to the actualities to which it is relevant, and so on.

One of the more challenging of Weiss's doctrines is the view that God, though " omnipotently omniscient, providential and self-expressive " and in many respects the supreme being, is not the source of being and is dependent on the other modes. Weiss provides no less than twenty-seven and fifty-four indirect proofs of the existence of God, and a glance at one of these will illustrate some of the criticisms I have made.

The testimony in the world to the existence of God consists in certain *non-essential* attributes of the other three modes which only God is capable of bringing about (though I am not sure *why* ; one gets the impression that God is allocated the task partly by elimination and partly in deference to tradition ; the question is whether Weiss has not jettisoned just those characteristics of the divine nature which traditionally enabled God to sustain this role). If an attribute were essential, Weiss would say that since it belongs to an original and irreducible mode of being, it needs no other mode of being to explain its presence. For example (4.16), Weiss holds that the union of the universal and the individual must be the work of God. He first suggests that the universal *man* is " a mere abstractive aspect of myself, this unique individual ;' As distinct from me it is a non-essential feature ; I do not need it in order for me to

be the living existing individual that I am." This seems to be a
fallacy. In order to be the individual *that I am*, I must be precisely
this sort of individual. But even if we do not thus press his words,
it remains that in order to be any being at all I must be *some sort of*
a being ; yet he goes on to say that even the possession of the most
general descriptive feature *actuality* is non-essential and thus a
testimony to the existence of God, who alone " allows universals
to be sharable and individuals to be private ". But if no actuality
could exist without having a nature, then surely the fact that it
instantiates a universal is an *essential* feature of it. But the in-
sight of the Thomistic proofs was precisely that if a being is *essentially*
complex, its being is communicated. Now Weiss cannot accept
creationism (for reasons I must leave the reader to assess—see
3.08, p. 191 ; 4.79, p. 345 ; and para. C.6 of Chapter X, p. 506),
and therefore is led into this dubious " non-essentialism " by having
to maintain that the being of actualities is underived (this seems to
be part of what he means by ' irreducible '—there seems to be a
perpetual equivocation between conceptual distinctness and on-
tological independence).

The whole account of the proofs (of which Weiss details twenty-
seven) seems to me to be a blend of rich suggestiveness and shaky
argument. For example, Weiss holds that the traditional teleological
" arguments " in fact provide only testimony which needs to be
supplemented by the cosmological " arguments ", which exhibit the
world in some determinate relation to God and thus provide a
continuum of which the teleological traces and God are the terms.
But even then, the existence of God is not proved without " an act
of ontological detachment of him [God] from the structure of a
proof ", which is attained by intellectual assent, faith or work,
in the order of ideality, actuality or existence respectively. I will
mention only one point about this surprising doctrine. It is one
thing to see that God as a religious reality needs to be confronted by
the individual otherwise than as the mere conclusion of a train of
reasoning ; but it is quite another to fail to see that if the premisses
of a valid argument are given, the conclusion may be asserted as
already *virtually* unconditioned (*cf.* 3.34). Surely Weiss confuses
the psychological necessity of assent with the logical question of
validity in maintaining that the traditional arguments are *invalid*
without this act of detachment ; though they may well be *ineffectual*.

In some ways this book is an impressive intellectual achievement,
and I wish I could report that Weiss had produced the viable philo-
sophy for our time that he desiderates. But in fact it seems to
owe very little to the specific methodological and scientific discoveries
of recent years, and I doubt if it will make many converts to the
cause of metaphysics.

Memorial University of Newfoundland   N. J. BROWN

IX.—NEW BOOKS

Patterns of Discovery: *An Inquiry into the Conceptual Foundations of Science*. By NORWOOD R. HANSON. Cambridge, at the University Press, 1958. Pp. ix + 248. 30s.

PROFESSOR HANSON is concerned with the discovery, not establishment, application, or confirmation, of scientific laws and theories. Using historical examples he indicates with finesse and style the sense in which he feels that " seeing " a lawful pattern in diverse data is a matter of conceptual organization. His stated procedure is to view traditional issues of the philosophy of science through " the lens of particle theory " rather than to shape a discussion of particle theory on the pattern of philosophical systems with prefabricated notions of cause, fact, observations, and the like. A by-product of the method is that two traditional views of laws are set to one side. The view that laws are arrived at by applications upon observed data of Mill-like methods, or sophistications of these, is in fact false. The view that laws function as high-level hypotheses in a hypothetico-deductive system does not tell us how they are come by in the first place. The reasons for accepting a law and the reasons for proposing one may be, and typically are, very different. Nor can the latter be relegated to psychology as a matter of hunch, genius, or insight. Whatever the causes which lead to the initial formulation, there must be good reasons for its proposal, reasons why it makes a bid for the scientist's acceptance. The author seeks a new prise on worn issues by grasping the essential elements of the discovery of laws and the reasons which underly their initial proposal.

Nearly every division of the book has its detailed examination of a historical discovery or controversy of law or theory. Chapter II on Facts is supported by an account of the intellectual climate in which the law of falling bodies came to be adequately formulated by Galileo while the gist of the matter escaped Descartes. Chapter IV, Theories, contains an engrossing account of how Kepler came, at last, to the elliptical orbit of Mars about the sun. A second appendix supplies some detail of the conceptual clash in elementary particle physics of today. (The author appears to be more convinced by the logic of Von Neumann than intrigued by the suggestions and speculations of Bohm.) The entire work is buttressed by some fifty-eight pages of notes containing references to, comments upon, and bits of a wide range of writings present and past. This is all neatly handled. The effect is that one is initiated into select, historically dead but conceptually live, material rather than submerged in a pool of gratuitous historical detail. In this is the strength of the book.

But it is in another way its weakness. The stated aim—that of laying bare something of the logical characteristics playing about the move from " surprising, anomalous data to a theory which might explain those data "— and the stated method—that of taking the measure of philosophical views against the grid of scientific theorizing—each fail because the historical examples cited are too weak to bear alone the weight placed upon them. It is not a question of different examples nor of more examples. The difficulty with the stated aim is that there are remarkably few hints as to what the examples have in common, what we are to look for. It is true that each records an instance in which the conceptual organization of anomalous data was achieved by the introduction of a law or theory which

could account for those data and which in turn was possible only against
the theory-governed background of previously held concepts and beliefs. But
the logically requisite features which any candidate proposal must display,
and which supposedly are exemplified by the chosen examples, lie implicit
and undisturbed in the detail of the historical appeals. There is no sys-
tematic attempt to get at the general logical requirements or to display the
patterns of discovery. There is at best a hint or two, *e.g.* " if H is meant to
explain P, then H cannot itself rest upon the features in P which required
explanation ". (The reference to curve fitting (p. 205), if used differently,
might have provided more insight into the specific requirements of " retro-
ductive inference " from data to law than does the general analogy with
perception.) In short, the author is more concerned to insist upon the
fact of retroduction than to display its requirements. One feels *Patterns
of Discovery* might better read (*Selected*) *Discoveries of Pattern*.

The difficulty with the stated method is that no case study of actual scien-
tific practice will in itself adjudicate among responsible rival philosophical
views. Yet any study of such cases from a favoured perspective will
appear as doubtful to the reader as the perspective seems biased. And so
it is here. Professor Hanson, for instance, holds that any law sentence
may be put to any one of a family of related but different uses. It may
function now as an inferential principle, then as a convention, here as a
definition, there as an *a priori* but empirical assertion, and so on. But
" if its use is different its meaning is different, and if its meaning is different
its logic is different ". Thus the competing traditional accounts of natural
law are wrong, since they fasten upon single uses to which the law sentences
can be put but ignore other equally correct uses. Does this appeal to
context resolve the traditional conflict as to the nature of natural laws?
Would Kneale, Toulmin, Braithwaite, Mach, Hume, and Poincaré, peering
at the same moment over a white smock give the same account of how that
garmented figure used a law, their differences as to the logical character
of natural law now resolved? How does one tell how a law is used?
There will be as many different accounts of the use of a law in a given
context as there are initially different philosophical views at hand. Hume
will find the scientist's reluctance to brook contrary evidence a symptom
of his stubbornness, Poincaré will find evidence of the conventional character
of the law, and so on. Querying the scientist or noting his subsequent
research activities are trivial extensions of the same theme. If the notion
of a law functioning as an inferential principle is unclear, doubtful, or
unintelligible, no appeal to a range of uses will provide the sceptic an
instance of such a use.

There are a number of issues which presuppose a philosophical short-
course in how to focus the lens of particle theory on the traditional prob-
lems. Thus, a now familiar account of perception is invoked, complete
with *seeing, seeing as*, and *seeing that*, to provide an analogical bridge
from seeing of perceptual wholes to the " seeing " of conceptual patterns
in the data of science. Many readers will be uncomfortable with the way,
e.g. seeing that the gun is loaded shares common quarters and plumbing
with seeing accordingly that it is a lethal weapon and so seeing it as a way
out of an unhappy romance. Others will find it difficult to determine the
extent and character of the logical neighbourhood in which law-ridden
concepts thrive. Does seeing that that is a bird really involve seeing
(entail knowing?) that it will not do snap rolls? In general there will be
doubts about the organizational aspects of perception highlighting those of

theorizing. It is after all Hanson's point that the latter carry a responsibility to prior data, an obligation to reason and explanation, which seeing now a duck, next a rabbit, does not.

Formalists will charge Hanson with psychologism. If his anticipation of the charge seems to involve the confusion urged, at least he rightly draws attention in an interesting way to the fact that "retroductive inference" belongs to the logic, not psychology, of inquiry.

ROMANE CLARKE

Ludwig Wittgenstein. A Memoir by NORMAN MALCOLM, with a Biographical Sketch by G. H. Von Wright. Oxford University Press, 1958. Pp. 100. 12s. 6d.

THIS book should satisfy the curiosity about the character and the cast of mind of the first philosopher of this age. G. H. Von Wright's excellent biographical sketch is reprinted from the *Philosophical Review* for October 1955 ; and in a lucid and moving memoir Norman Malcolm speaks of his association with Wittgenstein, first as a pupil and later as a pupil and friend.

In the course of the memoir a number of Wittgenstein's opinions, expressed in short personal letters or in conversations, are recounted. The subjects include the writings of Tolstoy and Dostoievsky, religious faith, the character and aptitudes of some contemporary philosophers, English academic life, the fate of being a Professor of Philosophy (for *him* " a kind of living death "), the character of *Mind*, the infective character of Oxford (on other occasions it was typhoid, not influenza), Wittgenstein's distaste for the publications of his pupils and disciples, English films (there probably couldn't be a decent one), the harm done to many by psycho-analysis, "Freud's extraordinary scientific achievement", and some questions about household arrangements. Enough evidence is given to enable the reader to decide whether Wittgenstein's opinions, expressed with equal force on most matters, were equally likely to be right on all matters ; and enough evidence is given to enable the reader to see that any question whether abstract, moral, mundane or political, that is of concern to people, was of serious concern to Wittgenstein.

There are a few pages of notes of lectures taken by Malcolm in 1946-47 ; these will provoke strong agreement or strong dissent. There are, as well notes made by Malcolm of discussions in 1949. (In what follows Malcolm's words are either quoted or paraphrased.) The topic is Moore's claim that it is a correct use of language for him to say, while pointing at a tree a few feet away " I know for certain that this is *a tree* ". Two of the main points are these : (i) " Statements like ' That's a tree ' sometimes play a role similar to that of mathematical propositions in the respect that experience could not refute them . . . Moore said ' I *know* that there's a tree ' partly because of the feeling that if it turned out *not* to be a tree, he would have to ' give up ' " (p. 88). (ii) Instead of saying that such a statement is a misuse of language it is better to say that it has no clear meaning, that we can suspect that such a statement might be used to make some philosophical point (p. 89). In the course of these discussions Wittgenstein came to think that, contrary to what he had previously said, it is *false* that in the ordinary use of " I know " it is always sensible to speak of making sure. The following cases are mentioned. (i)' A sighted

person could say " I know . . . " to a blind man who asks " Are you sure
it's a tree? " (ii) At the end of an investigation one can say " I know
now that it's a tree ". (iii) If someone were able to see a house before
him when his companion was still in the woods it would be natural for the
first man to say " I know it " if he were asked whether he was sure. (iv)
" We might say ' A human being knows that he has two hands ' and mean
by this, that he doesn't have to count them or make sure that there are
still two—while some other creatures might have hands that occasionally
disappeared " (p. 99). Readers may think that Wittgenstein here seems
to show a greater willingness to sort out different and less central uses than
is apparent in his published writings.

About his friend's life and character Malcolm writes, " When I think of
his profound pessimism, the intensity of his mental and moral suffering,
the relentless way in which he drove his intellect, his need for love together
with the harshness that repelled love, I am inclined to believe that his
life was fiercely unhappy. Yet at the end he himself exclaimed that it had
been ' wonderful '! " (Perhaps this is the sense in which Yeats said that
Hamlet and Lear are gay.) Anyone who went to Wittgenstein's lectures
would agree that this picture is one that might be naturally formed. But
I believe that a number of Wittgenstein's friends say that Malcolm has
overpainted the depression and the severity. There will be no room for
doubt that Von Wright and Malcolm have written about a man of " great
and pure seriousness and powerful intelligence ".

A. C. JACKSON

The Works of George Berkeley. Edited by A. A. LUCE and T. E. JESSOP.
Nine volumes. Nelson, 1948-57. £13 10s.

THE last edition of Berkeley's works other than this one is the second
Campbell Fraser edition published by the Oxford University Press in
four volumes and still available at four guineas. This 1901 edition did
not contain Berkeley's private correspondence apart from an occasional
letter including the two to Samuel Johnson replying to his criticisms of
the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues.* An earlier Oxford edition (1871),
also edited by Campbell Fraser in three volumes had a fourth supplementary
volume headed *Life and Letters.* This edition is now out of print. It
included a few non-philosophical pieces not reprinted in 1901. Compared
with these two editions the new Nelson edition contains very little new
philosophical material. It does contain some hundred and thirty new
letters not to be found in the earlier Campbell Fraser, but they are not on
the whole of philosophical interest. The new edition also contains the
following items not to be found in either the 1871 or 1901 editions. A short
political pamphlet entitled *Advice to the Tories who have taken the Oaths,*
a letter on tar-water from the Dublin Journal, three letters on the militia
from the same journal, a poem about tar-water, a topographical description
of Lough Neagh, five sermons, an unpublished pamphlet (*The Irish
Patriot*), and Johnson's two letters in the correspondence with Berkeley.

The philosophical value of the new edition must therefore rest on its
editing and presentation. Here the principal textual improvement is in
the setting out of the Commonplace Book, the entries in which (as is well
known) were printed in the wrong order by Campbell Fraser because of
the way the manuscript notebook was bound together. The final order

and selection of entries is to some extent a matter of editorial discretion. G. A. Johnston edited the Commonplace Book in 1930 giving the entries in what Dr. Luce regards as more or less the right order, and Dr. Luce's own near-facsimile edition was published in 1944. In the present edition of the works we have as a basis the 1944 edition, though the deleted phrases of the manuscript are not recorded and the notes of the 1944 edition have been cut to what looks like less than a half of their original length. The Commonplace Book is the first item in volume one of the present edition. Two sets of entries which have sometimes been printed with the Commonplace Book (the last half page of Campbell Fraser's version and the *Disputatio on Locke's Essay*) have been transferred to the Addenda in the last (9th) volume. One set of entries from the verso of folio 164, which Dr. Luce rejected in the 1944 edition as not being part of the Commonplace Book proper, does not seem to have survived in the Nelson Works at all. (They occur in Johnston's edition numbered 946-953.) If these are not in the Nelson edition it seems a pity since they include one or two quite interesting entries, in particular the important one, " Whether is a spirit mov'd w^{ht} absolute or relative motion or wth both".

The standard of editing is generally much higher than in Campbell Fraser, particularly it seems in the text of the *Theory of Vision Vindicated*. Generally the editors do not seem to have aimed at anything like a facsimile text of either manuscripts or original editions and have adopted different *ad hoc* conventions for title-pages, orthography, etc., for different works. The footnotes are fairly clear of interpretative comment, so that the editors' own views do not obtrude in the text. They do appear however in the introductions to each work. These commonly contain an analysis of the argument of the following work. These seem to me to be particularly good for the *Principles* and the *Three Dialogues*. In the Introductions generally both editors show less interest in Berkeley's theory of language and its bearing on his philosophy than is common nowadays. At many points in Berkeley's exposition his theory is explicitly tied up with linguistic questions, the practical satisfactoriness of our everyday idioms and their possibly strict falsehood. Even the question of the identity of sensible objects (which is crucial to establishing that the objects which we saw originally are the same as the ones which do or do not continue to exist unperceived by us) rests apparently for Berkeley on a consideration of the strictness of our use of the word *same*. The introduction to the *Three Dialogues* states that proof of the existence of God in the second dialogue is a natural consequence of Berkeley's position in the *Principles*. This does seem a possibly controversial question since the drift of the *Principles* would seem to be that one can only establish the existence of sensible objects from the fact that they are perceived. The dialogue presents an argument which appears to imply that we can be sure of the existence of sensible objects in some other way and argues from this to the existence of a perceiver for those objects.

The *Theory of Vision* and the *Principles of Human Knowledge*, have different editors and, perhaps consequently, the relation between these two works, though it is discussed by Dr. Luce, is not discussed in very great detail. The *Alciphron* has a short, principally historical introduction. The *De Motu* is provided with an English translation. The Index in the ninth volume is fairly comprehensive, although it is not as elaborately analytical as for example Selby-Bigge's indices to Hume. It is considerably better than Campbell Fraser's index. It is justifiably primarily a philosophical index. Economics has a block entry as does Religion and

some of the Mathematical Sciences. There are some thirty block entries under philosophical topics. I have not failed to locate any passage that I have looked for by making reasonably flexible use of these principal headings. The binding of this work seems to me to be a bit below the standard one might expect for what will inevitably be primarily a library set.

O. P. WOOD

The Idea of Social Science. By PETER WINCH. London : Routledge & Kegan Paul. (New York : Humanities Press), 1958. Pp. iv + 143.

MR. WINCH enters a plea for more apriorism in sociology. He argues that because the theoretical part of sociology must make fundamentally important decisions about what is to count as the same social institution or situation, and what is not, it has much to learn from philosophy which is, in his view, principally concerned with just this sort of question. From this base he argues that any attempt to subsume total human behaviour under the explanatory principles of physical science is stultified by the fact, made clear by philosophical analysis, that any re-description of social behaviour in other (*e.g.* purely scientific) terms must necessarily fail to make clear that it is *social* behaviour under discussion ; " . . . the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanations offered in the natural sciences " (p. 72).

The argument proceeds by the adducing of various reductionist[1] hypotheses (Mill, Newcomb, Pareto), and the refutation of these by the repeated use of a principle, variously worded, but stating in effect that any description of social activities must be made in terms which do not leave out the fact that it is *social* activities which are being described. A ' theory ' is not a set of noises, but a device playing a certain fairly fixed role in social life (p. 109) ; ' money ' does not consist in pieces of metal and paper, but in these *as they are used* in certain quite specific ways in human societies (p. 118). And the neutral terms of physical science, Winch insists, do leave out just those features of the institution in question which make it an institution. The physical scientist has only to agree on a conceptual apparatus with his fellows, then impose it on a mute world ; but the sociologist, when he settles on a conceptual apparatus, must choose one which does not deprive the society which is his subject, of its specifically *social* character.

If Winch were suggesting that at the present stage of knowledge of the causes of behaviour it would be much more fruitful to do sociology in non-physico-chemical terms, then one could hardly demur. But Winch's programme is clearly the much wider one of showing that no matter how extensive our scientific knowledge of the structure and function of human beings, a social science could never be built on it ; or, if some further science were built on it, it would not be a *social* science. This programme cannot, I think, be supported by the arguments of the book. My general reason for thinking this is that I see no objection to filling the gap Winch (rightly) points to in reductionist accounts by further statements containing only

[1] By ' reductionist ' I mean hypotheses which seeks to represent human beings as not ontologically *sui generis*, but as (complicated) forms of some other and preferred items, *e.g.* minds and bodies (Mill) or just physical particles (Newcomb).

items of the sort preferred by those accounts. It is, for example, argued that the description of *money* as metal or paper leaves out its character as a means of exchange ; but why should further statements about exchange habits among human beings not be added to complete the account? To this it will (properly) be objected that ' exchange ', ' habit ', and ' human beings ' raise the question again ; but then why should they not be eventually eliminated in favour of the preferred terms, even if this does take us to several removes? I have no doubt that an actual description of money, which made clear its social function, but from which all save terms of the preferred type had been eliminated, would be complicated and tedious ; but I see no *a priori* objection to its possibility. But Winch does not consider this possibility ; he is content to show that the social character of money is omitted by a *simple* description of it in the preferred terms, and appears to infer from this that *no* adequate description is possible in the preferred terms, not even a long and complicated one. If it is asked what the point of such a project would be, to what end it would be worth undertaking, it seems to me that the following reply is plausible. I take Winch's argument to be aimed at showing that " the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanations offered in the natural sciences " (p. 72). This presumably means that any attempt at describing a human society in terms of the interaction of exceedingly complex physico-chemical organisms (even if we had all the relevant information) must necessarily fail, and that for the purely conceptual reasons he elaborates. On the other hand are the impressive advances in (*a*) neurophysiology and (*b*) cybernetics, which suggest strongly that the brain is a purely physical system, and hence that the totality of behaviour can be explained in purely physical terms.[1] This then, at least on the face of it, suggests a conflict between philosophy and science. For on any clear meaning I can give to Winch's arguments, he is denying on *a priori* grounds what science is asserting—or rather hypothesizing—on *a posteriori* grounds. This suggests strongly to me that the *a priori* argument may be at fault, and hence there is considerable theoretical interest in the programme I suggest of giving adequate descriptions of social institutions which nevertheless are couched entirely in terms of the preferred type.

A good instance of Winch's *a priori* way with empirical possibilities, though in a slightly different field from the one I am mainly interested in, is his refutation of the possibility of tight prediction of human behaviour. He argues that " even given a specific set of initial conditions, one will still not be able to predict any determinate outcome to a historical trend because the continuation or breaking off of that trend involves human decisions which cannot be *definitely* [his italics] predicted : if they could be, we should not call them decisions " (p. 93). No doubt if tight predictability becomes possible we shall have to revise our essentially pre-scientific view of human beings, and our use of such words as ' decision '. But how does that go anyway to proving that " one will not be able to predict any determinate outcome to a historical trend "? The logical fact, if it will always be one, that if something is to be called a decision it must be unpredictable, has no bearing on the empirical question whether something which has been *called* a decision *is* predictable or not. We have not *made* something unpredictable merely by calling it a name.

[1] For elementary surveys of evidence see *e.g.* W. Grey Walter, *The Living Brain*, and J. O. Wisdom, " The Hypothesis of Cybernetics ", *B.J.P.S.* (1951).

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Winch makes an ingenious proposal by which he might perhaps wish to avoid the interpretation I have laid on him. This is his use (pp. 71-75) of Hegel's " Law of the Transformation of Quantity into Quality "; he argues that the practice of speaking of human beings as merely extremely complex mechanisms obscures the fact that there is a point at which mere quantitative difference does pass into qualitative difference. He might perhaps argue from this that he could admit the physicalist account of human behaviour, while at the same time—what? Retaining the " logical incompatibility " of social with scientific concepts (p. 72)? But that phrase would then seem to be emptied of meaning ; for the construction one would normally place on it—that a thing's being an x precluded it from being a y, and vice-versa—is being denied if he accepts the physicalist account. Or perhaps we are to take " logical incompatibility " in this weak, and highly unusual, sense, that p is incompatible with q, not when p and q are contradictories, but merely where p does not entail q and q does not entail p. But then Winch would again be up against my earlier argument to the effect that one *could* in fact completely redescribe social occurrences in the terms of physical science, and that one thus *could* establish a mutual entailment between the p and q of the case.

There are many other interesting arguments in the book, and equally many places one would like to raise questions. Some of these concern (1) the alternating uses of ' rule ' throughout Chapter 2, *The Nature of Meaningful Behaviour*, sometimes in the sense of a descriptive rule about the way things happen, sometimes in the sense of a descriptive rule about the correct use of expressions, sometimes in the sense of a prescriptive rule about how to behave ; (2) the notion of a ' realm of discourse ' which leads on to a defence of religion (and of magic?) (pp. 99-103) ; (3) the discussion of motives (pp. 75-83).

<div align="right">M. C. BRADLEY</div>

Philosophy and Linguistic Analysis. By M. J. CHARLESWORTH, Ph.D. Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, U.S. 1959. Pp. ix + 234. Paper $ 4.75, cloth $ 5.50.

I ALWAYS open a book with such a title with considerable misgivings, but to some extent these were dispelled by Dr. Charlesworth's work. First, the book has been constructed on the right lines, for the author has read his sources with care, and consequently has managed to distinguish the various strands which go to make up the English philosophical scene at the present time. He is quite clear, for example, that Logical Positivism has never been an important force in English philosophy, in spite of the success of *Language, Truth and Logic* ; in fact Charlesworth holds that its main *philosophical* influence has been as a horrid warning to the Analysts.

The first two chapters of the book are concerned with Moore and Russell, the next and longest with Wittgenstein, dealing separately with the *Tractatus* and the *Investigations*. Then comes the chapter on Ayer, followed by one on the Cambridge School and another on the Oxford philosophers. There is nothing in his factual account which will be surprising to those brought up in the English tradition, nor does it contain any glaring errors. But the audience that Charlesworth has in mind is

rather the contemporary followers of the Scholastic tradition, and for them I think the book will provide a good basis for seeing the main trends of a way of thought that they are all too ready to dismiss without consideration. The writer will be the more appreciated by such readers in that he claims to write from a " Thomist " standpoint, and emphasises, in his concluding chapter, the importance of the lessons which scholastic philosophy can learn from Analysis.

Unfortunately, there is some evidence that his reading has not had the effect on Charlesworth that might be desired, for he falls into certain traps that show how the old models of philosophy still exercise a fatal fascination for him, e.g. he says after a discussion of Austin's " performatory " expressions (p. 175), " Thus, it is plausible to say that ' good ', for instance, is not the proper name of anything, but it is not plausible to say that it does not *refer* to anything at all. . . . ' Performatory utterances ' must in some way be based upon ' what is the case ', they must signify some reality ; there cannot be a *pure* performatory utterance." This objection arises from his desire that philosophy should continue to be " the investigation of the necessary structure of reality ", and this in its turn is due to a failure really to come to grips with those passages which he himself has quoted from Wittgenstein's *Investigations*. It is clear from what he says about them that he has not understood the notion of a " language-game " nor the vital distinction between " use " and " usage ". If he had, he could hardly conclude with the following words : " But, of course, as we have also seen, the essential difference is that, for the Scholastic, this investigation is into the necessary conditions for the meaningful use of language, and so has *ipso facto* an extra-linguistic reference ; whereas for Wittgenstein and the analysts, philosophical analysis is, so it seems, concerned rather with the grammatical structure of language, that is to say, the more or less arbitrary or conventional conditions governing the use of particular languages " (p. 220). It may well be that it is not always clear what English philosophers mean when they talk of " language ", but it is quite clear that they have never meant this.

The book contains an adequate bibliography : the two indices have some oddities of alphabetical arrangement. On page 125 the reference to Strawson's review should read page 78. As a piece of book production the work leaves much to be desired. The printing in my copy is extremely uneven, and the size of the margins makes the book unwieldy to handle. I think the paper version would be short-lived.

A. R. MANSER

Garlandus Compotista, Dialectica, First Edition of the Manuscripts, with an introduction on the life and works of the author and on the contents of the present work. By L. M. DE RIJK. Van Gorcum and Co. 1959. Pp. lxii + 209.

THIS is an elementary and not very skilful exposition of the *ars vetus, i.e.* a primer of logic as it was known before the rediscovery of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* in the twelfth century. For the most part it is based, as might be expected, on Boethius, but it contains a number of references to a work called simply *Liber* which may perhaps have been some other compendium now lost. The text is preserved in two manuscripts, one

in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris which is apparently from the end of the eleventh century and one in Orléans which is said to be from the middle of the twelfth century. The second manuscript opens with the words *Incipiunt regule magistri Gerlandi super dyalecticam*, and for this reason its contents have been attributed to Gerland of Besançon who lived in the twelfth century. But Dr. De Rijk's identification of the first manuscript as an earlier copy of the same text disposes of this attribution and makes it seem likely that the work is by a certain Garlandus who is sometimes called Compotista because he wrote a *Compotus* or *Computus*, i.e. a tract on calculation for almanacs. In the Paris manuscript the author calls himself Iarlandus, and the names both of people and of places which he uses in his examples suggest strongly that the work was written for the schools of Liège. De Rijk argues that it was composed before 1075 and even possibly before 1040, when he supposes the author to have come to teach in England for a period of about twenty-six years. These dates depend on a speculative reconstruction of the Computist's life with materials drawn partly from English references to a philosopher called John of Garland. But if we may rely on the palaeographical judgement which De Rijk quotes from Mlle. M. Th. d'Alverny of the Bibliothèque Nationale, there can be no doubt that we have to do with a work of the eleventh century ; and when this point is conceded, it seems not impossible that the work should have been composed comparatively early in that century, since the author says in a bland uncontroversial way that species, genera, and all other predicables are just words (*voces*), where it is clear that he does not mean simply that the five heads of predicables were called *quinque voces*. Such a remark could scarcely have been made in such a fashion when the controversy on universals had become heated, but it might well have been thrown out earlier by an author who had no pretensions to be a metaphysician.

It is interesting to notice that Garlandus seems to have been led to his view about the predicables by reflection on the queer sentence *Homo est species* which was derived by Latin logicians from remarks of Aristotle such as the passage about secondary substances in *Categories* 5 and was used constantly as an example in mediaeval writings on logic. In the later Middle Ages this sentence was held to involve *suppositio simplex*, i.e. use of the noun *homo* in a special way to stand for what it ordinarily signifies (namely, the form of humanity), but Garlandus takes it as a statement about the word *homo*, i.e. as involving what later logicians called *suppositio materialis*. The evidence of Anselm, Abelard, and John of Salisbury shows clearly enough that this was the context in which the great debate about universals began, and it was in this same context that Ockham and his followers defended conceptualism nearly three centuries later.

De Rijk has done a good service in publishing this text with a critical apparatus and all the necessary indices. It is not a distinguished work, and it cannot even be said to throw floods of light on the history of logic : but it is one more source of evidence for those who are interested in the beginnings of mediaeval philosophy. For those who like their mediaevalism flavoured with goliardery it contains two references to a lady called Avelina whom Garlandus professes to love. Within the life which De Rijk has reconstructed for him these references are more appropriate to a date before 1040 than to one after 1066.

WILLIAM KNEALE

The Structure of a Moral Code : A Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Discourse applied to the Ethics of the Navaho Indians. By JOHN LADD. Harvard University Press (London : Oxford University Press), 1957. Pp. xv + 474. 63s.

" THE object of *The Structure of a Moral Code* ", writes Professor Ladd, " is to explore the problems involved in describing the ethics of societies other than our own ". The book which emerges from Mr. Ladd's investigations is an outstanding achievement and of considerable value to all moral philosophers, actual and potential. It is divided into three parts. Part I discusses the aims and methods of descriptive ethics ; Part II examines the structure of ethical discourse ; and Part III consists of an application of the author's general theory, the precipitate so to speak of Parts I and II, to the ethical discourse of the Navaho Indians. The actual reconstruction of the Navaho moral code is obtained by applying the general theory to the information derived from the interviews recorded in the Field Notes, which form a 90-page Appendix.

It must be said at the outset that Parts I and II are much too long and in places repetitious. It is a pity that Mr. Ladd did not commission one of his post-graduate students to cut this portion down to half its present length. What is said here is extremely important ; but it would benefit from a less prolix presentation. With this reservation, the work as a whole is thoroughly commendable ; Mr. Ladd is fully conversant with modern ethical discussion, and followers of Hare and Nowell-Smith, for example, will find that he talks their language. Indeed, he has adroitly put his finger on one of the modern defects : the muddling of the logic of ' good ' with that of ' ought ' and the correlative mistake of assuming that value-terms such as ' good ' and ' bad ' conceal an imperative and thereby serve to guide conduct. Others of course have already noted these errors, but Mr. Ladd neatly points to the right course when he says " Prescriptions are concerned with the *right*, whereas evaluations are concerned with the *good* " (p. 68).

Mr. Ladd realizes that in any attempt to reconstruct the ethics of a non-literate people, from interviews from their wise men or moralists, certain temptations present themselves—temptations which, if not overcome, may well bedevil interpretation. One of these, to which many anthropologists have fallen prey, is to try to squeeze the moral thinking under examination into Western moral categories, and to evaluate it according to some putative Western standards. Another temptation is to evade providing a criterion for deciding what exactly, in the code under examination, is to rank as a moral and what as a non-moral prescription. Yet obviously enough it is vital to distinguish between rules governing etiquette and general social behaviour on the one hand and essentially moral conduct on the other. After an over-long discussion of competing theories, culled from both anthropologists and philosophers, Mr. Ladd decides that " the distinctive characteristic of moral obligations is their ' special authority ', which will be analysed in terms of their superiority and legitimacy " (p. 44) ; and further that a prescription being recognized as moral or not must depend on the view of " the person whose ethics is under investigation " (p. 83). The investigator, therefore, is to sort out the various prescriptions or rules in force in the community he is examining, and only label those moral which, from the point of view of that particular community, are *thought to be* invested with superiority and legitimacy.

Mr. Ladd expatiates at some length on these twin concepts, but the following short extract will suffice to indicate his line of thought :

> . . . the two distinctive elements of this special moral authority are its presumed superiority and legitimacy. This means that the moral obligatoriness of an act is thought to be a consideration which is more overwhelming and demanding upon us than, say, the intense distaste we may have for doing it. Moral considerations are in this sense superior to non-moral ones. Moreover, the demands for superiority must be thought to be legitimate, for many sorts of actions make questionable demands of one sort or another upon us. In other words, these demands must be regarded as valid and binding. The conception of " legitimacy " introduces the elements of impersonality and objectivity . . . (p. 84).

The interested reader can entertain himself by comparing this view with others which pick on the principle of ' reciprocity ', or that of ' equity and utility ', or that of ' harmonising people's actions '—to name but three— as the factor responsible for making a rule a moral rule.

The reconstructed moral code that emerges from all the questioning and interpretation is extremely interesting. The Navaho moralists, we may note, are always willing to say *why* something is either wrong or *bahadzid* (wrong *and dangerous*) : they do not regard any action as wrong in itself. But they do not adopt the Benthamite view that actions are wrong if they do not tend to promote the greatest happiness of the greatest number ; on the contrary, actions are wrong if they are likely to bring trouble of one kind or another to the *agent*. Navaho morality is based, not on a ' spectator ' ethics, as are so many Western codes, but on an ' agent ' ethics. It is not the approval or disapproval of ' society ' or ' the disinterested spectator ' that counts ; it is the interests of the agent. Indirectly, however, the system is utilitarian, since by the avoidance of troublemaking acts the agent automatically benefits the community. But there is no sign whatever of that conception so dear to many Western moralists : the general good. The prescription, whether positive or negative, is always conceived in terms of the agent's well being. Moreover—and this may appal the Western moralist—if you can ' get away ' with what is designated either wrong or even *bahadzid*, so much the better. Thus stealing and adultery are both *bahadzid*—though ' all right ' if you don't get caught (*cf*. ancient Sparta !). On the other hand, no one should take chances. In actual practice, the Navahos do of course take chances, just as Westerners do ; but the code advises against this. Sanctions, it may be noted, in the form of morally approved aggression, are not condoned in the Navaho culture ; the way to deal with moral misdemeanours is to talk things over with the miscreant and thus ' straighten them out '. Another interesting point which Mr. Ladd brings out is the fact that the Navaho code is restricted to members of their own group : you may rightly deceive a stranger, but not a fellow tribesman.

One of the difficulties which faced Mr. Ladd was the problem of discovering when esoteric beliefs, which his informants were loth to mention, were conditioning moral views. Thus one of his informants, inconsistently with our conception of what ethical egoism implies, appeared to regard it as wrong to kill someone in order to save one's own life. The reason given that " killing others wouldn't save oneself anyway "—was clearly an equivocation ; and Mr. Ladd strongly suspects that a concealed belief in ghosts was relevant here—the belief, namely, that the dead man's ghost would come to haunt the killer. There were other cases of a *prima facie* denial of egoism where a ghost-hypothesis seemed relevant.

To sum up. All Navaho moral prescriptions, *i.e.* those prescriptions which satisfy the criteria of superiority and legitimacy, can, whether positive or negative, be derived from the following basic prescription : Do all those actions necessary to promote your own welfare. And from this positive prescription there is an immediately derived prohibition : Do not do any action sufficient to prevent or jeopardize your welfare. The basic prescription is thus, as Mr. Ladd puts it, extrinsically teleological in that it enjoins and forbids actions in terms of their promoting or averting an end-state of affairs which is naturalistic and this-worldly ; and the end in terms of which the actions are prescribed is egoistic. In other words, the goal of moral action is the personal welfare of the agent. Mr. Ladd believes that one of the most interesting aspects of the reconstructed Navaho moral code is the light it throws on the relations between egoism and altruism. According to the Navaho system, it is impossible to be a good egoist without at the same time being a good altruist ; for (a) there are no egoistically based moral prescriptions of actions which could conflict with the interests of others ; and (b) there are many egoistic prescriptions which require altruistic action. Moreover, the basic factual belief which unites egoistic premisses with altruistic conclusions is that the welfare of each individual is dependent upon that of every other individual in the group.

Towards the end of Part III, Mr. Ladd attempts a comparison of the reconstructed Navaho code with ' Western egoistic ethics ' and takes as his exemplars of the latter what he calls the ' codes ' of Epicurus, Hobbes and Spinoza. He warns his readers that his comments " do not pretend to be historically accurate interpretations of these authors " and indeed they are not. It is a pity that this section (pp. 305-309) was included at all ; for in it he makes the more than dubious remark that " It is almost safe to say that the reconstructed moral code which I have presented is identical with Hobbes's theory except for . . . differences in psychological and economic ' theory ' ". What Mr. Ladd, surprisingly enough, has not grasped is the fundamentally different approach of Hobbes the moral philosopher on the one hand, and the Navaho *moralist*, concerned with issuing and justifying moral prescriptions, on the other. This aberration, however, should not be allowed to deter any one from reading a book which, taken as a whole, is thoroughly rewarding.

<div align="right">J. HARTLAND-SWANN</div>

Maine de Biran ; Reformer of Empiricism. By PHILIP P. HALLIE. Harvard University Press (London : Oxford University Press). Pp. xii + 217. 38s.

UNFORTUNATELY this book is not what we wanted. Maine de Biran could well be called " the Unknown Philosopher "—outside his own country, where Bergson gave him the rank of the greatest French meta-physician after Descartes and Malebranche. Many of those of us to whom he is even a name might be shy of giving him a date. (In fact he was four years younger than Fichte, four years older than Hegel, of the generation of the French Revolution, an administrator and politician under the Directory, Empire and Restoration.) But only specialists or enthusiasts can be expected to wade through the fourteen volumes of the definitive (Tisserand-Gouhier) edition of his writings, which consist very largely of drafts, personal letters and other private papers. We need to have the essence of Maine de Biran made accessible and intelligible to us, so that

we can judge for ourselves what he is worth, even if the conclusion to
which we come is only that he does not deserve the reputation he enjoys
in France. But what Mr. Hallie gives us is only a distorted view from a
peculiar angle. His own account of his purpose is " to understand how
Biran's philosophy constitutes a criticism of the key ideas or doctrines of
British Empiricism ". Though the words " Reformer of Empiricism "
in his title promise something more exciting, all that Hallie means by
" Empiricism " is any opinions maintained by one or other of the British
philosophers labelled " Empiricists " in our traditional History of Phil-
osophy lecture-courses—in fact the familiar trio, Locke, Berkeley and
Hume. And this is unfortunate for him in two ways. Firstly, we all
know much more about Locke, Berkeley, and Hume than we do about
Biran, and on these we find his observations so unpenetrating or conven-
tional as to make us suspicious of his reports on Biran. Secondly, it
becomes very clear that Biran seldom thought much about " British
Empiricism " at all. His disagreements were with the French *Idéologues*
of the school of Condillac and Destutt de Tracy, who did indeed represent
the tradition of Locke transplanted to French soil, and developed it in
ways sometimes interestingly parallel to its development across the Channel
by Hume and Hartley and others, but no more. So Hallie is reduced
for the greater part of his book to a rather barren comparing and contrasting
of what is comparable only in very general terms.

Biran belongs, as Hallie points out on his first page, to what Sainte-Beuve
once called *la famille des méditatifs intérieurs*—a typically French line of
thinkers running from Montaigne to Sartre. He is an introspective
psychologist, not really an epistemologist or metaphysician. When he
tries to draw conclusions from his observations, his argument gapes with
non-sequiturs, which even his most sympathetic critics notice, and some
of which he even came to see himself. His one contribution to the history
of thought was what Hallie calls " the description and evaluation of
man's experience of bodily movement ". Awareness of voluntary self-
movement he finds to be an integral component in every perception, though
varying in degree from one to another. *Seeing* is what happens when we
look ; the felt difference of visual perceptions from mere visual images
lies in the fact that to get them we must open our eyes or keep them open
and move our eyeballs or turn our heads ; and so with the other senses.
Biran has been called " the French Kant ", which is absurd, but we might
wonder why he has not been called " the French Fichte ", when he derives
our recognition of the reality of external things from their resistance to the
effort voulu, though the differences are in fact far greater than any likeness,
and rooted in the difference between the men. Not only is the Fichtean
" activity " transcendental, the Biranian purely physiological : Fichte's
is the philosophy of the strong will, which likes to create its own obstacles
to show its strength in overcoming them, whereas Biran is the man of weak
will and chronic ill health, to whom his greatest obstacle seems to be his
own body, though he only feels himself to be himself to the extent that he
has control of it. Characteristically his insistence that the human self
is nothing if not the absolutely free will is combined with the admission
that we are very seldom free and therefore very seldom ourselves. One
of his preoccupations was Stoic morality and the utter impossibility of
achieving the self-control which it required. But all this—which is, I
suspect, much closer to the heart of Maine de Biran than any " Reform of
Empiricism "—is only faintly visible between the lines of Hallie's book.

A. M. MacIver

The Sleepwalkers. By ARTHUR KOESTLER. Hutchinson : pp. 624. 25s.

MR. KOESTLER'S survey of cosmology has several themes ; the exploration of the nature of discovery; the debunking of the positivist account of science ; the impossibility of separating out a strand of " pure science " in the intellectual history of such men as Kepler and Galileo ; the need for some sort of rapprochment between the scientific and religious attitudes to natural phenomena. The last theme is not dealt with in the body of the book but is the substance of a disastrous epilogue in which Mr. Koestler claims to be summing up the conclusions of the survey. Unfortunately he has chosen Eddington and Jeans as his philosophical models and so he finds it terribly disturbing that he should be sitting on a chair that is mostly empty space. However, like his characters Mr. Koestler is also a sleep-walker for the body of the book contains material of the utmost importance for the philosophy of science.

The two main schools of philosophy of science, logicists (the positivists, Reichenbach, etc.) and naturalists (Duhem, Campbell, Toulmin), have usually conducted their arguments around the sciences that are already very well-established ; the logicists claiming that the whole thing can be tidied up by the application of formal logic and probability theory and the naturalists arguing that the result of this is something so unlike actual science as to be virtually useless. The great merit of Koestler's book is that it shows that as far as scientific *discovery* goes the logicist's account won't do. From a positivist point of view the Copernican Revolution would have been a retrograde step, for as far as the appearances went Ptolemy's system was a better inference device and summary of past observations than the Copernican model. Furthermore in the very detailed analysis of the history of Kepler's discoveries Koestler shows just how the construction of theories involves the interaction of a model (the regular solids, the harmonies) and the facts ; and that it was the *model* which led to the discoveries. Kepler didn't find anything by induction from observation. Observations were used by him simply as checks upon the hypotheses that his incredible imagination wove out his obsession with order and regularity. If the book has no other merit the chapters on Kepler at least show that the naturalist school have history on their side.

<div style="text-align: right">R. HARRÉ</div>

Knowledge and Value: Introductory Readings in Philosophy. Edited by E. SPRAGUE and P. W. TAYLOR. Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1959. pp. 717.

EXCERPTS from philosophers past and present are gathered into eight sections ; problems of knowledge of the world, of science, of God, and of morals, problems of meaning, of free will, of political principles, and of philosophy of history. Each section is prefaced by a few pages of general remarks on the type of problem treated (and each excerpt has a particular preface) and completed by a set of examination questions and a biblio-graphy. The whole book is introduced by a short discussion of the nature of philosophy which envisages it as having two tasks. One is a 'first-order ' enquiry into 'those problems about which there is as yet no uni-versal agreement either with regard to the precise nature of the problems

or with regard to correct methods for solving them ' ; examples are said to be metaphysics, theology, ethics, politics, and an interpretation of history. The other is a ' second-order ' examination of ' the grounds on which all first-order statements rest ' ; examples are said to be the problems dealt with in the eight sections of the book. The authors believe that pursuit of these second-order enquiries helps the pursuit of the first order, and it is to this purpose that they have compiled the book.

The selections cover a wide range of authors and are large enough to include, e.g., most of Descartes's *Meditations* and Kant's *Groundwork* and large chunks of Locke and Hume. The weakest section is that on *Meaning*, which adheres too closely to the naming and verification theories. The prefatory remarks are generally sensible and many-sided ; but the examination questions seem too often designed to test the degree of attention of the student's reading of the excerpts rather than his reflectiveness and curiosity. The bibliographies are up-to-date.

<div align="right">ALAN R. WHITE</div>

Concerning Human Understanding. By N. K. BANERJEE. George Allen & Unwin, 1958. Pp. 333. 30s.

PROFESSOR BANERJEE'S book consists of four sections, the first two of which are concerned with the theory of knowledge, the third with the nature of philosophy, and the fourth with religion. In fact there seems to be little relation between what may be considered the two main halves of the book, the first two ' essays ' and the second two. But what does give the whole book a unity in spite of this is the background against which it is written. Although he has clearly read and pondered the writers on the theory of knowledge in the English tradition, Banerjee is looking at them from a distance. Russell and Moore, Berkeley and Locke jostle each other in the first two sections, but they are not quite the familiar figures of English lecture rooms. It is this remoteness which gives an interest to the discussion of the problem of sense-data and other such topics that it would not have in a work written by a contemporary English philosopher, and which perhaps renders worth-while another trip along the well-trodden paths of ' Our knowledge of the external world '. It is unfortunate that Banerjee's acquaintance with modern English philosophy apparently stops with Moore and Russell ; it would have been interesting to see what he made of Wittgenstein. The conclusion of the first half of the book is that " the solution of the problem of our knowledge of the external world rests entirely with common sense as aided by science, and that philosophy, whatever else its business may be, cannot be said to be concerned with the problem." But what has been said to reach this result surely *is* philosophy, a conclusion which the author himself recognises a few pages later.

More interesting is the final section on religion, in which the author makes most use of his Indian background; to be able to treat christianity as merely one among many religions is an advantage. From his point of view, for example, " the difference between Communism and the Western democracies is of no fundamental character ". Starting from a moral point of view—Banerjee comes close to using Arnold's definition of religion as ' morality touched with emotion '—it is soon found that the christia n

idea of God is incompatible with the idea of moral value. "Values . . . are such that hardly any of them is compatible with the admission of the Deity." The goal of religion is "liberation" from ignorance, an ideal which can be attained, and only attained, in this world, not in another life. But it is impossible to do justice to the discussion in a short notice. I think all those interested in Philosophy of Religion would profit by reading it.

There are occasional sentences which require re-reading for their sense to become plain, though in general Banerjee handles a language which is not his own with skill. It is a pity that the sanskrit motto at the beginning is not translated.

A. R. MANSER

The Life of Ralph Waldo Emerson. By RALPH L. RUSK. London : Oxford University Press (New York : Columbia University Press, reprinted 1957 (first published 1949)). Pp. ix + 592. $8.40 or 60s.

To many this will be a dull book of no philosophical interest ; a chronicle of the events in Emerson's life, where he went, what he did, where he studied, how much he paid for his tobacco, when his first wife died, when his brothers died, how much he got for his pears, and so on, with a detail whose extent reveals impressive patience on the part of the author but is finally overwhelming. To others, it may be a book which serves a philosophical purpose even though a modest one. They may find that it clears away the myth that has surrounded Emerson to reveal a man whose writings are the expression of a complex inner struggle. For example, the essay "Compensation" may take on new significance against the background of Emerson's poverty and his anguish over the death of his first wife and his two brothers. And it is at least refreshing to learn that Emerson thought everything he had to say about the subject could be best expressed in two words, "Damn consistency". Nevertheless, the book remains almost completely an external biography of Emerson, not a study of his life and thought or, what could have been of considerable interest, the relation between them. This fact and the price may well scare away most readers.

B. PEACH

The Blue and Brown Books. By LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. Basil Blackwell, 1958. 25s.

PHILOSOPHERS will not need to be told that this is a book to be possessed and read, nor is there much that needs to be said about it here. The *Blue Book* dates from 1933-34, the *Brown Book* from 1934-35. In addition to the texts of these, the present volume contains a brief preface by Mr. R. Rhees. There is nothing in the way of analysis of contents, commentary, or index ; but the texts, though no doubt they will prove a fertile topic of exegesis and critical study, are lucid enough to be seldom in need of annotation in detail. In subject-matter, as also in style, they foreshadow in a general way the *Investigations*, but not so exactly that one who has

read the later book can safely pass over these preliminary studies as superseded.

Two short comments may be made. First, it is noticeable that, in the *Blue Book* at least, Wittgenstein is more careful than in the *Investigations* to avoid the suggestion that he is offering specimens of diagnosis and treatment for philosophical problems without qualification. He there speaks of his own problems and proceedings as among the 'heirs' of a lengthy tradition, which may presumably have other heirs too or may even survive itself in certain branches. This explicit and deliberate non-exclusiveness is all to the good. Second, there is also some welcome variety in his remarks on the sources of philosophical puzzlement. Whereas later he seems to have wished always to say that we are led into perplexities by, or by means of, language, here he envisages from time to time several evidently different ways in which we may be mis-led. Philosophers sometimes attempt to copy the procedures of scientists : often they are betrayed by pressing analogies too far : they are apt to operate too boldly with inflexible categories : they are liable to be hypnotized by mechanical models ; and in general they are prone to hastiness, over-tidiness, over-simplification. If so, a philosophical study of the workings of language will be valuable, not necessarily as leading to the source of philosophical problems in general, but at least as furnishing by example a uniquely powerful corrective to inveterate tendencies to mis-represent and to mis-assimilate. It is perhaps true, in any case, that the highest value of these works of Wittgenstein's lies, not primarily in the rightness of their particular doctrines, but rather in the formidable model they provide of fertility of suggestion, copiousness of illustration, inventiveness, flexibility, and ingenuity of argument. Philosophers should not spend all their time in knocking off each other's chains, any more than in taking in each other's washing. But in whatever direction or manner they may wish to proceed, they can profit from so powerful an example of freedom of movement.

<div style="text-align: right">G. J. WARNOCK</div>

Received also :—

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X.—NOTES

JOINT SESSION

Exeter University 8-10 July 1960

PROGRAMME

Friday 8 July   8 p.m.   Chairman : Professor H. L. A. Hart.
Inaugural Address by Professor D. J. O'Connor.

Saturday 9 July   10 a.m.   (a) Symposium : The notion of a propositional
function.
Chairman : Professor A. N. Prior.
Mr. A. H. Basson, Mr. T. S. Smiley.

(b) Symposium : Unconscious Perception.
Chairman : Professor A. C. Lloyd.
Mr. J. P. de C. Day, Mr. G. N A. Vesey.

8 p.m.   Symposium : Purpose and Intelligent Action.
Chairman : Professor C. A. Mace.
Mr. A. C. MacIntyre, Professor P. H. Nowell-Smith.

Sunday 10 July   10 a.m.   (a) Symposium : Determinants of Hypothesis.
Chairman : Mr. P. Alexander.
Mr. G. Buchdahl, Mr. H. G. Alexander.

(b) Symposium : Tragedy.
Chairman : Mr. Stuart Hampshire.
Mr. A. M. Quinton, Miss R. Meager.

8 p.m.   Symposium : How can one person be represented
by another?
Chairman : Mr. J. D. Mabbott.
Mr. A.P. Griffiths, Mr. R. Wollheim.

The British Museum set of MIND lacks the number for July 1951,
Volume LX, No. 239. If any member owns an unwanted copy, would he
communicate with Mr. J. L. Wood, Department of Printed Books, British
Museum, London W.C.1?

Would Mr. M. McGuire, formerly from 20th Engineering Battalion, Fort Devens, Mass., U.S.A., send the Editor his new address?

THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL CONGRESS

G. E. Moore Memorial Meeting

In honour of the Late Professor G. E. Moore, a Memorial meeting was held at the thirty-fourth Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress at the Utkal University, Cuttack, Orissa on December 30, 1959. The gathering honoured the memory of G. E. Moore by standing in silence for two minutes. The Indian pupils of G. E. Moore read papers on his philosophy. Professor G. C. Chatterjee, Vice-Chancellor of the University of Rajasthan and a former pupil of G. E. Moore presided and read his Presidential Address, while N. A. Nikam (Mysore) G. N. Mathrani (Bombay) and K. J. Shah (Karnataka University), former pupils of G. E. Moore read papers. Other Indian students of G. E. Moore but who were not his pupils also participated : Miss Divatia (Baroda) K. K. Banerjee (Jadhavpur University, Calcutta) and Rajendra Prasad (Putna).

MIND ASSOCIATION

Those who wish to join the Association should communicate with the Hon. Treasurer, Mr. J. D. MABBOTT, St. John's College, Oxford, to whom the yearly subscription of Twenty-five Shillings (payable in advance) should be sent. Cheques should be made payable to the Mind Association. Members may pay a Life Composition of £27 instead of the annual subscription. The annual subscription may be paid by Banker's Order; forms for this purpose can be obtained from the Hon. Treasurer.

The Hon. Secretary of the Association is Professor KARL BRITTON, Dept. of Philosophy, King's College, Newcastle-on-Tyne 1.

Members resident in U.S.A. are requested to pay the subscription ($4.00) to the Hon. Assistant-Treasurer, Professor B. Blanshard, Dept. of Philosophy, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Those who join the Association after previously buying MIND direct from the publishers or through a bookseller are asked to inform the Hon. Treasurer of this (and of the name of the bookseller) when they join.

The Gibson Philosophy Library has the following volumes of MIND for sale, unbound : 1938, 1941 and 1950-1958. The price is £1 sterling, plus cost of transport. Requests should go to D. M. Armstrong, Librarian, Philosophy Department, University of Melbourne, Australia.

ERRATUM

In the Members' List published in the January 1960 issue of MIND the address of Mr. William R. Pierron was wrongly given as in Fredericksburg. It should have read

2065, Alder St.,
Eugene,
Oregon, U.S.A.

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THE
REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS
A PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY
Edited by PAUL WEISS